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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the economic structure of Italy 
underwent radical changes. The country experienced a dramatic growth and became a 
fully-fledged industrialised nation. One thing, however, remained constant: the 
structural incapacity of the Italian productive system to absorb all available 
manpower. A high level of unemployment, firstly concentrated in agriculture and, 
later on, in the industrial sector, characterised the history of the country. Compared to 
the experience of other Western European economies, unemployment in Italy has 
been a troubling issue. After 1946, the average European unemployment rate never 
rose above 2.5%.1 In Italy by contrast, the rate of unemployment remained above 7% 
of the total active workforce well into the 1960s, when the surge of industrial growth 
reached its peak. At the dawn of the 1970s, when heightened worker conflict and the 
eruption of the energy crisis ended the economic boom of the post-war period, Italy 
had barely managed to reach full employment.2 
Despite a disturbingly persistent high number of people without work, the 
Italian system of social insurance against unemployment has been extremely lacking, 
providing only a meagre dole to those who lost or could not find a job. Rather than the 																																																								
1 Michael Mossey Postan, An Economic History of Western Europe 1945-1964 (New York: Routledge, 
1967), p. 62. 
2 Fabrizio Barca, ‘Compromesso senza riforme nel capitalismo italiano’, in Storia del Capitalismo 
Italiano dal dopoguerra ad oggi, ed. Fabrizio Barca (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 1997), 4-117, at pp. 35-
36; Elisa Farri and Chiara Farra, Italian labour forces and population 1959-2013 (Milano: Fondazione 
Rodolfo Debenedetti, 2015), retrieved from http://www.frdb.org/page/data-it/scheda/italian-labour-
forces-and-population-1959-2013/doc_pk/10987, 08/09/2018 at 18.19 GMT. 
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consolidation of insurance-based assistance schemes, Italy pursued a policy model 
where neither assistance nor guaranteed minimum income were present. The 
weakness of state structures, the widespread cronyism of its political elite and the 
socially fragmented class system hindered the creation of a universalistic system of 
welfare. Rather than conforming to the experience of its Western European partners, 
Italian social security has been characterised by many protection gaps and niches of 
privilege, and standard unemployment insurance (UI) remained severely 
underdeveloped well into the end of the twentieth century.  
To compensate for the deficiencies of its unemployment social policy, the 
country has relied on the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG), literally ‘wage 
supplementation fund’, more often translated by scholars as ‘redundancy fund’.3 
Rather than offering universal assistance to all the jobless, or a system of insurance to 
compensate all who lost their jobs, the scheme has provided a wage replacement 
allowance in order to compensate employees for a temporary reduction of their 
working time. The intervention of the CIG was restricted to the industrial sector and 
was not automatic, but only happened upon request of single troubled companies and 
authorised by ad hoc local commissions on a case-by-case basis. Most importantly, 
the workforce made redundant under the scheme was expected to be rehired, and 
formally maintained its employment relationship with the companies for the entire 
duration of income support. The CIG is officially classified as a short time work 
device – namely a public program intended to preserve jobs at firms experiencing 
temporary low demand due to business downturns - along the lines of schemes 
existing in other European countries, like Germany and Austria, whose Kurzarbeit is 
broadly similar.4  
Compared to its European counterparts, however, the CIG has progressively 
been adapted to compensate for the absence of other forms of support for the 
unemployed. The generosity of the scheme was progressively expanded and its 
eligibility criteria relaxed. By the end of the post-war economic boom, the CIG had 
become a permanent instrument of intervention to finance manpower redundancy not 																																																								
3 Unless otherwise stated, all translations from Italian are my own.  
4 See Tito Boeri, Herbert Bruecker, Nicola Fuchs-Schündein and Thierry Mayer, ‘Short-time work 
benefits revisited: some lessons from the Great Recession’, Economic Policy 26 (2011), 699-765; Hugh 
Mosley and Thomas Kruppe, ‘Short-time work in structural adjustment: European 
experience’, European Journal of Industrial Relations 2 (1996), 131-151; Stefano Sacchi, Federico 
Pancaldi and Claudia Arisi, ‘The Economic Crisis as a Trigger of Convergence? Short Time Work in 
Italy, Germany and Austria’, Social Policy and Administration 45 (2011), 465-487. 
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only during economic downturns, but also in cases of industrial restructuring, 
reconversion and company bankruptcy, serving to face the social consequences of the 
economic crisis of the 1970s and the onset of deindustrialisation in the 1980s. Since 
then, the CIG has represented the chief social policy instrument against 
unemployment in Italy, so much so that it has become a synonym for the dole.5 
Since the importance of the CIG firstly became apparent, a growing body of 
economic, juridical and sociological studies has developed to understand the 
multifaceted effects of short time work. However, the dualistic nature of the 
instrument and its very confused legislative development made it difficult to situate 
the CIG into the broader context of Italian social policy. Existing literature has either 
concentrated on the macroeconomic effects of the CIG or on the role it played in the 
Italian political dynamic of the post-war period. A closer look at how the evolution of 
Italian industrial relations influenced, and was influenced by, the development of 
unemployment social policy has been missing, or at least lacking.  The thesis will 
shed light on this connection, showing how the pattern of industrial conflict in post-
war Italy shaped the development of its segmented and corporatist system of 
unemployment benefits. The role played by the CIG in governing the factory shop 
floor has often been neglected. By contrast, its development can be understood as 
both a consequence of and a response to the trajectory of the Italian labour movement, 
which was characterised by an endemic weakness during the expansion of the Italian 
economy, and by an abnormal explosion of conflict following the recession of the 
1970s. More closely relating industrial conflict and the development of the welfare 
state offers a new account of why the Italian system of social security never 
developed a universal safety net against unemployment. Most importantly, it explains 
why the CIG emerged as an institutional response to the economic and social 
problems of the crisis of the 1970s, becoming thereafter a permanent feature of the 
Italian labour market.  
  
																																																								
5 Paolo Garonna, L'economia della cassa integrazione guadagni: teoria e funzioni degli interventi di 
integrazione salariale nella economia italiana (Padova: Università di Padova, 1984); Fiorella Padoa-
Schioppa, ‘Underemployment Benefit Effects on Employment and Income Distribution: What We 
Should Learn from the System of the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni’, Labour 2 (1988), 101-124; 
Leonello Tronti, ‘Employment Protection an Labour Market Segmentation: The Fiftieth Anniversary of 
the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni’, Labour 1 (1991), 121-145. 
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1. The puzzle of unemployment welfare in post-war Italy 
Up until the late 1930s, mass unemployment had remained an endemic social disease 
for the whole European continent and many governments across the continent 
struggled to promote employment-creation policies or set up comprehensive systems 
of social insurance to halt its advance.6 In pre-modern economies, joblessness per se 
did not represent an overarching threat to social stability. As argued by Topalov, 
economists and social scientists started to develop – ‘invent’ - the modern concept of 
unemployment, intended as involuntary and prolonged idleness, only towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, in conjunction with the spread of industrialisation and the 
rise of organised labour and socialist political movements across European nations.7  
Despite the early recognition of the political and social relevance of 
unemployment in dawning industrial societies, social assistance targeting joblessness 
took long to manifest. Policymakers and organised labour concentrated first on the 
introduction of work accidents and old age insurance mechanisms. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the first schemes of unemployment insurance were 
introduced in some European countries, mostly following the demobilisation after the 
First World War. However, unemployment social legislation remained piecemeal, as 
the welfare discourse was still consolidating in both ideological and policy terms. 
Only after the watershed of 1945, when the international context of the Cold War and 
the need for reconstruction forced governments to rein in social conflict, did the 
welfare state enter a phase of sustained expansion, with the development of a 
comprehensive system of social security. The post-war decades witnessed the growth 
of welfare programs across the board in almost all Western European countries.8 The 
growth of social policy was so central to this period that the welfare state has been 
unanimously considered an integral part of Fordism, the industrial and societal 
																																																								
6  Barry Eichengreen and T.J. Hatton, ‘Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective: an 
Overview’, in Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective, eds. Barry Eichengreen and T.J. 
Hatton (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1988), 1-51. 
7 Christian Topalov, ‘Invention du chômage et politiques sociales au début du siècle’, Les temps 
modernes 496-497 (1987), 53-92; Christian Topalov, Naissance du chômeur, 1880-1910 (Paris: Albin 
Michel, 1994). 
8 For a comprehensive overview see Stein Khunle and Anne Sander, ‘The Emergence of the Western 
Welfare State’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, eds. Francis G. Castles, Stephan 
Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 62-80; Frank Nullmeier and Franz‐Xaver Kaufmann, ‘Post-War Welfare State Development’, in 
The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, eds. Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, 
Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 81-104. 
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paradigm built around Keynesian demand management and industrial mass 
production, accompanied by a consensual industrial relations framework.9  
In Italy, however, the post-war period did not see any serious attempt to set up a 
comprehensive system of passive labour market policies to tackle the issue of 
unemployment. After having followed a similar trajectory of social welfare 
development as those of other Western European countries, the evolution of 
unemployment protection in Italy progressively diverged. In many respects Italy 
could be considered a pioneer in the development of unemployment insurance. As 
early as in 1919, the country introduced a system of compulsory insurance against 
involuntary unemployment to cope with the social strife that ensued after war 
demobilisation. This measure anticipated the British Unemployment Insurance Act of 
1920 and, despite earlier developments, also the German labour market reforms of 
1927.10 The advent of Fascism during the early 1920s represented an institutional 
watershed, but during the interwar years the new regime built on the legacy of the 
social policy framework introduced during the liberal period. Mussolini's government 
consolidated the municipal bases of welfare and modelled social policy on the male 
breadwinner family model fostered by fascist ideology.11 In the field of unemployment 
protection, however, the impact of Fascism was much less incisive. The Fascist 
government was forced to face the social aftershock of the 1929 crisis in a broadly 
similar fashion to other European countries. In 1933, Mussolini rationalised and 
centralised welfare administration in the newly created Istituto Nazionale della 
Previdenza Sociale (INPS), the National Institute for Social Insurance, and three years 
later led a comprehensive reform of unemployment insurance, tripling its daily 
amount.12 
																																																								
9 Michel Aglietta, A theory of capitalist regulation: the US experience (New York: Verso, 2000), pp. 
111-147; Ash Amin, ‘Post-fordism: Models, Fantasies and Phantoms of Transition’, in Post-fordism: a 
reader, ed. Ash Amin (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1994), 1-40; Michael J. Piore and Charles F. 
Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
10 Niccolò Serri, ‘La cassa integrazione guadagni e l’illusione del welfare nell’Italia del dopoguerra 
(1941-1968)’, Storia e problemi contemporanei 72 (2016), 119-138, at p.120. 
11 Maria Sophia Quine, Italy’s Social Revolution: Charity and Welfare from Liberalism to Fascism 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 304-305. 
12 In 1936, law n. 1155 led a comprehensive reform of unemployment insurance. The new regulation 
raised daily benefits to between 1.25 and 3.75 lire but restricted them to a maximum of 120 days. See 
Manfredi Alberti, Senza Lavoro. La disoccupazione in Italia dall’Unità ad oggi (Bari: Laterza, 2016), 
p. 102; Chiara Giorgi, La Previdenza del Regime. Storia dell’Inps durante il Fascismo (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2004); Stefano Vinci, ‘Social security legislation in Italy during fascism’, Revista Aequitas: 
Estudios sobre historia, derecho e instituciones 3 (2013), 389-398, at p. 395. 
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It is only after 1945 that the divergence between Italy's system of 
unemployment protection and that of other European nations became apparent. From 
the very beginning of the war, spiralling inflation rates rapidly eroded the value of 
unemployment benefits, which was set in nominal terms. The end of the conflict and 
the birth of the Republic did not bring forth any attempt at reform of unemployment 
insurance. Facing the dramatic social situation that followed war demobilisation, the 
new provisional government tried to tackle the mass of jobless through emergency 
measures and a temporary ban on workers dismissals.13  
The first reform of standard unemployment insurance, introducing a daily sum 
of 200 lire a day - still largely insufficient to meet the most basic needs of the 
unemployed - only came in 1949. The dominant paradigm was one of economic 
liberalism, based on inflation targeting, low wages and an export-oriented drive to 
fuel industrial growth. Despite the growing importance attached to the problem of 
unemployment in the Italian socio-political debate, attempts to improve the coverage 
of social insurance were thwarted.14 Well into the late 1950s, with the widespread 
approval in principle of the theory of public intervention, the problem of 
unemployment insurance remained largely neglected.15 By 1975, the replacement rate 
of unemployment insurance equated to less than 15% of the average blue-collar 
worker salary.  The lack of generosity of the Italian insurance system fell short of the 
official directives of the International Labour Organisation, which in 1952 had already 
ratified Convention C102, indicating a 45% replacement rate as the bare minimum for 
a functioning unemployment welfare system.16 
As the effectiveness of unemployment insurance dwindled, the CIG emerged to 
accommodate the need for continued social stability and the income maintenance of 
redundant workers. The scheme was first established in 1941 to cope with the 
frequent production stoppages and difficulties of procurement induced by the Second 
World War. Initially, the scheme was not devised to work as an income maintenance 																																																								
13 Giorgio Mori, ‘L’economia Italiana tra la fine della Seconda Guerra Mondiale e il “secondo miracolo 
economico” (1945-1958), in Storia dell’Italia Repubblicana. I. La costruzione della Democrazia. Dalla 
caduta del Fascismo agli anni Cinquanta, ed. Francesco Barbagallo (Torino: Einaudi, 1994), 131-230, 
at pp. 134-140. 
14 Nicola Crisci, ‘Legge n. 264 del 1949: mosaico legislativo’, Il Foro Italiano (1951), 69-70; Francesco 
Vito, ‘La sicurezza sociale ei suoi riflessi sulla formazione e sulla distribuzione del reddito 
nazionale’, Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali 21 (1949), 271-283. 
15 Franco Archibugi, ‘La politica di piano in Italia: tra il passato e l’avvenire’, Centro di studi e piani 
economici. Contributi occasionali 20 (1967), 7-33;  
16 Roberto Leonbruni, Adriano Paggiaro and Ugo Trivellato, ‘Per un pugno di euro. Storie di ordinaria 
disoccupazione’, Politica Economica, Journal of Economic Policy 1 (2012), 5-48, at p. 10. 
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system for the unemployed.17 Rather the CIG was an industrial policy device to help 
freeze companies’ internal labour markets, allowing employers to overstaff and 
suspend production, but only temporarily, thanks to the support of the redundancy 
fund. At the end of the war, the CIG was incorporated into the law of the new 
Republican State. The immediate purpose was that of easing the social effects of 
reconversion to peace production and support industrial overcapacity, particularly in 
the industrialised north of the country. 
At this stage, the CIG replaced only two thirds of a worker’s salary and its use 
was tightly restricted to ‘accidental and transient causes’, intervening only for 
production stoppages caused by ‘events independent of the employer’s and 
employees’ will’.18 This ruled out coverage for prolonged layoffs and made the CIG 
unsuitable in the event of structural or sector-wide economic crises. That became 
apparent in the mid-1950s, when the crisis of the textile industry in the northwest 
regions of the country forced policymakers to temporarily expand the generosity of 
the CIG.19  Many piecemeal legislative provisions were implemented to adapt the 
workings of the CIG to the evolution of the Italian economy, which in the meantime 
had experienced a dramatic industrial development in the years of the so-called 
Miracolo Economico20  
The real watershed in the evolution of the CIG came only towards the end of the 
1960s, when the scheme experienced a drastic shift in nature and its use witnessed an 
explosive growth that continued unabated for almost twenty years, reaching a peak in 
the mid-1980s. In 1968, a new law introduced the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
Straordinaria (CIG-S), a new structural ‘extraordinary’ short time work fund, while 
the previous one was re-labeled as Ordinaria (CIG-O). The new CIG scheme was 
more generous and longer in its duration, replacing four fifths of employee wages. Its 
management was tasked directly to the government, which supervised its functioning 
through an inter-ministerial committee with complete discretion over the authorisation 																																																								
17 Franco Carinci, ‘la disciplina della cassa Integrazione: evoluzione storica e interpretazioni dottrinali’, 
in Ristrutturazioni aziendali, cassa integrazione e licenziamenti collettivi, atti del convegno su 
‘licenziamenti per riduzione di personale e cassa integrazione, Bologna 29-29 aprile 1973, eds. Franco 
Carinci and Maria Vittoria Ballestrero (Celuc: Milano, 1974), 9-29, at pp. 10-13.  
18  Decreto Legislativo Luogotenenziale, 9 novembre 1945, n. 788, Istituzione della Cassa per 
l'integrazione dei guadagni degli operai dell'industria e disposizioni transitorie a favore dei lavoratori 
dell'industria dell'Alta Italia, Gazzetta Ufficiale, Serie Generale n. 155, 27/12/1945. 
19 Claudia Mazzi and Valentina Severino,‘Finalità e Funzioni della Cassa Integrazione Guadagni per gli 
operai dell'industria’, Previdenza Sociale 6 (1974), 1816-1868, at pp. 1826-1828. 
20 Vera Zamagni, Dalla Periferia al Centro: la seconda rinascita economica dell’Italia, 1861-1990 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), p. 431. 
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and length of the CIG-S. The new short work scheme was devised to cover a whole 
new array of economic and social risks, shifting the emphasis of public intervention 
from accidental shocks in production to structural factors in business dynamics. 
Indeed, the CIG-S could be requested by employers to finance even complete 
suspensions of working time due to firm restructuring and introduction of 
technological change, reorganisation of production and business cycle downturns in 
certain regions or industrial clusters.21  
The fact that the new scheme was completely financed by the state - compared 
to the CIG-O, which was funded by employer contribution - made the CIG-S an 
important driver of ‘liquidity’ of employment relations. 22 Firms resorted to short time 
not only in times of real crisis, but also as an expedient to ensure that even momentary 
losses in the profit rate could be discharged on the state via partial manpower 
redundancy.23 As the economic crisis of the country deepened, following the 1973 oil 
crisis, to cope with higher labour and production costs, employers started to resort to 
worker suspensions systematically. The discretionary rules and flexibility of short 
time work schemes allowed them to be used in cases of prolonged redundancy but 
also for shorter production stops, due to temporary market downturns and even 
industrial strikes and workplace micro-conflict. During the 1970s, the CIG-S was 
further expanded to meet the needs of an increasingly sclerotic industrial system. By 
the end of the decade, short time could be requested to provide income maintenance 
to workers also in cases of corporate crisis and bankruptcy, to disguise de facto 
permanent layoffs.24  
In the span of forty years, the CIG was overturned and drastically altered from 
the aims that had guided its original design. From an instrument of temporary 
intervention to finance labour hoarding, by the early 1980s, short time benefits had 
become a fully-fledged system of unemployment welfare, addressing the absence of 
other forms of insurance. The CIG was used to cushion the social effects of industrial 																																																								
21See Michele Miscione, ‘Cassa Integrazione: fattispecie e condizioni di intervento’, in Ristrutturazioni 
aziendali, cassa integrazione e licenziamenti collettivi, atti del convegno su licenziamenti per riduzione 
di personale e cassa integrazione, Bologna 29-29 aprile 1973, eds. Franco Carinci and Maria Vittoria 
Ballestrero (Milano: Celuc, 1974), 30-41. The 1968 law also introduced a special unemployment 
welfare scheme, the Trattamento Speciale di Disoccupazione, meant for workers left jobless due to the 
closing down of industrial firms. It paid two thirds of the previous salary for a duration of 180 days. 
22 Marco Dardi, ‘Contratti di lavoro, licenziamenti e cassa integrazione’, Rivista internazionale di 
scienze sociali 91 (1983), 375-401, at p. 395. 
23 Ibidem.  
24  Marina Schenkel and Maurizio Zenezini, ‘Alcuni aspetti della Cassa Integrazione Guadagni: 
un'analisi empirica’, Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali 94 (1986), 87-112, at p. 88. 
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restructuring, providing public financial assistance for employer manpower policies 
and targeting only the core industrial working class, while the weaker strata of the 
labour market were left with little or no support against joblessness. 
 
Fig. 1 authorised CIG hours (1965-1988)25 
 
 
2. The Italian case in comparative welfare state analysis 
Since the development of the comparative welfare state analysis, the literature tried to 
frame the peculiarity of the Italian welfare system in its wider international context. 
Initially, however, the academic debate understood the historical delays of social 
security in Italy – and more broadly in the Southern European semi-periphery – as a 
result of the relative backwardness and incomplete socio-economic development of 
the country. This led to a severe underestimation of the institutional and social 
peculiarities of Italian welfare history.  
Still at the end of the 1970s, the field of welfare studies was characterised by the 
opposition between two functionalist schools of thought: Modernisation theory, on the 
one hand, and Marxism, on the other. Despite their contrasting approaches and 
different political overtones, these two interpretations shared the incapacity to answer 
																																																								
25 Data are taken from yearly statements of the National Institute for Social Insurance, see INPS, 
Rendinconti dell’Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (Roma: INPS, 1966-1989). 
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the basic question of why similar industrialised market economies developed such 
different systems for welfare and social protection. 
Modernisation theory posed a direct link between welfare and economic growth, 
understanding social policy as a natural result of industrialisation. In 1950, a 
forefather of modern sociological theory, T. H. Marshall, linked the welfare state to 
the twentieth century emergence of industrial and social citizenship, which defined 
the set of public responsibilities that modern states have towards their citizens.26 This 
suggestion was taken up, in the 1960s, by both Kerr and Wilensky and Lebeaux, who 
argued that the emergence of the welfare state was dictated by the necessity to ensure 
the socialisation of the labour force to factory work and coping with the technological 
changes induced by industrialisation.27 
Early Marxist interpretations adopted a similarly static interpretation, but linked 
the development of social policy not to industrial society per se, but to the overall 
needs of the capitalist system. The rise of the welfare state was interpreted as an 
instrument for ‘the social control of the working class’, serving to ensure the 
continued social reproduction of labour power.28  The orthodox Marxist view of the 
welfare state as simply a repressive instrument for the regulation of labour strife was 
amended only towards the end of the 1960s with the recognition of the relative 
autonomy of the state vis-à-vis the interest of capital, in the work of Poulantzas and in 
the German ‘state derivation debate’.29 The recognition that the state did not always act 
in the immediate interests of the employers opened up to more nuanced 
interpretations, which stressed the inherent duality of the welfare state and understood 
it as a compromise between its social control function and the material gains it 
afforded to the working class.30 
The paradigm shift in comparative welfare state analysis came to fruition only 
towards the end of the 1970s, with the rise of Power Resource Theory (PRT). 																																																								
26 Thomas H. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, in The Welfare State Reader, eds. Christopher 
Pierson and Francis G. Castels (Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 2000), 30-40. 
27 Clark Kerr, Frederick H. Harbison, John T. Dunlop and Charles A. Myers, Industrialism and 
industrial man: The Problems of Labor and Management in Economic Growth (Cambridge US: 
Harvard University Press, 1960); Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial society and 
social welfare (New York: Free Press, 1966). 
28 Christopher Pierson, ‘Marxism and the Welfare State’, in Marxism and Social Sciences, eds. Andrew 
Gamble, David Mash and Tony Trant (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1999), 175-194, at p. 180. 
29 John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, ‘Towards a Materialist Theory of the State’, in State and Capital. A 
Marxist Debate, eds. John Holloway and Sol Picciotto (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), 1-31, at p. 19; 
Nicos Poulantzas, ‘The Problem of the Capitalist State’, New Left Review 58 (1969), 67-78, at p. 74.  
30 Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1984), pp. 35-65. 
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Similarly to Marxism, PRT stressed on the importance of social conflict and working 
class mobilisation. However, it rejected the view of the welfare state as simply a 
repressive instrument. 31  According to PRT, social policy reflects ‘class-related 
distributive conflicts and partisan politics’ and the degree of welfare protection 
afforded by single countries is directly proportional to the political resources 
mobilised by national working classes, through the proxy of left wing organisations 
such as political parties and unions. 32 The growth of social insurance was understood 
in stark opposition with market dynamics. Welfare - particularly unemployment 
insurance - performed a de-commodification role and served to insulate workers’ 
incomes from the fluctuations of the market.33   
The most comprehensive analysis based on PRT was carried out in 1990 by 
Esping-Andersen. He introduced the concept of national ‘welfare regimes’, 
recognising three varieties of welfare states: a liberal system based on means tested 
assistance typical of Anglo-Saxon countries, a social democratic regime typical of 
Scandinavian countries based on universal insurance for all social strata, and a 
conservative regime, characteristic of continental Europe, in which assistance is 
largely based on employment status. Esping-Andersen’s interpretation had the benefit 
of considering the role played by institutions and path dependency in history, showing 
how the different historical trajectories of advanced economies shaped the evolution 
of their social policy. However, he dismissed the southern European semi-periphery 
and considered only Italy, grouping it together with other countries in the 
conservative world of welfare capitalism, as an underdeveloped case characterised by 
more exacerbated forms of corporatism and ‘familism’.34   
The neglect of Esping-Andersen for the specificities of Mediterranean countries 
underscored a wider problem in applying a PRT perspective to Italian social policy. 
Although underdeveloped compared to other continental European countries, Italy 
had all the ingredients to develop a strong occupationally based system of 
unemployment insurance, since it had a forceful and relatively well-organised 																																																								
31 Walter Korpi, ‘Social policy and distributional conflict in the capitalist democracies. A preliminary 
comparative framework’, West European Politics 3 (1980), 296-316. 
32 Julia S. O’Connor and Gregg M. Olsen, ‘Understanding the Welfare State: Power Resource Theory 
and Its Critics’, in Power Resources Theory and the Welfare State: a critical approach, eds. Julia S. 
O’Connor and Gregg M. Olsen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 3-34, at p. 15;   
33  Lyle Scruggs and James Allan, ‘Welfare-state decommodification in 18 OECD countries: a 
replication and revision’, Journal of European Social Policy 16 (2006), 55-72. 
34 Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three World of Welfare Capitalism, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 1990), p. 112. 
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working class. Despite the sharp ideological divisions of its unions, the country had a 
robust labour movement, particularly from the mid-1960s onwards.35  The Italian 
Communist Party (PCI), while permanently marginalised from power, was the 
strongest in numerical terms among Western European countries.36 Concentrating only 
on the mobilisation capacity of the working class cannot account for the peculiarities 
of the Italian system of unemployment protection and evolution of the CIG, the 
abnormal use of which was a unicum in postwar Europe.  
PRT was credited with bringing the realm of politics back in and underlining the 
importance of interest groups in the formation of social policy. However, it did not go 
uncontested and has been challenged by, among others, employer-centred approaches, 
which tied the development of welfare states to the overall structure of national 
economies, understanding social policies as part of distinct ‘welfare production 
regimes’.37 While PRT underlined the role of traditional labour institutions, the new 
outlook put stress on employers’ coordination capacities as a key variable to 
understanding various political economic outcomes, including welfare.38 The so-called 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, in the works of Hall and Soskice, Isabella 
Mares and Torsten Iversen, explored the role of companies in shaping social policy, 
demonstrating that employers also have an important stake in the development of 
unemployment policies. Building upon Esping-Andersen's work, they argued that the 
difference between liberal (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) is 
crucial in accounting for institutional social policy divergence. In LMEs, the low 
degree of business coordination leads to high labour mobility and low levels of 
investment in firm level training. In this context, employers have little stake in the 
development of comprehensive unemployment protection and tight dismissal laws, as 
workers have general skills and are easily replaceable. In CMEs, by contrast, the more 
centralised organisation of business interests and the higher investment in workers’ 																																																								
35  Lucio Baccaro and Valeria Pulignano, ‘Employment Relations in Italy’, in International and 
Comparative Employment Relations, eds. Nick Wailes, Gregg J. Bambury, Russel D. Lansbury and 
Chris Wright (New York: Sage, 2010), 138-168, at p. 147. 
36 Ida Regalia, ‘Le Politiche del Lavoro’, in Welfare all’Italiana, ed. Ugo Ascoli (Bari: Laterza, 1984), 
53-86, at p. 67; Emilio Reyneri, ‘The Italian Labour Market: between State Control and Social 
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Regini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 129-147.  
37  Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, ‘Welfare State and Production Regimes in the Era of 
Retrenchment’, in The New Politics of the Welfare State, ed. Paul Pierson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 107-145. 
38 Kathleen Thelen and Ikuo Kume, ‘Coordination as a political problem in coordinated market 
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companies-specific skills make a developed system of unemployment insurance more 
palatable to employers. In order to prevent poaching and inter-firm competition, 
unemployment insurance is more generous and job protection law stronger.39 Italy was 
considered by the early VoC literature as an example of CME typical of continental 
Europe. The country was characterised by strong employee protection and tight 
dismissal laws, while the Italian vocational training system scored much higher than 
either the United Kingdom or the United States - usually given as textbook examples 
of LMEs. This should have thus led to the development of unemployment insurance 
to prevent excessive inter-company worker mobility, but that was not the case. 
Employer-centred perspectives cannot fully account either for the deficiencies of 
standard insurance or highlight the reasons why unemployment protection in Italy was 
taken over by the CIG. Indeed, the most recent VoC literature has recognised that the 
country has a very low degree of institutional coherence and has given up on fitting it 
neatly into the categories of LME and CME, accepting that Italy represents somewhat 
of a political economy hybrid.40  
In general, mainstream literature on the sociology of the welfare state suffered 
from its incapacity to read the historical specificities of Italy. The rapid industrial 
surge and the process of political democratisation that characterised the post-war 
decades made scholars marginalise the specific character of the institutions and class 
structure of Southern European countries and simply regard them as latecomers. 
Building upon the insights of the international comparative approach, a more focused 
literature developed to make sense of Italian institutional anomalies, framing them 
within the larger context of a fourth Mediterranean model of welfare capitalism.41 In 
the mid-1980s, both Ascoli and Ferrera, from different angles, pointed out the fact 
that the ‘socio-political etiquette’ of the Italian welfare state is intrinsically different 
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from that of other corporatist economies in the north of Europe.42 The Italian welfare 
system does replicate the dualism typical of conservative/coordinated welfare 
regimes, differentiating between an extremely protected core and a marginal fringe of 
the labour market lacking a significant safety net. However, it does so to a much 
higher degree than other countries, where the spread between the benefits of different 
occupational categories is smaller. Furthermore, a great deal of financial 
fragmentation characterises the Italian welfare system. The ratios of contributions and 
expenditures differ widely across professional categories and economic sectors. 43 The 
result is a social insurance system based on a weak institutional edifice, characterised 
by the coexistence of niches of privilege and huge gaps in protection, where the 
institution of the family has traditionally offered an informal safety net to compensate 
for the shortcomings of official welfare.44  
An important stream in the literature sought to analyse the weakness of Italian 
social policy in light of the competitive mechanics of Italy’s democracy. The absence 
of a ‘Weberian bureaucracy’ and the institutionally fragmented system of social 
provision allowed the ruling Christian Democracy Party (DC) to distribute resources 
to clienteles and interest groups. On the other side of the political spectrum, the 
presence of a strong Italian Communist Party (PCI), allowed it to concentrate on the 
narrow protection of its constituencies at the expenses of a more moderate Italian 
Socialist Party (PSI). This resulted in the growth of a pension-heavy, financially 
distorted welfare system. 45 
Most recently, Georg Picot linked the fragmentation of the country’s 
unemployment insurance to the ‘polarised pluralism’ that characterised the party 
system of the country. Throughout the post-war period, the DC constantly occupied 
the political centre of the Parliament, leaving anti-systemic parties on the left to 
occupy the margins of the political space.46 Traditional PRT theories, as articulated by 																																																								
42 Maurizio Ferrera, ‘The Southern Model of Welfare in Social Europe’, Journal of European Social 
Policy 6 (1996), 17-37, at p. 29. 
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Regalia and Reyneri in regard to the Italian case, argued that the shortcomings of the 
Italian system of unemployment welfare were a direct result of the ostracism of the 
left and the authoritarian system of industrial relations that prevailed in the country 
during the 1950s.47  Picot turns this argument on its head: the need to secure electoral 
consensus and the pressure to repel the opposition created a context in which the DC 
chased after the proposals of the left.  The workerist bias of the PCI concentrated on 
campaigning for public labour market administration and employment promotion 
strategies, rather than on the protection of the unemployed per se, which would have 
been equated to an acceptance of the dynamic of a capitalist labour market.48   
Another literature stream sought to understand the rudimentary character of 
Italian unemployment welfare by linking it more closely to the needs of the national 
economy, and particularly to the specific context of the rapid industrialisation 
experienced in the country during the 1950s and early 1960s. As argued by Carlo 
Vercellone and others, mostly from the Marxist standpoint, the deprivation of the 
welfare state of its canonical pillar of unemployment compensation served to support 
the structural change of the country towards industry and favoured the establishment 
of a particularly regimented system of industrial relations. High unemployment and a 
poorly developed unemployment safety net exercised a downward pressure on wages, 
fuelling the industrial growth of the country. On the supply side, this resulted in a 
highly competitive labour market. As such, the extremely weak system of 
unemployment benefits played into the hands of the discretionary power of the 
employers, favouring the establishment of a particularly harsh and authoritarian mode 
of factory discipline. While the years of the post-war period might be remembered as 
a time of economic growth and wide social improvement, the workers' memories of 
the factories are of bodily searches, political and unions filings, discriminatory 
practices at the shop floor level and tight piecemeal work rates.49 
Even within the context of tightly focused works on the Italian welfare model, 
the CIG received only marginal attention. Most of the early works remained 
piecemeal accounts that concentrated on the effects of the CIG, rather than 																																																								
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questioning the nature of the institution and the political economy behind it.50 With the 
exception of an important 1958 study by Cerchi, the first attempts at a modern 
historiography of the CIG can be traced to the mid-1970s.51 In 1974, the publishing 
house affiliated with the communist leaning union Confederazione Generale Italiana 
del Lavoro (CGIL) published a pamphlet by Stefanelli on the ‘history and problems’ 
of the CIG, tracing the evolution of the Italian short time benefit system, arguing that 
its objectives varied between the need of the employers to discharge labour costs and 
that of the state to ensure local public order. 52  Regalia further articulated this 
perspective in a 1978 article in the pages of the journal of the left-wing publisher 
Feltrinelli. She stated that the main features of the CIG and its usage throughout the 
post-war period had been dependent on two variables: ‘the balance of power in 
industrial relations’ and the need to favour income maintenance for political 
consensus.53 In 1975, Biagio Longo had already stressed the connection between short 
time benefits and unions’ mobilisation on the pages of the radical left journal Primo 
Maggio. He underlined the importance of the CIG as an instrument of economic 
policy but highlighted also its repressive role in quelling down strikes and social 
turmoil, acting as an ‘employers’ lockout’.54 
During 1970s, the most important analyses of the CIG came from social 
scientists ideologically associated with organised labour and the Left. In the 1980s, 
instead, the main works were offered by jurists and economists, in the context of a 
public debate for a reform of the CIG - the profligacy of which was taking an 
increasing toll on public finances. Garonna, Brunetta and D’Harmant, Padoa Schioppa 
and Tronti, underlined the dual nature of the CIG, simultaneously an instrument of 
industrial and welfare policy, but also offered the first periodization of the history of 
the short time benefit system in Italy, tracking the confused normative development 
that had made it a surrogate of unemployment welfare. All authors identified an initial 																																																								
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phase, coinciding with the years of post-war economic growth, in which the CIG’s 
main function was that of allowing labour hoarding and temporary layoffs.55  
This was followed by a period, between the mid-1960s and the end of the 
1970s, in which the CIG’s scope was expanded in many directions, often overlapping 
one another with no clear institutional design. Tronti identified as many as five policy 
targets of the CIG during the economic uncertainty of the 1970s: a social shock 
absorber to manage work-time reduction; an instrument to externalize company 
reorganisation costs; an income maintenance system for the government to secure 
workers’ earnings in a period of low labour demand; a disguise for dismissal, 
allowing a permanent reduction of production; an instrument for covering worker 
costs connected to re-employment and job search.56  
In the third phase, starting in the 1980s, as Italian industry faced structural 
downsizing, short time work became de facto an unemployment protection device, 
abandoning its industrial policy function. All authors linked the evolution of the CIG 
to the macro-economic performance of the Italian economy during the post-war 
period, implementing an insider-outsider perspective to show how the CIG fostered 
extreme labour market segmentation, as an overly protected core industrial working 
class preserved their jobs while access was impeded for the marginal fringes of the 
labour market.57  
The domestic literature has had the benefit of placing Italian specificity in 
context, avoiding easy international comparisons that escape a detailed explanation of 
the anomalies of the country’s social policy. However, it has done so by concentrating 
almost exclusively on the institutional aspect of social insurance development, 
without taking into consideration the relations between the country’s welfare system 
and its labour market. Scholars tried to understand the specifics of the country's social 
policy by concentrating either on the dynamic of its political system or on the 
macroeconomic functions performed by welfare policies, ignoring how elements of 
labour organisation and industrial relations might have influenced the development of 
unemployment policy. Only seldom they considered the role effectively played by 																																																								
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organised interest groups in shaping the evolution of the CIG, neglecting how 
policymakers, firms and trade unions perceived and exploited this instrument. The 
insights of the 1970s literature on the connection between short time benefits and 
industrial relations remained unexplored. 
 
 
3.	Methodology	and	sources:	between	institutionalism	and	factory	history	
The lack of substantial historiographical work on Italian unemployment welfare 
policy has so far constrained the debate into the realm of comparative political 
science. In turn, this has led the analyses to focus almost exclusively on the 
institutional aspect of social policy development, neglecting the impact that 
unemployment welfare has had on the Italian labour market and industrial relations. 
Despite its overall importance in the system of unemployment protection, the CIG 
represents a conundrum. Because of its confused legislative development and the 
difficulty framing it within the existing interpretation of Italian welfare, few scholars 
have considered the scheme.58 The narrow institutional viewpoint of comparative 
welfare state analysis proved ill-suited to capture its functioning: The decision making 
process behind management of short time was highly arbitrary and made it possible to 
interpret the law in a very discretionary way, relaxing provisions so they would fit the 
needs of social actors on the ground. The CIG authorisation procedure was managed 
by local and central commissions composed of employers’ and unions’ 
representatives. In order to understand the effects of the CIG and the context that 
drove the demands for its progressive reform, it is thus necessary to better situate it 
within the dynamic of workplace industrial relations. 
The lesson of historical institutionalism - as developed by authors such as 
Thelen and Pierson - is key to avoid the methodological conundrums of existing 
welfare state analysis.59 The outlook of historical institutionalism, in fact, does not 
																																																								
58 Barbano Filippo (Ed.), L'Ombra del Lavoro, Profili di Operai in Cassa Integrazione (Milano: Franco 
Angeli, 1987). 
59 Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, ‘Historical institutionalism in contemporary political science’, in 
Political science: the state of the discipline, eds. Ira Katznelson, Helen V. Milner and Ada W. Finifter 
(New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2002), 693-721; Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism 
in Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999), 369-404. 
29		
understand institutions as ‘variables’ operating in a vacuum.60 Rather, it defines them 
as concrete object of historical change, taking into consideration elements of path 
dependency and the legacies of the past to explain their evolution. The assumption 
that the objects of historical study ‘change, adapt and are affected by history itself’, in 
particular, is a fruitful one: elements of contingency and ‘the interaction of 
interdependent variables over time’ are crucial to understanding the development of 
the CIG, a policy instrument that has been shaped by the complex relation between 
the state, capital and labour, affected not only by economic factors but also by 
different cultural understandings of industrial work and employment.61 Functionalist 
perspectives take institutions as the simple result of the social forces on the ground at 
any given point in time. Historical institutionalism, by contrast, adopts a dialectical 
approach that is able to show not only how organised interests sought to influence the 
development of social policy, but also how they were, in turn, affected by it. 
Complementing a strictly institutional analysis with the history of how the CIG was 
perceived and used makes it possible to better understand the specificity of the Italian 
unemployment welfare regime.   
Shifting the focus from the domain of high politics into the micro level of 
workplace history can open new pathways.62 By looking at how short time work was 
perceived and used on the industrial shop floor, it is possible to gauge the driving 
motives behind its intervention and understand its role in the dynamic of labour 
relations. The frequency with which employers resorted to the CIG - particularly after 
the energy crisis of 1973 - made it a mainstay into the managerial politics of 
production. Short time was used systematically to influence the structure of factory 
work, intervening to regulate the pace of production and counter the effects of rising 
worker conflict, serving to suspend workers during strikes on the factory shop floor. 
By constantly modifying production levels and workforce numbers, the CIG helped to 
disarticulate the rigid rules of Fordist manufacturing, effectively lessening the 																																																								
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vulnerability of the factory system to external shocks and labour disruptions. The 
traces of the relationship between the organisational logic of industrial capitalism and 
the CIG would be lost if the analysis concentrated solely on the macro level of 
welfare institutional development. A micro-historical survey investigating how short 
time influenced the everyday working of the factory is better suited to bring to light 
the dynamic of interaction between welfare and industrial manpower policies.  
The factory, as a place where economics, politics and workers’ everyday lives 
conflate, is the focus most suited for a study of social policy that takes into 
consideration its effects on the social relations of production. As argued by Burawoy, 
the labour process is structured by a practical aspect, but also by a ‘relational one’, the 
so-called ‘relations in production’, namely the ‘relations of the shop floor into which 
the workers enter, both with one another and management’, characterised by a high 
degree of informality.63 Nesting the study of Italian unemployment welfare within 
workplace industrial relations can not only help to better specify the different usages 
of the CIG, but it can also highlight the concrete policy preferences of organised 
interest groups and the social context that drove its reform. In turn, analysing the 
influence of the welfare state on the factory shop floor can help us better understand 
the complex life of the factory as a social body and illuminate neglected aspects of 
worker contention. 
The methodological shift is not only theoretical; it involves a new approach to 
archival sources. Traditional historiographical accounts of Italian welfare mostly 
concentrated on State archives, tracking the development of social policy through the 
papers of the INPS and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, thus favouring the 
perspective of policymakers. In order to understand the industrial and social milieu in 
which legislative and administrative procedures were undertaken, however, it is 
necessary to deepen the view, highlighting the outlook of organised interest groups. 
To do so, the thesis complements traditional institutional and press sources with the 
archives of the Confindustria, the national Italian employers association, and those of 
the main trade unions, at the national, but especially at local level.  
Getting access to the papers of regional and plant-level unions is indeed crucial 
to understanding how the CIG operated within workplace relations of production. The 																																																								
63  Michael Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent. Changes in the Labour Process under Monopoly 
Capitalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 15. 
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1970s witnessed the strengthening of trade unions at the national level, but also a 
decentralisation of industrial relations bargaining with the consolidation of plant-
based factory councils. These became labour’s negotiating front end on most factory 
issues and provide an invaluable standpoint to understand the effects of the CIG on 
the everyday life of the shop floor. This thesis will thus also rely on the archives of 
local and sector unions, particularly in the automobile sector of the Italian North-
West, which represented the fulcrum of industrialisation of the country and key test-
bed for the evolution of Italian industrial relations. The local archives of the 
metalworker sector unions, affiliated with the communist and Christian national 
unions, in Turin, Milan and Naples, store the papers of some of the major factories of 
the country, among which those of FIAT and Alfa Romeo. As a result of the 
examination of these records, it is possible to demonstrate not only how workers and 
workplace stewards perceived the problem of short time suspensions and redundancy, 
but also how managers utilised the CIG to govern the factory shop floor. 
 
4. Welfare and industrial conflict 
The shift from institutional macro-history to the micro-history of the industrial shop 
floor highlights the importance of the evolution of industrial relations to the 
explanation of social policy. Indeed, the main argument of this thesis is that the 
peculiar characteristics of the Italian unemployment welfare model can be related to 
the country’s pattern of industrial conflict. Compared to the experience of other 
Western European countries, the history of post-war Italian industrial relations has 
demonstrated a very skewed trend, with the initial marginalisation of the labour 
movement, until the mid-1960s, followed by the unchecked expansion of its militancy 
and influence during the 1970s. 64   This can not only provide an explanation for the 
relative narrowness of Italian unemployment social policies – as in power resource 
approaches – but might also explain why the system was not reformed in a more 
universalistic direction after the 1973 oil crisis, leading instead to the unilateral 
expansion of the CIG.  
In Italy, the immediate post war period was characterised by the weakness of 
the labour movement and by a very authoritarian system of industrial relations. Still at 																																																								
64Maximos Aligisakis, ‘Labour Disputes in Western Europe: Typology and Tendencies’, Internatonal 
labour Review 136 (1997), 73-94. 
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the beginning of the 1950s, most of the Italian workforce was tied to agriculture. Mass 
production was assumed as a ‘mythopoiesis’ of Italian industrial reconstruction after 
the war, embodying the modernisation desires of the country’s political elite. 65  Yet, 
the diffusion of large factories based on Fordist industrial organisation remained 
modest up until the late 1950s.66 This hampered the socialisation of the labour force to 
industrial work and slowed down the organisational build-up of the trade unions, still 
divided between the Communist leaning CGIL, on the one hand, and the more 
moderate Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL) and Unione Italiana 
Lavoratori (UIL), affiliated respectively to the DC and the PSI. While Western 
European countries, to a different degree, managed to integrate working class 
constituencies into their polities, in Italy the labour movement was excluded from 
actual policymaking.67  The fragile bargaining position of the unions and a financially 
weak state, which was investing all of its resources into the reconstruction effort, 
hampered the development of a broad system of unemployment insurance, leading 
instead to the progressive expansion of the CIG. Short time offered a leaner and more 
targeted social shock absorber, allowing welfare intervention on local industrial crises 
without creating a context of universal rights for unemployment that would have 
burdened state coffers. 
The repeated usage of short time throughout the reconstruction and the phase of 
post-war economic growth entrenched the CIG into the Italian institutional edifice, 
creating a path dependence effect. At the end of the 1960s, when the increase in 
industrial conflict finally projected the unions into the political arena, it did so by 
strongly emphasising their adversarial elements. The spread of large factories, 
growing urbanisation and migration flows sustained a process of politicisation among 
blue-collar workers. As the country hovered towards full employment, the end of 
1969 was marked by the sudden and unregulated rise of labour strife.68 The magnitude 
of the so-called ‘Hot Autumn’ led to an overhaul of the Italian industrial relations 
																																																								
65 Pietro Causarano, ‘La fabbrica fordista e il conflitto industriale’, in Storia del Lavoro in Italia, il 
Novecento 1945-2000, ed. Stefano Musso (Rome: Castelvecchi, 2015), 59-101, at p. 71. 
66 Duccio Bigazzi, La grande fabbrica: organizzazione industriale e modello americano alla Fiat dal 
Lingotto a Mirafiori (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2000), p. 179. 
67 Aris Accornero, La parabola del sindacato. Ascesa e declino di una cultura (Bologna: il Mulino, 
1992), pp. 50-51. 
68 Nicola Pizzolato, Challenging Global Capitalism. Labour Migration, Radical Struggle, and Urban 
Change in Detroit and Turin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 47-117. 
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system.69  A growing radical rank and file found its voice in the establishment of 
factory councils, which increased bottom-up democracy within official unions and 
fostered their radicalisation on bargaining and policy issues. At the organisational 
level, the renewed strength of the labour movement translated into greater unity, with 
the three main unions agreeing in 1972 to constitute a common federation: CGIL-
CISL-UIL, which lasted until 1984. As the bargaining strength of the unions grew, 
organised labour re-cast itself as a ‘political subject’, demanding the reform of 
existing labour law and social policy, trying to cover for the lack of redistributive 
reforms of the previous decades.70 Already in May 1970, the Parliament had passed the 
Statuto dei Lavoratori (Workers Statute), a new law to protect employees’ rights to 
political expression, preventing employers from conducting investigations and 
arbitrary firings, while the unions also increased their activism on issues ranging from 
healthcare to public housing.71  
When it came to unemployment welfare, however, organised labour neglected 
social insurance. By the early 1970s, the labour market was almost at full employment 
and the workforce was now decidedly concentrated in the industrial sector. This led 
organised labour to favour a social policy system targeted towards its core working 
class constituencies: the CIG would safeguard not only their income but also their 
social identity and jobs. Compared to the automatic mechanism of unemployment 
insurance, short time benefits helped strengthen the bureaucratic power of the unions, 
enhancing their gatekeeping role through their representatives in provincial and 
central CIG commissions.  In no small part, organised labour’s policy preferences 
were pushed towards the CIG by a dynamic of intra-left competition. In various ways, 
the radical worker groups that emerged during the Hot Autumn recognised themselves 
in the current of Operaismo - or ‘workerism’, which theorised the social centrality of 
salaried labour - and demanded a complete guarantee on existing jobs.72 As the Italian 
economy slowed after 1973, with the first foreclosures of factories starting to threaten 
the rank and file, the competition for consensus led the unions to embrace the more 																																																								
69 Diego Giachetti, L’Autunno Caldo (Roma: Ediesse, 2013); Bruno Trentin, Autunno caldo: il secondo 
biennio rosso 1968-1969 (Roma: Editori riuniti, 1999). 
70 Marino Regini, I dilemmi del sindacato: conflitto e partecipazione negli anni Settanta e Ottanta 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1981), p. 66. 
71 Emanuele Stolfi, Da una parte sola. Storia politica dello statuto dei lavoratori. Prefazione di Gino 
Giugni (Milano: Longanesi, 1976). 
72 Steve Wright, Storming heaven. Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism 
(London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 98. 
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radical proposals of autonomous worker groups, seeking to make industrial wages an 
‘independent variable’ of the economic system, insulating them through the protection 
afforded by CIG. 73 
The ebbs and flows of industrial conflict in post-war Italy help to account for 
the segmentation and occupational bias of the country’s system of unemployment 
welfare. The initial weakness of the unions, followed by the unchecked growth of 
their political influence and mobilisation capacity in the early 1970s explains why 
organised labour favoured a rigid system of social protection for its core 
constituencies. The relationship between industrial conflict and the evolution of 
unemployment welfare, however, is not one of simple correlation. Even if we factor in 
the timing of labour outbursts and the pattern of trade union mobilisations, explaining 
the increasing usage of the CIG as a direct result of the rise in organised labour’s 
power, we would be assuming a deterministic perspective of historical change.  The 
Italian short time work system was deeply shaped by the demands for employment 
security coming from bottom-up worker demands, but the reverse holds true as well.  
Rather than simply being a social policy instrument to counter unemployment 
and favour the de-commodification of labour, the CIG has also played a key part in 
quelling industrial conflict and cushioning its effects on the organisation of 
production. The expansion of the CIG during the crisis of the 1970s answered well-
founded social concerns, but also represented the regulative response of an 
increasingly rigid industrial system, overly reliant on labour intensive strategies, to 
the challenges posed by industrial conflict.74 Indeed, the CIG proved an invaluable 
instrument for employers to control the factory shop floor, allowing the absorption of 
the cost of strikes, marginalising the most riotous workers and intervening in working 
shifts and production levels without bearing the financial costs of such changes. 75  
Short time was often used to suspend workers during strikes and, in times of crisis, 
temporary redundancies offered a way for managers to put pressure on the rank and 
file, bypassing the tighter regulation on layoffs introduced by the Workers Statute. 																																																								
73 Duccio Cavalieri, Scienza economica e umanesimo positivo: Claudio Napoleoni e la critica della 
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Review 81 (1991), 565-579.  
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Without seeking to explain the CIG as both a result and a response to the non-
governability of the shop floor, it would be impossible to understand why 
Confindustria was an active driver in the expansion of short time benefits, preferring 
them over unemployment insurance, as the CIG allowed better control over the 
industrial workforce and financial incentives to carry out industrial restructuring and 
manpower redundancies.76   
Underlining the socially repressive use of short time work is also important to 
explain why, at the turn of the 1980s, the CIG shifted its gears: while the aim of short 
time work remained that of industrial flexibility, the nature of its intervention became 
more unilateral, directly targeting the bases of political mobilisation in the workplace 
and leading to the permanent exclusion of workers from the factories. The decade was 
marked by a qualitative change in Italian industrial relations, with the employers’ 
taking back political initiative on the shop floor, while the CGIL-CISL-UIL federation 
and its most militant sector categories lost consensus and fragmented, leading to the 
demise of the united labour front in 1984.77 As underlined by Beverly Silver, the 
decline of organised labour was an international trend: the wave of de-
industrialisation, business relocation and technological innovation altered the social 
landscape of all advanced economies, leading to an unprecedented surge of 
unemployment and putting the unions on the back foot.78 In Italy, the CIG became the 
kernel of these concomitant processes, linking industrial restructuring with the 
targeted expulsion of the labour force.  
Italian labour history has widely investigated the causes behind the demise of 
the country’s unions during the early 1980s. Factory councils underwent a process of 
bureaucratisation, with the official unions taking over at the expenses of the stewards 
directly elected by the rank and file, drying up the bottom-up democracy of plant-
level worker representation. As the crisis deepened, towards the second half of the 
1970s, organised labour was at odds with how to reconcile the need to foster 
employment creation policies with that of ensuring the protection of real wages in the 
industrial sector. Stuck within an insider-outsider dilemma between the unemployed 
and the core industrial working class constituencies, Italian unions lost consensus. 																																																								
76 Longo, ‘Meno Salario, più Reddito’, p. 24. 
77 Aris Accornero, ‘La disunione sindacale’, il Mulino, Rivista bimestrale di cultura e di politica 2 
(2003), 229-238, at p. 229. 
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Many scholars pointed at the perverse effects of the system of wage indexation to 
inflation, the so-called Scala Mobile, introduced in 1975 under the political pressures 
of the most radical fringes of organised labour. The automatic nature of the monetary 
increases introduced by the new system made practical wage bargaining redundant, 
weakening the raison d'être of the unions and alienating the sympathies of the most 
skilled workers.79  
In this context, most historians considered the unprecedented surge of the CIG 
in the 1980s a consequence of the brittleness of organised labour, which could not 
muster the organisational strength to resist the layoffs demanded by the employers. 
Looking at the way in which short time work influenced the factory shop floor, 
however, shows that the CIG was a cause as much as an effect of the weakening of 
organised labour, precipitating its crisis of consensus. The narrow targeting and 
generousness of the CIG - compared to the lack of protection afforded by 
unemployment insurance - extremised the inside-outsider dilemma. The unions and 
their members started to be perceived as ‘overly protected’ caste, even within the 
ranks of the Left.80 On a deeper level, the massive use of short time suspensions 
disarticulated the workings of factory councils inside large factories. As organised 
labour progressively lost control over managerial manpower policies, the CIG started 
systematically targeting union stewards and the most radical fraction of the rank and 
file, depriving factory councils of key personnel and social capital, impairing their 
capacity to resist further rounds of redundancy and accelerating the crisis of organised 
labour.81  
In sum, the connection between industrial conflict and the evolution of the 
Italian unemployment protection system is dialectical, characterised by many push 
and pull factors that make the relation between worker mobilisation, managerial 
strategies and the use of unemployment welfare a complex one. More closely 
examining how the history of labour relations and industrial conflict shaped and was 																																																								
79Michele Magno, ‘La sconfitta del movimento operaio e la ristrutturazione capitalista degli anni 
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shaped by the development of social policy provides a new explanation for the history 
of Italian welfare, recognising its intrinsic duplicity and multifaceted effects on the 
world of industrial work.  
 
 
5. Synopsis 
The structure of the dissertation follows a chronological order, tracking the evolution 
of the CIG through various stages of Italian history. The first chapter takes into to 
consideration the first three decades of the post-war period, from 1941, when the CIG 
was first introduced, until the end of the 1960s. It will show why policymakers and 
organised interest groups preferred short time work benefits to unemployment 
insurance during the reconstruction years and will consequently track the way in 
which the CIG was progressively used out of its original industrial policy boundaries, 
until the introduction of the CIG-S in 1968. In doing so, the chapter will question the 
applicability to the Italian case of the concept of a post-war social contract, showing 
instead how the peculiarities of the Italian unemployment social policy are related to 
the marginalisation and failed political integration of organised labour.  
The second chapter will take into consideration the period between 1968 and the 
beginning of 1973, shifting the focus to the industrial shop floor to investigate the role 
played by short time benefits into the worker protest cycle inaugurated by the Hot 
Autumn. Looking at the troubled evolution of industrial relations in the major car 
factories of the period, FIAT and Alfa Romeo, the chapter will show how employers 
sought to make use of the CIG-O as a repressive device to quell the unprecedented 
surge of labour unrest and solve the industrial organisation strains of mass production.  
The third chapter will take into consideration the period between the autumn of 
1973 and the beginning of 1975, concentrating on the strains the energy crisis brought 
on the Italian welfare state, highlighting the outlook of organised labour on the reform 
of unemployment social policy. Faced with the threat of redundancy and pressed by 
the competition of autonomous worker groups, organised labour embraced the radical 
proposals for a general strengthening of the CIG and greater bottom-up control over 
its allocation. The chapter will track how the demand for a ‘guaranteed wage’ 
emerged at the plant-level in the metalworking sector and was eventually adopted by 
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the national union federation, becoming the cornerstone of an important agreement 
with Confindustria at the beginning of 1975.82 
The fourth chapter will take into consideration the period between 1975 and the 
end of the 1970s, showing how the country's worsening economic crisis and the 
spread of the CIG-S undermined the consensus within organised labour, exposing the 
inherent contradiction between protecting the core working class inside the factories 
and foster employment creation policies for the growing mass of unemployed. The 
chapter will show how the management of redundancies came to be dominated by a 
system of imperfect corporatism in which organised labour accepted tying manpower 
policies to business market outcomes, but failed to obtain new employment creation 
investments in exchange. In large part, this failure was due to the weakness of state 
institutions, at the local and central level, lacking an enforcement mechanism to 
uphold the industrial relation bargain and put forward a proactive industrial policy, 
instead of simply attempting to freeze workforce levels in unproductive industries via 
short time.  
The fifth and last chapter will take into consideration the decade of the 1980s, 
starting in October 1980, when the carmaker FIAT made the momentous decision to 
resort to the CIG-S for tens of thousands of its employees, which drastically altered 
the panorama of Italian industrial relations.83 The chapter will highlight how the 
unilateral decision of the company, soon followed by other big companies, configured 
the CIG as a de facto unemployment subsidy. This section will show how the massive 
use of short time impaired the workings of factory councils and curtailed their 
bargaining strength. It will offer new data to account for the discriminatory use of the 
CIG to target the most politicised employees. Furthermore, it will bring new evidence 
to investigate the rift that opened up between the workers who remained in production 
and the workers in CIG, the so-called cassaintegrati. 
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1. The political economy of Italian unemployment 
welfare, 1941-1968 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 The post-war social contract in Italy 
The first chapter will reconstruct the history of the Italian unemployment welfare 
system from the Second World War until the end of the 1960s. It will track the 
process through which the CIG was born and progressively expanded, until it became 
a permanent feature of Italian social policy. In parallel, the analysis will explore the 
reasons behind the failed expansion of standard unemployment insurance. The focus 
will not only be on the institutional dimension of the process, tracking the legislative 
evolution of social policy. Crucially, it will also take into consideration how 
employers and organised labour favoured, and sought to make use of short time work 
throughout the post-war economic expansion, shaping it according to their respective 
interests. Tracking the interactions between the state, business and trade unions, this 
chapter will show the complex political economy behind the construction of Italian 
unemployment welfare, and illuminate the peculiar characteristics of the post-war 
social contract – or lack of thereof - on which Italian unemployment policy was built.  
Both national and the comparative literature on the Italian welfare state 
considered the 1970s as their initial standpoint of analysis. The explosion of the oil 
crisis in 1973, along with the consequent stagnation of industrial production, 
increased the problem of mass unemployment, and thus also the importance of social 
policy. The impact of external shocks and the increasing role played by international 
market factors on national economies during the decade, brought to the surface the 
institutional variations existing among the welfare states of various capitalist 
economies.1 Understandably, the late twentieth century has become the main focus of 																																																								
1 Peter Achterberg and Mara Yerkes, ‘One welfare state emerging? Convergence versus divergence in 
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analysis of comparative welfare developments. This, however, has led researchers to 
underplay the importance of the first three decades of the post-war period as a period 
of institutional formation. The interpretative category of a post-war social contract 
based on capital-labour collaboration has been applied to encompass different western 
European economies, underrating national specificities. In various ways, scholars 
interpreted the international political economy of the post-war period as a political 
exchange built on Keynesian expansive policies, a bargain between an employer class 
interested in exploiting the reconstruction as an opportunity for economic growth, and 
labour organisations seeking to improve institutional protection for their 
constituencies.2  
While recognising the existence of national specificities, Maier accepted the 
existence of a transnational pattern of social collaboration across western countries in 
the early stages of the Cold War. The industrial relation peace that dominated post-
war Europe underpinned what Maier termed the ‘politics of productivity’.3 Organised 
labour accepted ‘the linkage of wages to productivity’, in exchange for collective 
goods, such as full employment and the development of more inclusive welfare states, 
brokered by the state.4 Maier understood the emergence of the post-war social contract 
as a natural result of the ravages and high inflation inherited after the war.  
The most important works on the second half of the twentieth century accepted 
the idea of a post-war social compact. Hobsbawm recognised that the European 
golden age of capitalism was characterised by a settlement between capital and 
labour, in which employers maintained control over the politics of production while 
workers were compensated by the satisfaction of their immediate material needs 
through stronger welfare protection.5  
Judt put forward a similar perspective, understanding the post-war rise of the 
welfare state and social planning as a response to the political polarisations of the 																																																																																																																																																															
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interwar decades.  The social redistributive nature of the welfare state ‘bound social 
classes closer together, […] with a common interest in its preservation and defense’6, 
and acted as the lynchpin of a social contract ‘designed to reduce the risk of strikes 
and wage inflation’.7  
Eichengreen went even further, placing the idea of a social contract at the very 
heart of the European post-war growth mechanism. Organised labour accepted wage 
moderation in exchange for employment creation investments.8 The welfare state and 
other protective labour regulations were introduced to guarantee industrial relations 
peace, providing immediate benefits to the working class so as to solve the time 
inconsistency problem by which workers would have to make immediate sacrifices in 
exchange for future gains.9  
Historical theories rooted in Marxian categories, without explicitly mentioning 
the ‘social contract’, underlined that the post-war emergence of the welfare state was 
rooted into a dynamic of class compromise. For authors such as Aglietta and Jessop – 
part of the so-called French Regulation School – collective bargaining and the welfare 
state were a constituent part of the Fordist regime of accumulation and were 
instrumental in favouring the introduction of mass production industrial organisation, 
guaranteeing mass consumption and peaceful industrial relations.10 From a similar 
perspective, Gordon, Bowles and Weisskopf – pioneers of the Social Structure of 
Accumulation School – assumed that European post-war economic growth was 
characterised by a two pronged social contract, composed, on the one hand, of a 
capital-labour accord that guaranteed social stability on the job market, on the other, 
of a state-citizens compact that acted as a lynchpin for welfare state expansion.11 																																																								
6 Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), p. 76. 
7 Ibidem, p. 329 
8  Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945. Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princetoon University Press, 2008), pp. 31-47. 
9 Barry Eichengreen, ‘Institutions and economic growth: Europe after World War II’, in Economic 
Growth in Europe since 1945, eds. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 38-72, at pp. 43-17. 
10 Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, pp. 190-198; Bob Jessop, ‘Post-Fordism and the 
State’, in Comparative Welfare Systems, ed. Bent Greve (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 165-
183. 
11 Samuel Bowles, David M. Gordon and Thomas E. Weisskopf, ‘Power and Profits: The Social 
Structure of Accumulation and the Profitability of the Postwar U.S. Economy’, Review of Radical 
Political Economics 18 (1986), 132-167; David M. Kotz, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Theory of 
Regulation and the Social Structure of Accumulation Theory’, Science & Society 54 (1990), 5–28, at p. 
23. 
 
 
	42	
The historiography is unanimous in considering the Golden Age of capitalism as 
an important step of social policy formation, linking the growth of modern welfare 
states to the compromise that characterised post-war European industrial relations. 
While most authors underlined national differences, however, they rarely recognised 
the early post-war decades as a period in which the seeds of future institutional 
anomalies were planted. This is particularly the case for the Italian system of 
unemployment benefits. Few authors connected the imbalances of the Italian 
unemployment welfare model to the harsh regime of industrial relations and factory 
discipline that characterised the country during the 1950s and the early 1960s.  Most 
historiographical analyses of the short time benefits system concentrated their focus 
on the 1970s and 1980s, when the use of the CIG became widespread and its total 
expenditure overtook that of unemployment insurance. This led to failure to trace the 
roots of Italian unemployment welfare’s distortions back to the early post-war 
decades.  
 
Fig. 1.1 expenditures and contributions for UI and CIG (1947 – 1990)12 
 																																																								
12 Data are in 1992 lire. See the yearly financial statements of the National Institute for Social Insurance: 
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deflator index is provided by the National Institute of Statistics. See FOI(nt), Indici nazionali dei prezzi 
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A quick look at the timing of contributions and expenditures for unemployment 
insurance and short time work benefits in Italy points towards that direction. The 
importance of the CIG exploded during the recession of the 1970s, eventually 
overtaking unemployment insurance by the end of the decade. However, the 
beginning of its exponential growth predates the crisis, originating at the beginning of 
the 1960s, when the country had to grapple with the end of the post-war economic 
miracle. All the main institutional ingredients of the intervention of short time benefits 
seem to have been in place before the external impact of the oil shock. They were 
developed throughout the post-war period, in which the CIG served to tackle various 
sector and regional crises. This allowed for a process of institutional adaptation, 
policy testing and learning by state officials and social partners alike, through which 
the CIG was progressively transformed from an industrial policy device for labour 
hoarding into a flexible surrogate of unemployment insurance. Total spending on 
unemployment benefits remained initially higher than that on the CIG, but so did the 
fiscal contributions absorbed by the fund, which remained at breakeven for most of 
the post-war period. Compared to the CIG, unemployment insurance affected a much 
wider number of recipients and had a lower wage replacement rate, making it less 
effective than the CIG to tackle severe industrial crises, particularly when they were 
concentrated at the local or sector level.  
The failure to develop an effective unemployment insurance system and the 
parallel institutional development of the CIG can be understood as consequences of 
the peculiar social contract that characterised the Italian labour market during the 
post-war decades. Compared to the experience of other core European countries, 
Italian industrial relations were not consensual, but extremely adversarial. Italian 
organised labour suffered from internal divisions and a condition of structural 
weakness due to high unemployment rates. After having showed great cohesiveness 
and militancy in the immediate aftermath of WWII, its organisational strength waned, 
hampering its negotiating power on unemployment social policy matters. Employers, 
on the other hand, exploited their advantage to marginalise the most radical unions 
and opposed the universal extension of unemployment insurance to avoid increasing 
direct and indirect labour costs.13 After the war, the newly rebuilt Italian State was in a 
tenuous fiscal position and could not support an extended unemployment insurance, 																																																								
13 Valerio Castronovo, Storia economica d’Italia. Dall’Ottocento ai giorni nostri (Torino: Einaudi, 
2013), pp. 268-269. 
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fearing that the high number of jobless would cripple its finances. The state was in no 
position to redistribute social policy benefits to organised interest groups, and unable 
to provide the institutional enforcement mechanisms needed to foster capital-labour 
collaboration. 14   
The CIG emerged as a ‘second best institution’, adapting the need for a 
functioning unemployment social policy to the fiscal limitations of the Italian state 
and the country’s political economy context.15 Compared to standard insurance, short 
time work benefits provided a leaner and more flexible instrument of welfare 
intervention. Its discretionary nature allowed the state to intervene selectively to stem 
only the most disruptive crises, without overburdening its tight finances. At the same 
time, the CIG accommodated the respective interests of large employers and 
organised labour for manpower flexibility and the protection of core industrial 
working classes, at the expense of the weaker strata of the labour market.  
 
 
1.2 The Cassa Integrazione, industrial reconstruction and social struggles 
The Italian short time work system was created on the 13th of June 1941, through a 
national contract signed by the Fascist Employers' Confederation and the Fascist 
workers’ union. The agreement established a special fund within the INPS, funded by 
a 5% contribution by employers, which guaranteed the salaries of industrial workers 
on reduced working time. Upon request of companies, the CIG could subsidise 75% 
of workers’ wages for all lost time short of a 40 hours working week.16 The scheme 
was created to cope with the wartime difficulties of the industrial sector, when most 
firms in the north of the country were forced to reduce their production because of 
reduced consumption. The function of the CIG was twofold: on the one hand, it 
guaranteed workers’ income despite production shortages. On the other, it served to 
safeguard employers from the risk of losing a highly skilled workforce in favour of 
their competitors. At this stage, the fund was not a public welfare scheme, but a 
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15 Dani Rodrik. ‘Second-Best Institutions’, The American Economic Review 98 (2008), 100–104. 
16 CGIL, Contratto Collettivo Nazionale per la integrazione dei guadagni degli operai dell'industria 
lavoranti ad orario ridotto, Roma, 13/06/1941, Archivio Storico CGIL (thereafter ASCGIL), Segreteria 
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device of industrial policy whose chief aim was to favour firms’ labour hoarding.17 
Despite the chronic stoppages affecting Italian industry - further exacerbated by 
energy and raw material procurement problems - the use of the CIG was narrow. 
Many workers were conscripted into compulsory military service as the conflict 
progressed, and the state allowed the intervention of short time only in cases of 
‘preordained, systematic and continuous work-time reduction’, restricting its field of 
intervention.18 By the end of the conflict, the fund showed a positive balance of one 
billion liras.19 
The CIG assumed a more pronounced welfarist character only in the aftermath 
of the war, to cope with the disastrous social conditions of the country. The end of 
war left the new Italian state facing a serious issue of industrial reconversion, with a 
hypertrophic military complex and a technologically backward consumer goods light 
industry. 20  These imbalances weighted heavily on an already strained labour market, 
where the return of demobilised soldiers and partisans worsened the problem of 
structural unemployment. To face the risks of social disruptions, the first post-war 
government introduced a special ban on firings in the industrial sector in May 1945, 
freezing productive overcapacity in the north of the country so as to avoid massive 
layoffs.21 In this context, the new Italian state resorted to the CIG to introduce a degree 
of flexibility in an industrial labour market which otherwise risked becoming 
excessively sclerotic. In November 1945, the decree law n.788 introduced the cassa 
integrazione guadagni per gli operai dell’industria into the new legislation, but 
restricted its replacement rate to 66% and prohibited its intervention in cases of 
complete work suspension, so as to encourage work sharing practices. Only in the 
north of the country, where most industries were concentrated, did the decree envision 
a special temporary regime: it was also possible to use the CIG also in cases of 
complete production shutdown, subsidising the entire working week and financing 
industrial manpower redundancies with no time restrictions. Furthermore, the new 																																																								
17 Claudia Mazzi and Valeria Severino, ‘Finalità e funzioni della cassa integrazione guadagni per gli 
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decree allowed the state to intervene directly into the financing of the fund. The Cassa 
could spend above the contributions it accumulated, drawing on money anticipated by 
the state without interest. Crucially, the scheme shifted from its mutualistic bases to 
an outright public welfare framework.22 Contrary to the wartime period, when the 
intervention of the CIG served to tackle temporary stoppages, the new law was 
designed to cope with a structural problem: relieving industrial companies of excess 
workforce, so as not to impair their profits in the reconstruction effort, while 
guaranteeing workers’ incomes and occupational statuses.23 
The short time work system was adapted in the post-war period as an 
emergency measure, to compensate for the shortcomings of standard unemployment 
insurance, so much so that the decree that instituted it had a self-limiting clause and 
was set to expire in September 1946, when the ban on firings was supposed to come 
to an end. The inability of the employers’ association of Confindustria and the CGIL 
to reach an agreement on how to jointly oversee the process, however, led to the 
opposition of the labour movement to any kind of dismissal. Until the summer of 
1947, layoffs were adamantly opposed by the union, which could count on a strongly 
entrenched constituency of highly politicised workers. The CIG was thus 
progressively prolonged to cope with enduring industrial rigidities. In the years 
following the end of the war the fund witnessed a dramatic growth of expenditure, 
quintupling from the 4.491 billion lire of 1945 to 20.952 billion in 1948.24  In 1951, the 
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment, led by the social democratic 
MP Roberto Tremelloni, was already highlighting the key role played by the CIG to 
diffuse social tensions and prevent the ‘rise of public disquiet […] and discomfort 
among the new mass of workers’.25 
A reform of unemployment insurance would have helped to ease social tensions 
and the Ministry of Labour had been working on a draft project to raise 
unemployment benefits since the early part of 1946. At the beginning of the post-war 
period, Italian unemployment insurance was still regulated by law n. 1155, introduced 																																																								
22  Decreto Legislativo Luogotenenziale, 9 novembre 1945, n. 788, Istituzione della Cassa per 
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24 INPS, Rendiconti dell’Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (Roma: Inps, 1947-1951). 
25 Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sulla disoccupazione, La Disoccupazione in Italia: relazione 
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under the Fascist regime in 1936, which had set the daily benefit to between 1.25 and 
3.75 lire, depending on the contributions cumulated by single workers, for a 
maximum of 120 days. In April 1939, a royal decree raised the daily amount to 
between 2.50 and 7 lire, but left the main institutional framework untouched.26 After 
the end of the conflict, there were many calls for a comprehensive reform of the 
unemployment insurance system. Being fixed in nominal terms, the amount afforded 
by the dole was rapidly eroded by wartime inflation, which reduced the lira to one 
thirtieth of its pre-war value, making unemployment social policy largely ineffective. 
The failings of the Italian welfare system were underlined already by the work of the 
Parliamentary Commission for the Study of Labour Problems, established in January 
1946 and led by the Communist MP Antonio Pesenti.27  
However, it was not until 1947 that a more coherent blueprint for a reform of 
the Italian welfare state emerged. In July 1947, the Christian Democrat Minister of 
Labour, Amintore Fanfani appointed the Parliamentary Commission for the Reform of 
Social Insurance, led by the Socialist Ludovico D’Aragona.28 Both commissions were 
explicitly modelled after the Greenwood Committee - which in 1941 carried out a 
survey of all British social insurance schemes and allied services – and looked with 
interest at the ideas of the so-called Beveridge report, which initially recommended 
the creation of a universal national security system to tackle social risks ranging from 
unemployment to healthcare. The proposals put forward by the Aragona commission 
were less radical and did not foresee the extension of welfare coverage to all Italian 
citizens. 29  Despite this, even the general extension of effective unemployment 
insurance to all those who were regularly employed was deemed financially 
unsustainable by the state, which feared, in particular, the high costs that would have 
derived from agricultural underemployment.30  																																																								
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For its part, Confindustria resisted the proposal to strengthen unemployment 
insurance: the employers recognised the need for a change, but were drastically 
opposed to any kind of universalistic extension.  A social security model à la 
Beveridge required too many fiscal resources. A larger system of unemployment 
insurance would have increased the social contributions required by employers, 
raising indirect labour costs. Furthermore, a generalised income support for 
unemployment would have caused an upward pressure on the national demand wage, 
with the risk of jeopardising the economy of reconstruction. Between 1947 and 1948, 
the employers’ association set up its own Confederal Committee on Social Insurance 
in order to stay informed of the works of the Parliamentary Commission and try to 
influence its workings.31  
Compared to the extensive coverage and automatic intervention of 
unemployment insurance, short time work benefits offered a much more flexible and 
discretionary social policy instrument. The intervention of the CIG was not automatic, 
but rather under the administration of provincial commissions within INPS local 
offices, in which both employers’ and unions’ representatives took part. The decision 
making process was thus dependent on the local dynamic of industrial relations, and 
the functioning of short time could be tailored taking into consideration the 
mobilisation capacity of organised labour and the production needs of the employers 
at a local level. At the national level, the CIG was managed by a Special Committee. 
This institution, however, intervened only when requests for short time were longer 
than four consecutive weeks. 32  The proceedings of the 1951 Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment show a widespread appreciation for the 
capacity of the CIG to operate without the burdensome institutional framework that a 
more developed system of insurance would have entailed. The use of short time 
served ‘to solve – in a discreet atmosphere, limited to bureaucratic and union circles – 
social problems that would have otherwise resulted in dangerous demonstrations’.33 
The workings of the CIG in the southern part of Italy are a good example of its 
discretionary nature. Since the establishment of the fund, the secretariat of the CGIL 																																																																																																																																																															
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had lamented the disparity of treatment existing between the industrial north and the 
rest of the country. The extension of full coverage of the CIG to the rest of the 
country, however, occured only in March 1947, when decree law n. 155 gave the 
Ministry of Labour the temporary right to grant full short time benefits in the rest of 
the country. The provision was not a rational institutional rearrangement, but a 
contingent measure to allow the state to intervene in order to contain the spread of 
social conflict. The Ministry of Finance, in fact, immediately contested the fiscal 
prodigality of the measure and underlined how the extension represented a clumsy 
manoeuvre designed to tackle workers’ agitation in the pasta-making industry in the 
Naples region, which was affected by a temporary cereal shortage. The decree was not 
a coherent normative restructuring, but rather an ad hoc attempt to resolve a thorny 
political situation.34 
Only towards the end of the year, as the political situation in the factories 
improved, did the cadres of the Ministry of Labour decide to lift the ban on dismissals 
and restore the CIG ‘to its technical functions’.35 In August 1947, the Confindustria 
finally reached an agreement with the union, promising gradual redundancies and a 
certain degree of worker control over the process. Increasingly, the CGIL found itself 
caught between the inescapable need to accept layoffs and the local struggles of 
factory workers who tried to prevent them. The secretariat of the union kept asking to 
maintain as ample as possible the coverage of the CIG. At the same time, however, it 
invited local union stewards to ‘adopt an elastic defense on a firm by firm basis, 
fighting back against the employers’ requests for layoffs when they are not 
sufficiently motivated by a necessary - if painful - reduction of employment”.36 
Decree law n. 869, approved in September 1947, exploited the lurking 
contradictions within the labour movement. The new provision standardised the 
workings of short time benefits across the country. The reform stopped the CIG from 
covering full suspension of workers and explicitly forbade the possibility of extending 
the scheme to those firms that were keeping employees ‘in excess […] through work-																																																								
34 Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Il Ministero dellle Finanze e del Tesoro, Ispettorato 
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sharing and work-time reduction’.37 The union acted defensively in front of the threat 
of massive layoffs, and this provided an opportunity to scale back welfare 
expenditure, bringing back the CIG to its industrial policy origins.38 
The shift from a lax welfare policy regime to a more stringent one, however, 
represented a delicate transition from the social point of view, particularly in northern 
Italy, where worker constituencies were stronger. In the autumn of 1947, local union 
officials were witnessing in fear, for the first time, that ‘on a large scale and for a 
protracted period of time, wages were not paid to the workers of great industrial 
complexes’.39 To cope with such sharp policy transition, law decree n. 869 introduced 
special transitory dispositions, which would last only until November 1947, through 
which short time could be conceded as an all-out surrogate of unemployment 
insurance, to workers that were sacked or in a company facing bankruptcy. 40  
The Ministry of Labour would have wanted to follow through the restriction of 
the CIG with a reform of unemployment insurance, as it had promised the CGIL. By 
the end of 1948, however, the Socialist and Communist Party were expelled from the 
governing coalition, when the Christian Democratic Party abandoned its 
accommodating stance, shifting towards a more radical anti-leftism.41 In economic 
policy terms, the change translated to a much more committed acceptance of the fiscal 
austerity line championed by the Vice-President and Governor of the Bank of Italy, 
the liberal Luigi Einaudi, who was extremely critical of the Beveridge Plan and 
staunchly opposed to indiscriminate welfare expansions.42 
The difficulties in pushing through a reform of unemployment insurance were 
also due to the severe organisational crisis that the union faced at the end of the 
decade. After having been outlawed during the Fascist period, the CGIL was 
reconstituted as an official union in June 1944, bringing together representatives from 
the Christian Democrats, communists and socialists. Such different labour culture 																																																								
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cohabitated in the same organisation in the context of the antifascist political unity 
that followed the end of the war. As the PCI and PSI were ousted from government 
and Christian Democracy strengthened its position after the general election of April 
1948, the internal contradictions within the labour movement came to light. In 
September 1948, the Christian Democratic component of the CGIL split off, accusing 
the organisation of being hegemonized by the communists, and created a new union 
that was to become the CISL.43 A year later, they were followed by the republicans and 
social democrats, who abandoned the CGIL to form a third union, the UIL.44  
The fracturing of the Italian labour movement reduced its bargaining position 
vis-à-vis the government and the employers. Furthermore, it allowed ideological 
divergences between the different unions, making the policy preferences of organised 
labour more varied. The Communist-led CGIL, finally freed from the moderatism of 
other political currents, concentrated more decisively on labour market issues, 
proposing to solve the structural unemployment of the country through nationalisation 
of industries and a general expansion of the national production base, neglecting the 
reform of social policy all together. In early October 1949, the general secretary of the 
CGIL, Giuseppe Di Vittorio, put forward an ambitious Piano del Lavoro, proposing 
the nationalisation of electric industries, new real estate investments and the 
modernisation of agricultural production, but not mentioning the reform of 
unemployment social policy.45  
The reform of unemployment insurance only began in April 1949, through law 
n. 264, and represented a compromise with the reform position expressed in the early 
post-war years. The law extended the maximum duration of unemployment benefits to 
180 days and increased the daily amount to 227 lire, adding supplementary 
allowances for bread price increases and additional family members. Yet, even at the 
time of its introduction, the total amount paid by unemployment insurance remained 
slightly below 20% of the average blue-collar salary, below the subsistence level. The 
law also foresaw the extension of unemployment insurance to dependent labourers in 
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the agricultural sector. But, as noted by Gina Papa on the pages of the journal Moneta 
e Credito, these measures did not take effect until the middle of 1952.46 
 
 
1.3 The 1950s and the textile industry crisis 
Throughout the economic crisis of the immediate post-war period, the CIG acted as an 
important welfare instrument in tackling the social consequences of industrial 
reconversion. Its discretionary nature allowed the state to intervene selectively, 
targeting social policy with the consent of social partners and without the financial 
burden that a more developed system of unemployment insurance would have 
entailed. Throughout the 1950s, by contrast, its usage decreased. The progressive 
normalisation of the industrial sector and the high rates of economic growth, 
particularly in the latter part of the decade, limited the intervention of the CIG to 
episodic and occasional uses in occasion of natural calamities and accidental 
production stoppages. Employers’ contributions systematically exceeded 
expenditures, so that by 1960 the fund had accumulated an active balance of roughly 
two billion lire.47 
On a national level the CIG performed a marginal role, but proved invaluable in 
tackling the various regional and sector crises that affected the Italian economy even 
during this period. In particular, the textile industry required a substantial public 
policy intervention. After having fuelled the economic growth of reconstruction, the 
textile industry entered a severe crisis: yarn production fell from 231,028 tons in 1951 
to 175,067 in 1955. Within the same time span, clothes production fell from 168,142 
to 137,070 tons.48 Growing international competition particularly affected the Italian 
cotton industry, which saw a 20% output decrease.49 
Since the summer of 1952, the CGIL complained to the Ministry of Labour 
about the precarious social conditions of many textile workers, particularly in 
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Lombardy and Piedmont, where most of the textile firms concentrated on cotton 
spinning. Facing the threat of dismissals, textile workers went on strike in many cities 
to call for the help of the state. Despite many requests for the intervention of short 
time work, the union denounced how ‘the provincial commissions of the CIG put 
forth very conservative interpretations of the law’, preventing the timely intervention 
of the scheme. For instance, among the 25,000 workers already suspended in the 
Milanese cotton industry, more than one fifth did not benefit from any income 
support.50 
Initially, the Ministry of Labour tried to tackle the social issue administratively, 
without any update of the legislation on short time benefits, but rather, encouraging 
local welfare commissions to act ‘less scrupulously and with the highest degree of 
automatism’.51 As the downturn of the textile sector persisted, the shortcomings of 
standard social policy became evident, as the existing legislation did not foresee full-
time coverage for lost hours. In mid-1955 a memo addressed to the Minister of 
Labour, Ezio Vigorelli underlined how severe work-time reductions were also 
spreading to central and southern Italy, where 3,000 workers had been suspended and 
4,000 had already fired. The situation of the Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali, the 
largest textile company of the South, with almost 6,000 employees, was particularly 
worrisome. When the company decided to reduce working shifts and shut down some 
its facilities, the workers entered into a prolonged strike, followed by the occupation 
of a factory in the Neapolitan area. 52 
From the standpoint of the national labour market as a whole, the loss of 
employment was not too significant. However, the textile workforce was highly 
concentrated in specific manufacturing provinces, and the persistence of production 
suspensions risked transforming the social malaise of entire cities into a political 
problem. In May 1955, the government ratified decree law n. 430, designed to allow 
workers in the cotton sector access to full-time short time work benefits for the 																																																								
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duration of at least six months. Initially, the decree was meant to be part of a larger 
industrial strategy. A specific technical commission was created within the larger 
Committee for Industrial Reconstruction (CIR) - the coordinating body for national 
industrial policy - to design a set of policies to relaunch the cotton textile sector. The 
proposals of the committee included a coordinated reduction of working hours among 
textile firms, so as to redistribute production quotas evenly.53 
The use of the CIG should have guaranteed a minimum income for laid off 
workers with a view to their future reemployment. The technical commission itself 
underlined the welfarist nature of the new CIG intervention. According to a draft of 
the final proposals of the commission, in fact, the first need was to control the ‘social 
explosiveness’ caused by employment loss in the textile sector. The role of the CIG 
was to ‘favour the adjustment of the workforce to a lower level of production, 
relieving companies of the costs of underemployment and strikes […] while 
guaranteeing workers a minimum salary in hope of a future reinstatement’.54  
The head of the technical committee, the Christian Democratic MP Mario 
Ferrari Aggradi, invited provincial CIG commissions to work without discrimination 
and without taking into consideration the ‘single organisational problems of firms’, 
practically removing the functioning of short time work from the concrete dynamic of 
production.55 The use of the CIG as a surrogate of unemployment insurance, after all, 
was implicitly recognised by the regulations of law n. 430, which again allowed 
employers to keep their workforce ‘in excess’ only so that they could receive the 
benefit. Even the stringent need to reemploy them became of secondary importance. 
Just two months after the new law, the INPS recognised in its newsletter the almost 
perfect interchangeability between the CIG and unemployment insurance, allowing 
workers on the normal dole the possibility to switch to short time benefits.56 
The data gathered in August 1955 by the CGIL bore witness to the massive use 
of the scheme. At a national level, the Special Committee for the Cassa Integrazione 																																																								
53 Legge 25 luglio 1955, n. 618, Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 27 maggio 
1955, n. 430, concernente disposizioni in favore degli operai dipendenti dalle aziende industriali 
cotoniere, Gazzetta Ufficiale, Serie Generale n. 179, 05/08/1955. 
54  Commissione Tecnica Ferrari Aggradi, Situazione industria Cotoniera, Roma, no date, ACS, 
Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Gabinetto, Ufficio Legislativo, b. 56, f. 357. 
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received more than 340 requests for intervention, only one of which was rejected. The 
number of firms on short time work exceeded 143, with more than 37,000 workers 
affected in various ways by the provisions.57 Employers in the cotton sector had 
greeted the decree positively. The easing of regulations allowed them to exploit the 
CIG to carry out industrial restructuring, even when it was not directly related to the 
recessive effects of the textile crisis. The report of the CGIL representative within the 
CIG Special Committee noted how ‘many firms, which never requested short time 
benefits or had not been doing so for a while, exploited the decree to cut the majority 
of their workforce’.58 
Such shrewd practices by the employers were not openly resisted by local union 
structures, which on the contrary, proved to be more than willing to accept layoffs and 
work stoppages once the covering of the CIG was assured. Towards the end of 1955, 
the CGIL went so far as to openly criticise its textile sector union, the Federazione 
Italiana Operai Tessili (FIOT). In a draft letter addressed to its branch organisation, 
the secretariat of the CGIL rebuked ‘the passive acceptance of short time and work 
suspensions’. The weakness of local union representatives risked creating frictions 
within the rank and file: ‘the comrades who rightfully started to fight for their jobs see 
the workers in other areas adopting a different position.’ The CGIL admitted the 
difficulties ‘in directing the struggle in a sector that has long been in turmoil’, but 
reminded the FIOT that ‘a trade union organisation cannot accept seeing a law that 
brings harm to workers applied so automatically’.59 
Decree n. 430 was set to expire at the end of November 1955. The enduring 
crisis of the cotton sector and the pressing requests coming from local administrations 
for an extension, forced the government to prolong the special short time work 
regime. The CIG was temporarily lengthened to a maximum of nine months, with the 
monetary benefits progressively decreasing every three months, allowing workers to 
slide out of employment towards unassisted joblessness.60 By mid-1956 the total 
expenditure of the CIG for cotton workers had reached 3.486 billion lire, a sizable 																																																								
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58 Ibidem. 
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sum, considering the relative employment weight of the sector and the fact that the 
employers had received a discount on contributions so as not to further aggravate the 
profit margins of the industry.61 
It was exactly because of the fear of financial overspending that the government 
opposed further enlargements. After having affected the cotton industry, the crisis 
rapidly reached other parts of the textile supply chain, such as the linen, jute and hemp 
industries, which employed roughly 17,000 workers. The social relevance of these 
sectors, however, was minor and there was the widespread concern among state 
officials that broadening the intervention of the CIG to other categories of workers 
would lead the system to spiral out of control. On the one hand, the Ministry of 
Labour recognised that ‘from the social point of view’, the slowdown affecting these 
sectors was in no way different from the one that struck the cotton industry. On the 
other, a further extension ‘would have made it very difficult to resist the requests of 
other groups of workers’, leading to ‘an untenable growth of social expenditure for 
the current system’.62 
 
 
1.4 The 1960s and the creation of the extraordinary fund 
After having been adapted to cope with the social situation of the immediate post-war 
period, the CIG had a secondary role throughout the 1950s, and its intervention was 
limited to circumscribed sector crises. In the middle of the decade, the downturn of 
the textile industry provided an important period of institutional testing, in which 
short time benefits served to manage the employment consequences of industrial 
reconversion. These experiences would prove to be of fundamental importance when 
the country faced the industrial slowdown that brought the economic boom of the 
post-war period to a halt. 
In 1963, at the peak of its absorption capacity, the Italian labour market saw the 
unemployment rate decrease to an all time low of 2.5%.63 In the summer of the same 																																																								
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year, however, the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Guido Carli, decided to raise 
interest rates across the board, in an attempt to cool down the economy, which risked 
overheating after the sustained growth of the previous years. The move brought about 
a general recession that affected the industrial system as a whole. The array of 
existing social policies, as in previous instances, would prove ill-suited to cushion the 
inevitable loss of employment.64 
In 1963, the National Council for Economics and Work (CNEL), a public 
consultancy organisation in economic and social matters, published a document on the 
reform of the social insurance system, calling for an abandonment of its occupational 
bias and for an extension of insurance to all citizens. The policy proposal of CNEL 
did not give much attention to the CIG, as it was not considered an integral part of the 
Italian welfare state, and concentrated solely on unemployment insurance, denouncing 
its ‘undeniable shortcomings’.65 
Construction workers were the first group to bear the brunt of the economic 
shock. Even before 1963, the construction industry had entered a steep downturn with 
the bursting of the property bubble that had grown during the economic miracle. The 
economic slowdown increased the already precarious nature of jobs in the 
construction industry. Workers were left with no income support, and the real estate 
business increasingly saw its highly skilled personnel migrate to the more thriving 
urban industrial sector. In July 1961, the construction industry unions and employers 
reached an agreement to create an informal system of short time work benefits to 
subsidise work stoppages. Two years later, law n. 77 formalised it at a legislative 
level, establishing a separate fund within the existing CIG system to provide a short 
time scheme in the construction industry.66 It was the very President of the National 
Association for Building Contractors (ANCE) who lobbied for an official recognition 
of the scheme, despite it being funded by higher than average employers’ 
contributions. In the autumn of 1962, he was writing to the Cabinet of the Ministry of 
Labour to ask for a quick approval of the decree, ‘because it was in the interest of the 
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country to avoid other strikes and revolts, which could have compromised public 
order’.67 
Just one year after the special decree for the construction industry, new rules 
were introduced by law n. 433, approved in June 1964, which relaxed the regulations 
on short time work for all sectors of national industry and reduced barriers for 
companies to gain access to the scheme. The new law explicitly followed the 
blueprint of the intervention of 1955 for the textile industry. The CIG could intervene 
in every economic sector to cover complete suspensions from work. Even the time 
limits of the scheme were extended, raising the maximum duration of intervention to 
nine consecutive months. The real novelty of the reform, however, related to the 
financial aspect. The new regulations allowed the Ministry of Labour to pool 
additional money from other insurance funds within the INPS - particularly from the 
rich fund of family allowances – and divert them to augment the resources of the CIG 
system.68 The functioning of the short time benefits was thus detached from its 
contributory base. In this way, the scheme was transformed into something different 
to an insurance-based system against unemployment, more closely resembling all-out 
state aid.69 
The relaxation of regulations and the greater financial firepower of the CIG led 
to an exponential increase in emoluments. The total amount paid in short time grew 
from only 4,597 billion lire in 1963 to almost 16,862 in 1964, reaching a peak of 54 
billion lire in 1965.70 A preliminary inquiry carried out by the CGIL after only six 
months from the beginning of the special regime, painted an accurate picture of the 
worsening social situation. As was expected, the textile and metalworking industries 
were hit the hardest by the negative economic juncture. These two sectors accounted 
for 67% of the total working time subsidised by the CIG, and the metalworkers alone 
absorbed almost 10 and half million hours of suspensions. The geographical 
distribution of the interventions was mostly concentrated in the areas of older 
industrialisation: Lombardy received more than 35% of the total CIG expenditure, 																																																								
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followed by Piedmont, with 25%. The exploratory report of the union did not only 
highlight the worrisome magnitude of the industrial restructuring, but also underlined 
the anomalous use of CIG subsidies to mask permanent layoffs: ‘we cannot exclude 
that the employers are taking advantage of the new laws of the CIG to curtail their 
workforce permanently, repeating the sad strategy that was put to the test with the 
textile workers in 1956’.71 
As happened before, the new rules were only temporary and were supposed to 
last for only one year. The initial government forecast, however, seriously 
underestimated the enduring stagnation affecting the Italian economy, whose sluggish 
productivity growth would last well into 1967. The special law on the CIG was thus 
renewed in July 1965 and again in May 1966.  But even these kinds of contingent 
policy measures - designed under the pressure of political urgency - were proving 
unable to cope with the problems of the Italian industrial system, which was going 
through a structural transformation. The unprecedented scale of CIG interventions put 
under severe strain a system that was still anchored to its 1940s institutional roots. 
The sheer number of CIG applications across the country rapidly overwhelmed the 
bureaucratic capacity of local and central commissions to decide the grant of 
authorisations. Within the Labour Commission of the Senate, Communist Party MPs 
denounced the ‘great number of applications piling up in local commissions, without 
any possibility for a quick completion.’ These delays were hampering the incisiveness 
of social policy and ‘were particularly deplorable as they had been denounced by 
workers from the beginning’.72  
The growing need, shared by union leaders and state officials alike, was to 
overcome the current system of occasional ad hoc laws and establish a permanent 
form of intervention, unburdened by the bureaucratic constraints that were slowing 
down the workings of the CIG. This way, it would have been possible to act in a more 
flexible and prompt manner to resolve the industrial crisis of the country. The labour 
movement was particularly vocal in campaigning for a reform of the system, asking 
the Ministry of Labour to raise the wage replacement rate of the CIG to 80% and to 																																																								
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intervene directly in the governing of short time work, bypassing the collegial 
decision-making process through ministerial decree, if needed. 73  
The unions, however, were starkly opposed to any kind of welfarist 
understanding of the CIG. In September 1968, the CISL, the union formerly affiliated 
with the Christian Democratic party, wrote a letter to the Ministry of Labour with a 
list of desiderata for the reform of unemployment social policy. In the document, the 
union asked that the workings of the CIG were tied more closely to the general 
economic policy of the country, allowing the Inter-ministerial Committee for 
Economic Planning to participate in the management of social policy. For labour 
representatives, the key was to connect the use of short time work to an effective 
industrial policy capable of guaranteeing the reemployment of suspended workers. In 
this view, the reform of unemployment insurance was seen as complementary to that 
of short time work. The unions were asking that the daily allowance of standard 
insurance be raised to 600 lire a day.74  
The Ministry of Labour had no problems accepting an increase in the costs of 
the short time work system. Despite the greater financial burden, the CIG system 
lacked automatism and was thus easier to control from the point of view of 
policymakers, who could ultimately decide whether or not to grant the benefits. The 
reform of unemployment insurance was more problematic. The request of organised 
labour was not only a nominal raise of insurance payments, but also an extension of 
its time limit, up to a full year. A note prepared for the Minister of Treasury, Emilio 
Colombo, in September 1968, noted how a comprehensive reform of unemployment 
insurance would have ended up having a projected cost of 295 billion lire, a burden 
judged ‘too enormous’ for the financial stability of the Italian welfare state.75  
Law n. 1115, approved on the 5th of November 1968, received in toto the unions’ 
requests for the reform of the CIG, but left unemployment insurance untouched. The 
new regulation institutionalised in a permanent way the temporary rules introduced in 
1964. It introduced the cassa integrazione straordinaria (CIG-S), a new 																																																								
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‘extraordinary’ short time fund flanking the existing one, relabelled as ordinaria 
(CIG-O). The new scheme was longer in duration – up to nine months with 
discretionary possibility of renewal. Its working was not supervised by central or local 
commissions, but by an inter-ministerial committee led by the Ministry of Labour, 
which decided the entity and scope of the interventions.76 
The extraordinary short time work scheme was devised to cover a whole new 
array of economic and social risks, shifting the emphasis of public intervention from 
accidental shocks on production to the internal dynamic of firms and industrial 
sectors. The CIG could now be requested by employers to finance the temporary 
reduction of working time due to firm restructuring and the introduction of 
technological change, reorganisation of production and business cycle downturns in 
certain regions or industrial clusters. The new regulation did not only alter the scope 
of the scheme but drastically restructured its financial architecture. The new fund was 
financed entirely by the state and represented a change in line with the requirements 
of both employers and the unions, which had asked to pool resources through general 
taxation, without increasing indirect labour costs, shifting the costs on the whole 
Italian polity.  
 
1968 marked a watershed in the history of Italian social policies against joblessness: 
law n.1115 sanctioned the transformation of the CIG into a welfare policy device. Up 
until that point, the CIG had been conceived as a temporary industrial policy 
instrument to intervene in an otherwise healthy industrial system. By the end of the 
Golden Age, the institution had developed into a permanent feature of Italian public 
intervention to compensate the pathological dysfunctions of the productive system. As 
the industrial crisis of the country deepened, the CIG became a synonym for 
joblessness and assisted unemployment. During the 1970s and the 1980s, the use of 
the CIG - and particularly its extraordinary fund - would increase dramatically, 
digging a wide hole in state finances and rapidly overtaking expenditure on 
unemployment insurance. When the oil shock of 1973 brought to a close the 
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economic expansion of the post-war period, the divergence of Italian social policy 
from the models embodied by other European nations became staggeringly apparent.  
The abnormal use of short time work schemes, however, was not born when the 
Italian industrial development model entered a structural decline. The origins of the 
anomaly of Italian unemployment welfare are deep-rooted, going back all the way to 
the missed opportunity for reform of the immediate aftermath of World War Two. 
The institutional foundations of the CIG pre-dated the crisis and were built gradually 
throughout the post-war period to compensate for the lack of protection afforded by 
the standard insurance system. This was not a conscious policy choice: Italy’s 
political elite tried to cope with the endemic social problems of the country’s labour 
market through a process of learning and adaptation, progressively shifting the aim of 
the CIG from labour hoarding to unemployment protection. Tracking the development 
of Italy’s unemployment policies to their origins, helps to reframe the 
historiographical debate on Italian social policies, offering a more refined 
periodisation of their development and problematising the short run analysis offered 
by existing comparative welfare state accounts. The state, employers and the unions 
acted in a much more dialectical way than the literature recognised, eschewing 
functionalist interpretations. Organised interest groups interacted with one another 
and with the government to confront an ever-evolving social situation, adapting their 
strategies depending on the time and place of industrial crises and social policy 
interventions.  The way the CIG was used reflects their nuanced behaviour: at certain 
times, short time work benefits offered a way to prevent inter-firm mobility of the 
labour force; at other times, they were used to quell social strife, providing an income 
to workers who would have otherwise become unemployed. 
Compared to core European countries, Italian post-war political economy was 
built around the lack of a strong social contract. Public institutions were structurally 
weak and the state was unable to broker a balanced political exchange between 
business interests and labour constituencies. The employer class took advantage of its 
greater cohesiveness to reap the benefits of a growth model based on low wages and 
welfare protection. Organised labour, on the other hand, suffered from chronic 
organisational weakness. The union movement was able to push through greater job 
protection in the immediate aftermath of 1945. However, internal splits and the high 
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level of unemployment soon thwarted labour’s capacity to influence national 
policymaking, restricting its negotiating power to sector and local levels.  
In this context, the progressive preference for short time work devices over 
unemployment insurance becomes clearer. The CIG provided a leaner and more 
flexible instrument of social policy. It allowed the state to intervene selectively to 
stem only the most disruptive crises, without introducing a general unemployment 
insurance that would have put its tight finances under stress. The cassa integrazione 
could be kept under control at all times by policymakers but its regulation could also 
be expanded on a dicretionary basis to adjust welfare expenditure to the level of social 
strife. This way the CIG, one the one hand, allowed employers to diffuse tensions in 
the workplace, without having to cope with the costs of unemployment insurance. On 
the other, it ensured a strong degree of protection for the industrial workforce, the 
union core constituency, at the expense of the rest of the labour market.  
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2. Welfare, labour strife and industrial restructuring, 
1968-1973 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Governing the shop floor 
The role of social conflict in the development of the welfare state can hardly be 
overstated. The previous chapter showed how one of the chief characteristics of the 
Italian system of protection against unemployment during the post-war decades was 
its discretionary nature.  The CIG emerged in response to bottom up worker pressures 
for job security, but also as a way for the state to stem the most disruptive business 
crises, which risked engendering uncontrollable social conflict. The history of the 
early development of the Italian short time work system questioned traditional power 
resource approaches to the development of the welfare state. Stressing a simple and 
unidirectional connection between the growth of labour power and welfare 
development does not capture the process of institutional formation of the CIG, which 
instead was rooted in the weakness of state structures and the imbalances of the 
peculiar social contract that regulated post-war Italian industrial relations.  
This second chapter brings the argument a step forward: far from being solely a 
result of workers’ demands for job security, the CIG was also used by employers to 
undermine the very basis of labour power, quelling industrial strikes and favouring the 
demobilisation of workers inside the factories. At the crossroads of the 1970s, the CIG 
became a mainstay in the manpower policies of big companies, which often resorted 
to it not just to cope with business downturns, but to discipline the industrial shop 
floor.  
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During the late 1950s, Italian industry witnessed a period of sustained 
expansion due to low labour costs, which allowed businesses to adopt a market 
strategy based on low prices. The exhaustion of the availability of cheap manpower, 
combined with the growing international competition of newly industrialised 
economies in low value-added sectors, forced policymakers and entrepreneurs to 
rethink the broad lines of the country’s development strategy.1 As wages began a slow 
but steady rise in the early 1960s - following a western European trend - the need to 
reorganise the economy based on a labour intensive growth model became pressing. 
The rise of unit labour costs and decline of the rate of profit undercut the margins for 
self-financed companies. 2  Furthermore, the Italian industrial structure was 
characterised by the ‘dimensional and spacial pulverization’ of its units, particularly at 
the low end of the market. With but a few noteworthy exceptions, manufacturing was 
geographically dispersed and organised in relatively small plants. The perceived need, 
by the state and employers alike, was to foster a process of concentration and 
transformation towards high technology sectors.3 
The term ristrutturazione industriale – literally, industrial restructuring – began 
to be widely used in the public sphere, in the industrial relations arena and in 
government technocratic circles, becoming the object of a hot debate among social 
partners.4 The complex processes involving industrial concentration, the attempt to 
introduce new labour saving technology, and the reshaping of shop floor industrial 
organisation and manpower policies exerted pressures on workers. On the one hand, 
capital-intensive technology threatened existing jobs, impairing the organisational 
capacity of the rank and file and making them distrustful of company-led innovations. 
On the other hand, to cope with the excessively hierarchical and rigid system of 
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Fordist mass production, there was rationalisation of shop floor labour organisation 
and streamlining of the manufacturing process.5  
The attempts by management to control more tightly and reduce production 
wastages on the assembly line run counter to the recent advances of organised labour, 
engendering widespread social conflict over control of the country’s industrial 
restructuring. Labour militancy had been gradually building throughout the 1960s, 
ultimately exploding in the autumn of 1969, when the country witnessed an 
unprecedented surge of stikes fuelled by the discontent of migrant workers in the 
industrial north-west of the country.6 Riding on the wave of social strife, organised 
labour chased the emerging demands of the rank and file. This allowed for greater 
workplace union democracy, with the introduction of workers’ elected factory 
councils, and the strengthening of the national organisation with the creation of a 
common federation among the CGIL, CISL and UIL in 1972. At the workplace level, 
the unions were able to better negotiate working shifts and the pace of production, 
leading to some important achievements, such as the official reduction of the working 
week and the passing of tighter job protection regulations in the Workers’ Statute of 
1970.7 Inevitably, the stiffening of shop floor industrial relations put into crisis the 
tenets of Fordist industrial organisation. Scientific management and mass production 
strategies required a highly disciplined labour force and a close regulation of work 
practices that were incompatible with a high level of labour resistance.8 The need to 
subdue labour power to the tempo of the assembly line was difficult to reconcile with 
the diffused industrial micro-conflict that characterised the shop floor of large 
factories - particularly during the high phases of the protest cycle identified by Sidney 
Tarrow between 1968 and the mid-1970s. 9 																																																								
5 Graziella Fornengo, Il problema della ristrutturazione industriale: la soluzione italiana (Milano: 
FrancoAngeli, 1984), pp. 30-113; Enzo Pontarollo, ‘Le politiche di ristrutturazione industriale in Italia 
dal 1961 al 1977’, L’Industria 1 (1980), 369-394;  
6 Diego Giachetti and Marco Scavino, La FIAT in mano agli operai: l'autunno caldo del 1969 (Pisa: 
Bfs, 1999); Nicola Pizzolato, ‘Gli Operai, Gli Immigrati, La Rivoluzione. Detroit e Torino: Un'ipotesi 
Comparativa (1967-73)’, Meridiana 56 (2006), 47–69, pp. 64-65. 
7 Corrado Perna, Breve Storia del Sindacato. Dalle Società di Mutuo soccorso al sindacato dei Consigli 
(Bari: De Donato, 1978), p. 293. 
8  Giuseppe Bonazzi, Storia del pensiero organizzativo (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1998), pp. 54-57; 
Charles F. Sabel, Work and Politics: The Division of Labour in Industry (London and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 131; Bruno Settis, Fordismi. Storia politica della produzione di 
massa (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016), pp. 67-69. 
9 Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, ‘Unwanted children: Political violence and the cycle of 
protest in Italy, 1966–1973’, European Journal of Political Research 14 (1986), 607-632; Ida Regalia, 
Marino Regini, and Emilio Reyneri, ‘Labour conflicts and industrial relations in Italy’, in The 
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In this context, the state did not manage to play a proactive function in steering 
the economic and social development of the country. Public industrial policies 
remained fragmented and financing for companies indiscriminate and with little 
oversight, which only served to sustain increasingly unproductive and inefficient 
factories.10 Yet the early 1970s witnessed both a qualitative and a quantitative change 
in state expenditures, with the passing of important pieces of industrial and social 
policy legislation. These were not part of a coherent public policy planning. As in the 
previous period, the state updated the rules hastily and in a confused manner, often to 
tackle specific or localised industrial crises. In this chaotic regulation framework, the 
CIG proved a very versatile instrument. Between 1968 and 1975, the use of short time 
work increased drastically, with the number of working hours subsidised by the CIG 
increasing from just over 30 million a year in 1968 to a peak of 285 million in 1975.  
 
Fig. 2.1 authorised CIG-O and CIG-S hours (1967-1975)11 
 
  
																																																																																																																																																															
Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968, eds. Colin Crouch and Alessandro 
Pizzorno (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978), 101-158, at p. 131;  
10 Romano Prodi and Daniele De Giovanni, ‘Forty-Five Years of Industrial Policy in Italy: Protagonists, 
Objectives, Instruments’, in Industrial Policy in Italy 1945-1990, ed. Mario Baldassarri (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1993), 31-55. 
11 INPS, Rendinconti dell’Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (Roma: INPS, 1968-1976). 
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 Between 1968 and 1972, the CIG-S was updated again in a piecemeal manner 
just few years after its introduction. The rules behind the CIG-O, instead, were not 
officially changed, but the fund was adapted to cater to the unintended effects of 
industrial conflict. The highly discretionary nature of the CIG made it an important 
instrument in the manpower policies of large Italian firms, stuck between industrial 
restructuring and social strife. The combined intervention of the extraordinary and 
ordinary CIG served a dual purpose: on the one hand, it cushioned the social effects of 
restructuring, easing job losses in the absence of a strong unemployment insurance 
protection system in those industrial sectors that faced the initial brunt of the 
economic slowdown. On the other hand, it served to discipline the workforce, 
intervening during work stoppages caused by strikes, absorbing their economic impact 
on company finances and targeting the mobilisational basis of union power in the 
factories.  This chapter will assess and explain the role played by short time work in 
the economic and social transformation experienced by Italian industry during the 
early 1970s. The objective is to demonstrate how the Italian system of unemployment 
protection, centered on the peculiar use of short time work schemes, interacted with 
the social crisis of mass production work organisation. This will allow light to be shed 
onto the peculiar characteristics of Italian Fordism, underscored by the extreme 
virulence of labour conflict during the 1970s, and show how this, in turn, influenced 
the development of the Italian welfare state. 
 
 
2.2 Crisis and transformation the textile and chemical industries 
The previous chapter tracked the history of the evolution of the CIG throughout the 
post-war period, until the approval of law n. 1115 in 1968. The new law led to a 
significant transformation of the aims and coverage of the Italian short time work 
system. It introduced the CIG-S, designed to allow the Ministry of Labour to tackle 
cases of industrial restructuring and technological change, providing an income 
maintenance system for the redundant workforce for prolonged spans of time. It 
allowed the state to absorb the social shock of industrial restructuring, guaranteeing 
the incomes of workers in an effective and timely manner, without emergency 
legislation or the red tape of parliamentary approval. During the two crises of 1955 
and 1964, the CIG was de facto widely used as a cushion for permanent redundancy 
		 69	
and a surrogate of unemployment insurance, but the role of the state remained limited 
to episodic and anti-cyclical interventions.12 At the the beginning of the 1970s, instead 
short time work became a ‘conscious instrument of economic policy, aimed not only 
at stemming social conflict in periods of economic recession, but also to facilitate 
industrial transformation’.13 
It is not a coincidence that textile industry employers were the first to take 
advantage of the new CIG-S regulations. The sector had initially been one of the main 
drivers of exports, but at the end of the first post-war decade, entered into a phase of 
structural decline and suffered particularly harshly from the slump of 1964, with an 
unstoppable haemorrhage of employment.14 Between 1961 and 1971, the national 
textile industry lost almost 131,000 cotton, wool and silk production workers.15 Job 
losses were mirrored by a high rate of business failures and a process of concentration 
that trimmed down the number of production units. Reporting in the XII 
Parliamentary Commission on Industry and Trade, in October 1969, the Christian 
Democratic MP Danilo De’ Cocci remarked how the precarious situation of the textile 
industry was due to the low productivity of the sector. Despite the growing pace of 
technological change, the ‘textile industry contributed only 7% to the total added 
value of Italian manufacturing, while it accounted for 18% of total industrial 
employment’.16  
In an effort to foster new fixed capital investments while favouring the 
geographical and organisational rationalisation of the textile apparatus, the Christian 
Democratic government, led by the Ministry of Industry Mario Tanassi, presented the 
Parliament with a law decree project to subsidise the restructuring of the textile 
industry. The plan envisaged a system of public subsidies for industrial restructuring 
and generous tax breaks for firms willing to switch their production away from textile 																																																								
12 Longo, ‘Meno Salario, Più Reddito’, p. 23. 
13 Biagio Longo, ‘Storia e caratterizzazione giuridica della Cassa integrazione guadagni’, in I diritti dei 
lavoratori, Terzo Volume, Licenziamenti, Cassa Integrazione e Lavoro a domicilio, ed. Pier Antonio 
Varesi (Milano: Mazzotta, 1976), 54-64, at pp. 61-62. 
14 Richard M. Locke, Remaking the Italian economy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1995), p. 137. 
15 Fulvio Coltorti, ‘Phases of Italian Industrial Development and the Relationship between Public and 
Private sectors’, in Industrial Policy in Italy 1945-1990, ed. Mario Baldassarri (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993), 59-123, at p. 81. 
16 Camera dei Deputati, Relatore de’ Cocci, Disegno di legge approvato dal Senato della Repubblica 
nella seduta del 16 Ottobre 1969, Ristrutturazione, riorganizzazione e conversione dell’industria e 
dell’artigianato tessili, Atti parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, V legislatura, XII commissione 
permanente, Industria e commercio – artigianato – commercio con l’estero (Roma: Tipografia della 
Camera dei Deputati, 1969), pp. 6-7. 
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and towards other productions, so as to guarantee the partial reemployment of the 
workforce in occupationally depressed areas. At a central level, a committee chaired 
by the Ministry of Industry, assisted by six experts equally chosen from employers’ 
and trade unions’ representatives, was tasked with overseeing individual companies’ 
plans for restructuring.17  The scheme caused much criticism and counter proposals 
from both sides of the political spectrum, with the employers lamenting excessive 
state interventionism and the unions criticising the lack of proper controls on the 
granting of public funds. The debate dragged on in the Parliament until December 
1971, when law n. 1101, soon relabeled Legge Tessile, was approved.18 
The CIG played an important part in the framework of the new law and was 
used by the state to cushion job losses. The number of hours subsidised by the CIG in 
the textile sector had already quadrupled from 11,481,285 in 1968 to 44,456,254 in 
1971, of which the lion’s share was represented by the CIG-S. Short time work, often 
leading to the complete suspension of the workers, became the norm for textile 
companies. The overloading of requests, however, immediately put the extraordinary 
fund administration under stress.  
In November 1970, the Secretariat of the CGIL wrote to the Ministry of Labour 
to complain. Suspended workers often had to wait a long time, ‘up to four months’, 
for a special decree from the Ministry of Labour granting short time benefits on a case 
by case basis, a situation that severely impaired the effectiveness of the CIG.19 The law 
for the textile sector intervened to streamline authorisation procedures, relaxing the 
eligibility criteria of the CIG-S: in the case of the textile industry, the authorisation for 
short time work could be decided directly by the ad hoc committee created by the new 
law, overriding the Ministry of Labour and bringing social partners into the decision 
making process. The CIG-S was almost explicitly conceived as an alternative to 
unemployment benefits and served to finance the long-term income maintenance of 
redundant workers. Law n.1101 discounted the contributions that textile companies 
needed to pay for the family allowances of workers. 																																																								
17 Roberto Marchionnati, ‘Protezione e aggiustamento settoriale in Italia. Il caso dell'industria tessile’, 
Rivista di Politica Economica 7/8 (1991), 79-126. 
18 Legge 1 dicembre 1971, n. 1101, Ristrutturazione, riorganizzazione e conversione dell'industria e 
dell'artigianato tessili, Gazzetta Ufficiale, Serie Generale n. 324, 23/12/1971. 
19 Ministero del Lavoro e della Previsenza Sociale, Direzione Generale assistenza e previdenza sociale – 
DIV XIII, Appunto per l'On.Le Ministro, integrazione salariale – applicazione della legge 5 novembre 
1968, n.1115, Roma, 25/01/1971, ACS, Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Gabinetto, 
Ufficio Legislativo, b. 129, f. 16/369. 
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A portion of these would instead be covered with the money from the 
unemployment insurance fund, burdening its already strained finances for the 
protection of labour force insiders. The overlapping of short time work and 
unemployment insurance caused confusion, even among policy-makers: in the run up 
to the approval of the textile law, a former CISL unionists, Ettore Calvi, stood up in 
Parliament to ask whether ‘the cassa integrazione guadagni and the involuntary 
unemployment insurance fund are indeed the same thing’.20 
As the Italian industrial system entered a phase of profound structural change 
during the early 1970s, the recently introduced CIG-S witnessed further institutional 
evolution and enlargements. Change was not the result of coherent public policy 
planning, but rather respondent to the centrifugal pressure of various industrial 
sectors. Just a year after the passing of the textile law, it was the chemical industry 
that required the assistance of the state. In 1972, the public discovered that 
Montedison, the largest company in the Italian chemical sector, was in a deep 
financial crisis. The company was born of a merger between the chemical company 
Montecatini and the electricity giant Edison in 1966.21 Almost immediately the group 
had shown signs of financial weakness, and as early as 1968 the state was forced to 
buy some of its shares through the state owned petrol company ENI. At the end of 
1971, the corporate balance had a deficit of almost 230 billion lire, which prompted 
the president of the company, Eugenio Cefis, to ask the Ministry of Budget and 
Economic Planning for the intervention of the state to salvage the chemical sector. 22 
At stake for the government was not only its large share of the company, but 
also the risk of a full-blown social crisis. The chemical industry as a whole 
represented only 4.9% of total industrial employment. However, after FIAT, 
Montedison was the second largest private company in the country, with roughly 
180,000 employees.23 The Cefis report explicitly highlighted the need for public help 																																																								
20 Camera dei Deputati, seguito della discussione del disegno legge n. 1922 etc., Seduta di Giovedì 21 
ottobre 1971, Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, V Legislatura, XII commissione permanente, 
Industria e commercio – artigianato – commercio con l’estero (Roma: Tipografia della Camera, 1971), 
p.  730. 
21 Paolo Sylos Labini, ‘Montedison. Il Dinosauro nel MEC’, l’Astrolabio 4 (1966), 11-13. 
22  Eugenio Cefis, L'industria chimica italiana e la crisi Montedison, Indagini conoscitive del 
Parlamento sull'industria chimica (Roma: Tipografia della Camera, 1972); Alves Marchi and Roberto 
Marchionnati, Montedison, 1966-1989. Una grande impresa sul confine tra pubblico e private (Milano: 
FrancoAngeli, 1992). 
23 Enzo Pontarollo, ‘Italy: effects of substituting political objectives for business goals’, in State 
Investment Companies in Western Europe, ed. Brian Hindley (London and Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1983), 25-58, at p. 35. 
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to ‘support the reconversion of employees who were made redundant due to the 
restructuring programs.’24  Many workers were at risk of losing their jobs and at least 
since the earlier part of 1970, the company resorted to the use of short time work and 
complete work suspensions to cope with its problems. In many cases, Montedison 
announced the possibility of shutting down some of its smaller plants around the 
country, a situation that caused widespread protests by the workers, often culminating 
in strikes and factory occupations. In July 1972, for instance, the employees of a 
silicium processing facility near Merano, in Trentin-Suditrol, occupied the factory in 
protest against the decision of Montedison to shut it down. But problems existed all 
over the country, from Piedmont, where the company wanted to shut down its 
facilities in Rho, to southern Italy, where it had recently invested in petrochemicals.25  
The problems of the chemical group blended in with the larger crisis of textile 
sector, as Montedison had made important inroads into the production of artificial 
fibres and now planned to curtail the labour force in the sector.26 The CIG-S could be 
used to tackle the social cost of the restructuring of the chemical industry and 
Montedison immediately applied for it at the Ministry of Labour. Yet, the original 
provisions of law n. 1115 of 1968 presented an evident limit to the welfarist use of the 
CIG: a mandatory time limit of nine months. This represented a problem for the use 
that Montedison wanted to make of the CIG-S. Not only was the restructuring of the 
group going to take more time; most importantly, it involved the shutting down of 
many facilities and the geographical reorganisation of the company, which would 
have left many workers with no immediate re-employment opportunities and no 
alternative source of income.  
Mindful of the experience of the textile sector and with the pressing need to 
tackle the situation at hand, in August 1972, the government hastily passed law n. 
464, leading to important updates to the framework of the CIG-S. First of all, the new 
piece of legislation allowed the CIG-S to intervene in cases of business reconversion, 																																																								
24 Senato della Repubblica, Indagine conoscitiva concernente la situazione della Montedison ed il piano 
di sviluppo dell’industria chimica, Seduta 14 Dicembre 1972, Atti parlamentari, Senato della 
Repubblica, VI legislatura, Commissione X Industria, Turismo e Commercio (Roma: Tipografia del 
Senato, 1972), p. 456.   
25 Senato della Repubblica, Indagine conoscitiva concernente la situazione della Montedison ed il piano 
di sviluppo dell’industria chimica, Seduta di Giovedì 18 ottobre 1972, Atti Parlamentari, Senato dela 
Repubblica, VI legislatura, Commissione X Industria, Turismo e Commercio (Roma: Tipografia del 
Senato, 1972), p. 312. 
26 Anna Maria Falchero, ‘”Quel Serico Filo Impalpabile...". Dalla Soie De Châtillon a Montefibre 
(1918-1972)’, Studi Storici 33 (1992), 217–233. 
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allowing companies to make use of extraordinary short time to switch their line of 
production from one sector to the other. Secondly, and crucially, it eliminated any 
time limit to the use of the CIG: the concession of subsidies was still tied to the 
decision of the Ministry of Labour, at the head of an interministerial committee which 
also brought together the Ministry of Industry. Yet, every six months after the 
expiration of the first allotment, the Ministry of Labour had the right to grant further 
extensions, indefinitely.27 Law n. 464 officially sanctioned the new welfarist nature of 
the CIG and represented the culmination of a decade long transformation that, 
throughout the 1960s, fundamentally shifted the CIG out of the domain of industrial 
policy and towards that of unemployment protection. 28  The Minister of Labour, 
Dionigi Coppo, explicitly vindicated this perspective during the run up to the approval 
of the law. The Minister stated that, while useful for temporary downturns, the 1968 
law that introduced the extraordinary fund had some limits. In particular, it was ill 
suited to ‘guarantee a consistent and stable intervention […] in the case of large 
companies, which required more time to overcome the crisis’.29 Contrary to the 1971 
textile law, which had a limited reach, law n. 464 applied to every industrial sector, 
without an explicit reference to the case of the chemical industry.  
Still, Montedison was mentioned often during the discussion and the leftist 
press polemically labeled the new provision ‘Montedison law’.  Coppo was careful to 
underline that the new law was not devised as a purely welfarist measure to mask 
permanent unemployment: the new provisions for the CIG-S were supported by a 
system of tax breaks and easy credit for large companies that decided to re-employ at 
least two thirds of their workforce. Yet, the words of the Minister betrayed the fact 
that the new law was tailored to the needs of large factories, so as to avert the social 
unrest caused by massive redundancies.30 It is not a coincidence that the revision of the 
CIG-S received a barrage of criticism. In mid-July 1972, for instance, the Ministry of 																																																								
27  Legge 8 agosto 1972, n. 464, Modifiche ed integrazioni alla legge 1116/1968 in materia di 
integrazione salariale, Gazzetta Ufficiale, Serie Generale n. 218, 23/08/1972. 
28 Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Appunto per l'On.Le Ministro, oggetto: disegno di 
legge riguardante gli interventi straordinari della Cassa Integrazione Guadagni e della Gestione 
del'Assicurazione contro la disoccupazione in favore dei lavoratori dell'industria, Roma, 21/07/1972, 
ACS, Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale. Gabinetto, Ufficio Legislativo, b. 129, f. 
16/369; See also Fabrizio Barca and Marco Magnani, L’industria tra Capitale e Lavoro (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1989), p. 45. 
29 Camera dei Deputati, Seduta di Mercoledi 2 agosto 1972, Atti parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VI 
legislatura, Commissione XIII, Lavoro – Assistenza e previdenza sociale – Cooperazione (Roma: 
Tipografia della Camera, 1972), pp. 3-4. 
30 Stefanelli, La Cassa Integrazione, p. 4. 
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Treasury voiced a complaint, stating that ‘a simple extension of the time limits of the 
CIG does not solve the basic issues affecting the companies, […] in particular the 
possibility of adjusting manpower to real production needs’.31 This position was shared 
by the Ministry of Public Participation in Industry, which expressed the concern that 
without a mandatory time limit, it would have been impossible ‘to calculate exactly 
the state’s financial burden’.32  
The labour movement and left parties expressed an opposing view to that of the 
technocratic circles of the state, though they were no less dissatisfied with the final 
outcome of the law. On the one hand, organised labour welcomed the stronger income 
protection afforded by the 1972 law, protecting workers from sudden industrial 
shutdowns. On the other, it lamented that the law was weak on the employment 
creation policy side, with scant guarantees for the re-employment of the workforce 
and weak public control over companies’ restructuring plans. The Socialist Party MP 
Libero Della Briotta during the parliamentary discussion on the law, for instance, 
argued that ‘this piece of legislation fits positively into the Italian welfare state 
edifice, and it is the first step towards the assertion of workers’ rights to re-
employment’. However, he also warned that the lax financial framework of the law 
scheme risked making ‘the collectivity pay for the entrepreneurial mistakes of 
companies, […] resulting in the solution of economic problems through state 
paternalism’.33  
These worries were echoed by the unions, which feared that the lure of public 
financing would invite private companies to declare a state of crisis and lay off 
manpower even when business circumstances might not require it. While the law 
favoured the use of short time work instead of dismissals to address industrial 
redundancy, it also relieved the company of any responsibility for their employees, 
transforming short time work into a gateway towards unemployment. These concerns 																																																								
31 Ministro del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Il Ministero del Tesoro a La Presidenza del Consiglio 
dei Ministri – Gabinetto, Schema di disegno legge recante modifiche ed integrazioni alla legge 5 
novembre 1968, n. 1115, in materia di integrazione salariale e trattamento speciale di disoccupazione, 
Roma, 18/7/1972, ACS, Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Gabinetto, Ufficio 
Legislativo, b. 129, f. 16/369. 
32 Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, il Ministro delle Partecipazioni Statali, Ferrari 
Aggradi, alla Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, uff.leg, e al Ministero del Lavoro e della 
Previdenza Sociale, Roma, 21/07/1972, ACS; Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza ìSociale, 
Gabinetto, Ufficio Legislativo, b. 129, f. 16/369. 
33 Camera dei Deputati, Seduta di Mercoledi 2 agosto 1972, Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VI 
legislatura, Commissione XIII, Lavoro – Assistenza e previdenza sociale – Cooperazione (Roma: 
Tipografia della Camera, 1972), pp. 5-6. 
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were aptly captured by a CGIL internal memo from September 1972, underlining how 
law n. 464 pointed ‘towards a strengthening of welfare and income of workers, but 
did not safeguard jobs and employment development with the aim of fostering full 
employment’. The CGIL clearly recognised the risk of creating a rift between core job 
market insiders and the rest of the marginal labour force and the unemployed. The 
memo, in fact, warned: ‘the need to avoid the creation of a category of employees 
that, while not working, are receiving almost the full wage or masses of unemployed 
that are paid at different rates’.34 
 
 
2.3 Industrial conflict and the delays of Italian Fordism 
Despite much criticism, the update on the workings of the extraordinary CIG fund 
was passed amid the perceived social emergency. If the 1971 law applied only to the 
textile sector, the 1972 law instead extended the more beneficial short time work 
regime to the whole industry, with an eye on the rescue of large companies. The 
immediate increase in the use of the CIG-S underscored the widespread need for 
manufacturing employers to restructure their production with the introduction of new 
technologies and the spatial reorganisation of facilities. Yet, this should not lead us to 
overstate the importance of the CIG-S during the early stages of the crisis of Italian 
industry. The introduction of a new kind of short time work and the de facto 
abolishment of any kind of limit to its usage would prove essential during the latter 
part the 1970s, as the manpower overcapacity of the Italian industrial system became 
a structural problem.35 However, during the early stages of the decade, the CIG-S did 
not overshadow the continued use of other income maintenance schemes and the new 
laws did not alter the trend in the utilisation of the CIG-O. Institutional evolution 
takes time to seep down to the ground level of everyday business practices and social 
partners might take a while to understand how to effectively make use of a new social 
policy device. This is principally because the CIG-S did not replace the existing 																																																								
34 CGIL, Il Ministro del Lavoro Coppo a Uffici Regionali Lavoro, Ispettorati Regionali Lavoro, Loro 
Sedi, Roma, 29/08/1972, ASCGIL, Segreteria Generale, Atti e corrispondenza, Istituti contrattuali – 
previdenza e assistenza, b. 29, f. 180; Eugenio Guidi per l'Ufficio Sindacale e Piero Boni per la 
Segreteria, CGIL, Circolare 3019, oggetto: Cassa Integrazione Salariale alle Camere Conf. Del Lavoro, 
alle Federazioni Naz.Li di Cat., ai Comitati Regionali CGIL, Roma, 15/09/1972, ASCGIL, Segreteria 
Generale, Atti e corrispondenza, Istituti contrattuali – previdenza e assistenza, b. 29, f. 180. 
35 Marino Regini, ‘La Varietà Italiana di Capitalismo. Istituzioni Sociali e Struttura Produttiva negli 
Anni Ottanta’, Stato e Mercato 43 (1995), 3-26, at p. 9. 
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regulations. It left the ordinary CIG-O intact and represented just another layer in the 
growingly complex system of Italian short time work schemes.  
It was mostly large-sized companies that took advantage of CIG-S provisions. 
Occupationally relevant enterprises were better situated to appeal to the central 
government and raise the interest of ministerial authorities for a speedy approval of 
benefits. The highly discretionary nature of the workings of short time left smaller 
companies at disadvantage.36 They often had to go through the trouble of repeatedly 
pressuring the employers’ association and national union representatives to put 
forward their case at the central level, with inevitable delays. Thus, medium and small 
sized companies continued to resort to the ordinary CIG fund - even in cases of 
restructuring or long-term business crises that fell under the extraordinary domain - 
sorting authorisation procedures through the opaque patronage of provincial 
commissions. 37   
In certain industrial sectors, the CIG-O remained the preferred form of labour 
market intervention to cope with production stoppages, at least until 1975, during the 
height of the economic crisis. Among the most representative industrial sectors, the 
CIG-S was mostly used in the chemical and textile industries. Companies in the 
metalworking sector, instead, made a relatively larger use of the CIG-O to cope with 
their own production problems. These accounted for almost 40% of total industrial 
employment in 1970 and had been more resilient in the face of the economic 
slowdown, at least until 1973.38  
Such different sectoral trends are explained, in part, by the different nature of 
the risks the CIG-S and CIG-O were supposed to cover. The extraordinary fund was 
set up to subsidise redundancy during long term restructuring processes, and was 
utilised in the industries, such as textile and chemical, that underwent structural 
change early on. The CIG-O, instead, continued to be used to cover for workers’ 
income during momentary production stops. It is quite likely that many companies - 																																																								
36  Alberto Martinelli, ‘Organised business and Italian politics: Confindustria and the Christian 
democrats in the post-war Period’, West European Politics 2 (1979), 67-87, at p. 71. 
37 See Eugenio Guidi per l'Uff. Sind e Piero Boni per la Segreteria, CGIL, Circolare 3019, oggetto: 
Cassa Integrazione Salariale alle Camere Conf. Del Lavoro, alle Federazioni Naz.Li di Cat., ai Comitati 
Regionali CGIL, Roma, 15/09/1972, ASCGIL, Atti e corrispondenza, Istituti contrattuali – previdenza 
e assistenza, b. 29, f. 180; Luciano Pariano p. La Segreteria al Compagno Guidi, Ufficio Sindacale 
CGIL, Crotone, 20/1/1973, ASCGIL, Segreteria Generale, Atti e Corrispondenza, Problemi sociali e 
del lavoro, b. 32, f -. 
38 Alberto Carreras, ‘Un ritratto quantitativo dell’industria Italiana’, in Storia D’Italia. Annali 15. 
l’Industria, eds. Franco Amatori, Duccio Bigazzi, Renato Giannetti and Luciano Segreto (Torino: 
Einaudi, 1999), 180-272, at pp. 254-255. 
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particularly among the small and medium sized ones - perceived their business 
problems to be only transient, resorting to short time on a stop and go basis to cope 
with momentary market downturns, without undergoing structural transformation.39 
The availability of data does not allow disaggregating CIG hours by individual 
companies or by their size category, and it is thus not possible to ground the above 
speculations on a firm quantitative basis. However, erroneous economic forecasting 
and the slowness of centralized decision-making at the government level can explain 
the continued use of the CIG-O up to a certain point. A simple business cycle 
interpretation cannot satisfactorily account for why it was often preferred over the 
CIG-S during early years of the 1970s.40 
The sudden explosion of industrial conflict, at the beginning of the decade, 
provides an important explanatory variable. If the growth of the CIG-S was the result 
of bottom-up workers’ demands for social protection against job loss, the CIG-O 
progressively emerged as an instrument to control and prevent social strife, targeting 
the bases of unions’ mobilisation and political power in the everyday life of the shop 
floor. The evolution of the CIG-S and parallel growth of the CIG-O after 1968 came 
not only as a result of the endemic economic slowdown of the country, but also as a 
consequence of the rise in industrial conflict that accompanied the crisis. The growth 
of working class organisation increased bottom up pressures for job security, but it 
also presented employers with the problem of how to stem the mounting tide of 
industrial strife, particularly in the most riotous large factories. The CIG-O, designed 
to finance momentary and relatively short production stops, was equipped to intervene 
during strikes, suspending workers upstream and downstream in the production cycle 
and targeting strikers directly, increasing the organisational costs of industrial conflict 
for the unions while lessening its impact on the company’s finances.41 
In the last months of 1969, in what is known as the ‘Hot Autumn’, a sudden 
wave of strikes engulfed the country from its epicenter in the northwestern auto 
industry. In that year, after the summer break, workers in the metalworking industries 
started staging strikes and wide protests for the renewal of the sector’s national 
contract, often ending up in shutdowns and factory occupations. The number of hours 																																																								
39 ISTAT, 5° censimento generale dell’Industria e del commercio, 28 ottobre 1971, Vol.VIII, Dati 
Generali Riassuntivi, Tomo II – Unità Locali (Roma: Tipografia Failli, 1976), pp. 860-890. 
40  Vittorio Daniele, Paolo Malanima and Nicola Ostuni, ‘Geography, Market Potential and 
Industrialization in Italy 1871-2001’, Papers in Regional Science 97 (2016), 639-662, at pp. 645-647.  
41 Graziosi, La Ristrutturazione nelle Grandi Fabbriche, pp. 58-69. 
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lost to strike actions in 1969 totalled more than 300 million, far more than any other 
comparable western country.42 The Hot Autumn opened what Sidney Tarrow labeled 
‘a protest cycle’, in which heightened conflict became endemic across the social 
system and growing incentives for collective action at the factory level led to a 
spiraling increase of strikes.43 Figure 2.2 reports the number of hours lost due to strikes 
and the number of workers involved, in Italy for the whole post-war period. 
 
 Fig. 2.2 Industrial conflict in Italy (1950-1990) (in thousand)44 
 
 
After peaking in 1969, the number of hours lost to strikes remained substantially 
high and the number of workers involved continued to increase throughout the whole 
decade. The dramatic increase in the tempo of industrial conflict led to significant 
institutional innovation by both the state and the labour movement. Bottom-up worker 
pressure for a greater democratisation of plant level representative structures 
crystallised into the introduction of Consigli di Fabbrica - factory councils - directly 																																																								
42 Diego Giachetti, l’Autunno Caldo. 
43 Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Poltics in Italy, 1965 –1975 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 302. 
44 Data are taken from the monthly surveys of labour disputes carried out by the National Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT). See ISTAT, Rilevazioni sulle forze di lavoro (Roma: ISTAT, 1951-1991). Retrieved 
from http://seriestoriche.istat.it/fileadmin/documenti/Tavola_10.22.xls, 03/09/2018 at 20.06 GMT. 
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elected by the workers and tasked with the supervision of plant-level negotiations.45 
This process was paralleled by the organisational strengthening of official unions. 
They almost doubled their membership and mended their strained internal 
relationships during the first half of the 1970s.46 For the first time since the division of 
the unitary CGIL in the immediate post-war years, in July 1972, the three national 
unions signed an agreement for a federation that brought together the CGIL, the CISL 
and the UIL. At the sectoral level, the process of unification went even further, with 
the creation of a Federazione Unitaria Lavoratori Chimici (FULC) for chemical 
workers and, most importantly, a very militant metalworkers federation. The 
Federazione Lavoratori Metalmeccanici (FLM), the year after.47  
Almost immediately, the growing strength of working-class constituencies 
translated into the introduction of new legislative provisions: in May 1970, the 
Parliament, with the input of the Italian Socialist Party, approved the Statuto dei 
Lavoratori, the Workers’ Statute, a new law to protect employees’ rights to political 
and organisational expression. It prevented employers from conducting investigations, 
arbitrary firings etc., drastically reducing the panoply of disciplinary measures 
available to factory managers.48 
Immediately, both scholars and activists sought to make sense of the sudden 
burst of conflict, which took organised labour and employers alike by surprise. 
Traditional interpretations, mostly following the analysis of trade unionists 
themselves, presented social strife as the inevitable outcome of the rapid economic 
growth of the country. Industrialisation progressively eroded the availability of cheap 
manpower, levelling off supply side imbalances in the Italian labour market and 
increasing workers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the employers. The cramming of the 
industrial workforce into the urban peripheries of northern Italian cities and the 
experience of assembly line work unified everyday practices and commonalities 																																																								
45 For a broad overview of factory councils and Italian workplace democracy during the 1970s, see 
Luciano Albanese, Fernando Liuzzi and Alessandro Perrella, I consigli di fabbrica (Roma: Editori 
riuniti, 1973); Fabrizio D’Agostini. La condizione operaia e i consigli di fabbrica (Roma: Editori 
riuniti, 1974); Bruno Trentin, Il sindacato dei consigli. Intervista di Bruno Ugolini (Roma: Editori 
riuniti, 1980). 
46  Vittorio Valli, ‘Industrial Conflict and Trade Unions in the 1970s: The Italian Case’, in The 
Management of Industrial Conflict in the Recession of the 1970s, eds. Ezio Tarantelli and Gerhard 
Willke (Florence: European University Institute, 1981), 183-204, at p. 184. 
47 Fabrizio Loreto, L’ “Anima Bella” del Sindacato, Storia della Sinistra Sindacale (1960-1980) (Roma: 
Ediesse, 2005), p. 101. 
48 Lorenzo Bordogna and Giancarlo Provasi, ‘La Conflittualità’, in Relazioni Industriali, Manuale per 
l’analisi dell’esperienza Italiana, eds. Gian Primo Cella and Tiziano Treu (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989), 
215-245. 
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among blue-collar workers. A new social figure seemed to emerge out of the 
factories: the ‘mass worker’ - as the theorists of the extra-parliamentary workerist left, 
dubbed it – readier to articulate its grievances in political terms and prone to direct 
industrial action.49  
In their classic 1973 work, Gli anni duri alla Fiat, Emilio Pugno and Sergio 
Garavini traced the roots of the 1969 movement back to the early years of the decade 
and to the changing strategy of the labour movement in confronting employers’ 
intransigence. With the diffusion and consolidation of industrial labour organisation, 
trade unions began to devote a greater deal of attention to the negotiations of working 
conditions at the shop floor level.50 In 1960, the unions successfully organised a 
general strike in the eletromechanics sector in Milan. In July 1962, in Turin, 
thousands of workers clashed with the police, protesting against the carmaker FIAT 
and the decision of one of the unions to sign a separate agreement with the company. 
Even in 1966, despite the modest outcome of the negotiations, the unions managed to 
mobilise a substantial number of workers for the renewal of the metalworking sector’s 
contract. Pugno and Garavini stressed the continuity of union action throughout the 
1960s as a basis for the mobilisation of the 1970s.51  
This interpretation, however, did not go uncontested and was criticised for not 
recognising the pathbreaking nature of the Hot Autumn. Scholars such as Berta, 
Scavino and, most recently, Pizzolato, focused on the immediate run up to the events 
of 1969 and on the recruitment policies of large industrial enterprises, rather than on 
the actions of the unions.52 In their view, the outburst of conflict is to be traced to the 
sudden admission of southern migrants into the large car factories in the north. This 
workforce often came from rural areas and was not socialised into the routine of 
industrial work. Most importantly, it was marginalised in the urban peripheries and 
frequently discriminated against cultural and regional lines, even by other workers. 
Both management and organised labour progressively lost touch with this substantial 																																																								
49 See Gisela Block, Paolo Carpignano and Bruno Ramirez, La Formazione dell’Operaio Massa negli 
Usa, 1898-1922 (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1976); Mario Tronti, Operai e Capitale (Roma: DeriveApprodi, 
2013), p. 7; Steve Wright, Storming Heaven, pp. 152-176.  
50 Stefano Musso, Le Regole e l’Elusione: il Governo del Mercato del lavoro dall’Unità ad Oggi 
(Torino: Rosenberg and Sellier, 2004), pp. 245-270. 
51 Emilio Pugno and Sergio Garavini, Gli anni duri alla Fiat (Torino: Einaudi, 1973). 
52 Giuseppe Berta, Conflitto industriale e struttura d'impresa alla FIAT (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998), p. 
153; Giachetti and Scavino, La Fiat in mano agli operai, p. 131; Nicola Pizzolato, ‘Workers and 
Revolutionaries at the Twilight of Fordism: the breakdown of industrial relations in the Automobile 
plants of Detroit and Turin, 1967-1973’, Labor History 45 (2004), 419-443, at p. 427. 
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fragment of their base, allowing into the ‘factory system individuals who eventually 
dissented to its form of regimentation of the workforce’.53 
Whether the emphasis was on the long-term social effects of industrialisation or 
on the cultural marginalisation of migrants, the end result was a rise in labour conflict 
that had an immediate and deleterious effect on the productivity of the industrial 
system. Between 1970 and 1974, after having stagnated for almost all of the post-war 
period, unit labor costs increased 59.5 %, closely followed by inflation, which jumped 
to 21.2 % in the same years. Squeezed between higher wages and more stringent 
labour regulation, company profits dropped sharply.54  
The changes in the dynamic of contention did not only affect the ‘quantity’ of 
industrial conflict, in terms of workers’ participation and hours lost, but also its 
quality. Up until that point, strikes had been highly regulated, announced days in 
advance as an almost ceremonial show of class strength and often called off during 
actual company negotiations. With the Hot Autumn and its aftermath, instead, labour 
strife took on an unregulated nature, including drawn out strikes and wildcat actions. 
These were often supported by radical far left groups, such as Lotta Continua (LC), a 
revolutionary movement rooted in the student worker groups of 1969. LC published 
an omonimous newspaper that became one of the most authoritative voices of the 
extra-parliamentary left, together with il Manifesto.55 
 The official unions did not always support the actions of the rank and file, but 
had to chase some of the most radical demands that emerged during the strikes, 
‘riding the tiger’ of industrial conflict so as not to risk losing legitimacy.56 During 
these years, the campaigns promoted by the unions encompassed a wide range of 
issues: the unification of job classification schemes and the abolition of territorial 
differences in wage levels, improvements in health and safety conditions, and 
reductions in the speed and duration of work. A new array of tactics emerged to deal 
the most damage to production at the shop floor level, with chessboard and hiccup 
strikes and work-to-rule becoming daily occurrences in large industrial plants, where 
workers often organised by department or even by team.57 																																																								
53 Pizzolato, ‘Workers and Revolutionaries’, p. 421. 
54 Barca and Magnani, L’industria tra Capitale e Lavoro, pp. 27-38. 
55 Roberto Franzosi, The puzzle of strikes: class and state strategies in post-war Italy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 287. 
56 Claudia Magnanini, Autunno Caldo e “Anni di Piombo”, il sindacato Milanese dinnanzi alla crisi 
economia e istituzionale (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2006), p. 66. 
57 The rationale behind all these new forms of strikes was that of producing the maximum amount of 
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The spread of micro-conflict on the factory shop floor put the management 
strategies of many companies, particularly the bigger ones, who modeled their labour 
organisations on Fordist mass production models, in jeopardy. Fordism, as an 
industrial paradigm, was characterised by a high integration of the production process, 
with semi-finished and interchangeable parts moving sequentially from one 
workstation to the other along the assembly line. An extremely low skilled workforce 
was tasked with a standard set of rules, which dictated the tempo of production and 
work practices to follow in an extremely detailed fashion.  Mass production was 
firstly pioneered early in the century in the United States by Henry Ford, who blended 
the technocratic principles of tayloristic scientific management with a new model of 
large factory, structured around the conveyor belt and vertically integrated across all 
phases of production. The American entrepreneur himself used the word ‘Fordism’ to 
describe the new technical organisation of production, and the term has since then 
been widely used.58  
In Italy the introduction of Fordism was somewhat delayed. As argued by Pietro 
Causarano, two of the distinctive characteristics of Fordist manufacturing, large-scale 
dimension and technocratic management, were never dominant in the Italian industrial 
apparatus, which remained anchored for a long time to a structure of small companies 
and family capitalism.59 It was only at the end of the 1950s that Italian employers 
begun to modernise their factories more consistently, with the introduction of new 
machinery and the spatial reorganisation of the industrial shop floor.60 The change in 																																																																																																																																																															
disruption and damage to production with the least possible sacrifices for the rank and file. During 
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Contention’, Social Science History 17 (2002), 281-307, at p. 102. 
58 For a general theoretical review of the debate on the nature and development of international Fordism, 
see Aglietta, A theory of capitalist regulation, pp. 111-147; Ash Amin, ‘Postfordism’, pp. 1-40; 
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managerial strategies and the introduction of mass production took advantage of the 
forced quiescence of organised labour. In 1955, the CGIL affiliate Federazione 
Impiegati Operai Mettalurgici (FIOM) lost the majority of seats in the internal 
commission of Mirafiori, the largest turinese factory of the carmaker FIAT. It was a 
traumatic display of the internal division fracturing the labour movement, and it led to 
a wider retreat of workers’ organisations nationwide, followed by the marginalization 
of the most conflictual employees at FIAT and elsewhere. Industrial reorganisation in 
Italy occurred in a condition of structural weakness of the union movement.61  
This is not coincidental. The management of conflict is key to the paradigm of 
industrial Fordism, which involved not only a new technical organisation of 
production, but also a new mode of social organisation of the workforce. The 
monotonous and tiring nature of the work on the assembly line required a complacent 
and malleable workforce. Furthermore, the high integration of the production cycle 
under mass production made the Fordist factory extremely brittle when faced with 
industrial conflict - even if localised - as small numbers of workers could hit its vital 
points and bring production of a whole factory to a complete shutdown.62 In the post-
war period, the management of conflict provided the bedrock on which Fordist mass 
production could spread in Western Europe. 63   Many scholars underlined how 
industrial growth was made possible by the implicit social contract brokered by the 
state between employers and organised labour, with rising welfare gains for the 
workers and a consensual system of industrial relations. This ensured what Ralph 
Darhendorf aptly termed the ‘institutional isolation of social conflict’, necessary to 
import the new industrial model.64  
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As the previous chapter underlined, in the context of the adversarial system of 
Italian industrial relations, the window of opportunity for the introduction of Fordist 
mass production was provided to employers by the weakness of the labour movement; 
imposed on, rather than negotiated by the unions and the skilled working class. The 
unilateral nature of the industrial transformation and its speed contributed to the 
sudden explosion of social strife. The increase in the rate of strikes started to cripple 
the productivity of Fordist industrial organisation just as many companies had 
implemented it, committing to high fixed investments. In parallel, the growing 
strength of union shop floor organisation and the passing of pro-labour legislation 
reduced the array of traditional repressive instruments available to managment, 
forcing employers to find new tools to harness industrial conflict. The unorthodox use 
of the CIG-O to stem strikes emerged at the beginning of the 1970s as a way to cope 
with this dual pressure exercised on the industrial system, bending welfare policy to 
solve the failure of Fordist social regulation. 
 
 
2.4 Defining the strikers: the legal debate on strikes and short time work 
Even before the CIG had found its first institutional codification in 1947, the problem 
of how to reconcile the intervention of short time work benefits and industrial strikes 
gave rise to a heated debate among state bureaucrats and social partners, continuing 
throughout the whole post-war period. Briefly tracking the evolution of the discussion 
within state bureaucracy can help highlight the disciplinary feature of short time work 
and see how it interacted with industrial conflict, before moving on to analyse the role 
of the CIG in the post-1969 cycle of conflict.  
 The CIG was a short time work device designed to intervene, in specific 
circumstances, to provide a replacement wage for all the hours an employee does not 
work short of his weekly contractual time. Up until the late 1960s, barring 
emergencies, the scheme was not intended to finance labour costs during complete 
suspensions of production and intervened only to cover up to a certain number of 
hours per week.65 By halting production, industrial strikes involved a proportionate 
deduction from employees’ wages, altering the weekly contractual working time and 																																																								
65 Lafranconi, ‘La cassa integrazione guadagni’, p. 40; Mazzi and Severino, ‘Finalità e funzioni della 
cassa integrazione’, p. 1831. 
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thus forcing a recalculation of the benefits provided by the CIG. According to the 
bureaucrats of the INPS, the possibility of a strike in a factory on short time created a 
jurisprudence conundrum: given that a strike cannot be considered as paid working 
time, and thus cannot be taken into account in the total working week, short time 
benefits should be reduced. In particular, every strike hour in a working week period 
should also lead to an equal subtraction from the short time allowance of the same 
week.66  
The INPS was keeping an eye on the strained finances of cassa, offering a very 
restrictive interpretation. But such a framing of the problem exponentially increased 
the monetary cost of strikes for workers. If employees on CIG went on strike, they 
would not only lose their normal hourly wage, but also the corresponding benefit 
provided by the cassa. The problem had already arisen in the post-war years, as many 
workers found themselves on short time and reduced income, protesting the wave of 
industrial closures and downsizings, the decision of the INPS significantly raised the 
organisational resources necessary to go on strike.  
The position of the institute’s bureaucrats did not go uncontested, especially by 
organised labour. Already in the late 1940s, workers’ representative within local CIG 
commissions objected to the repressive nature of INPS’s proposal, underlining that, if 
accepted, ‘workers who abstained from only one working day would lose a double 
wage, one for the actual strike, another for the cassa integrazione at 66% of the 
salary’. 67  Even Confindustria seemed to support the protest of the unions. The 
employers’ did not want to stir further unrest and hoped to smooth out social strife by 
meeting organised labour demands for a change in the excessively draconian rules set 
by INPS. 68   
In 1948, a compromise was reached: every day lost to strike in a given week 
would lead to a deduction of one-sixth from the total amount of hours subsidised by 
the CIG, ‘irrespective of whether or not the strike fell on a normal working day’. This 																																																								
66 Given the complex nature of the issue, the INPS provided some examples. For instance, if 4 hours of 
strike happened in a week in which 16 hours were paid for by the CIG, only 12 hours would be 
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would lessen the abnormal burden of strikes on the unions, but it was also 
‘satisfactory for the employers, because in such a way the employee would in any 
case also suffer the damage of the strike in the cassa integrazione’. 69  Such an 
arrangement lessened the most unjust aspects of the INPS directives, but maintained a 
disciplinary aspect in institutional edifice of the CIG to put pressure and contain 
worker mobilisation.70 
From the early 1950s onward, the jurisprudence on the cassa integrazione and 
the debate between policymakers and social partners almost completely focused on 
another issue, one that touched more directly upon the relationship between short time 
work and labour strife: namely, whether or not it was possible to use short time work 
for employees who were forced idle because of a strike by their colleagues. In theory, 
a company that resorted to CIG to suspend workers in the production cycle because 
another department was on strike could reap a dual benefit. On the one hand, it could 
reduce the impact of a strike, saving on the payment of salaries for workers that would 
have been idle anyway. On the other, it raised the cost of a strike for plant-level union 
organisation. The CIG paid only 66% of the wage and thus represented a net monetary 
loss for employees who did not partake in industrial action. If the company could 
blame this on the unions’ ‘reckless behaviour’, it could damage their organisational 
resources inside the factory.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CIG had been designed to intervene 
only in cases of accidents and production stoppages formally independent of the 
employers’ and the employees’ wills. With regards to the concession of short time 
benefits, it was not clear how a strike should be considered, however minor or 
localized, since it represented an intentional suspension of production. In 1951, the 
INPS bureaucrats within the CIG Special Committee intervened on the issue, offering 
their own interpretation of industrial conflict and class politics. According to the 
INPS:  
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‘The strike, even when it is carried out by a fraction of the company’s workforce, 
constitutes an expression of will of the workers as a collectivity – thus also comprising 
the dissenters. In this sense […] it is undoubtedly imputable to the workers and the 
inactivity cannot be covered by the cassa integrazione’ 71 
 
The statement of the Special Committee was not pacific and, in its conciseness, 
left many grey areas, but was immediately backed by the employers, with 
Confindustria siding against the intervention of short time in cases of strikes. It was 
very convenient for an individual company to use the CIG to absorb and quell a strike. 
But from the perspective of the employer class as whole – that of Confindustria - it 
was quite the opposite. The ordinary fund of the cassa integrazione, in fact, was 
financed entirely by employer contributions. This created a contradiction. A director 
of the employer association argued that allowing the intervention of the CIG during a 
strike ‘would have encouraged the unions to limit the number of strikers to those 
working only in the vital knots of a company or economic sector, disguising other 
workers as dissenters, with the result of allowing the cassa to finance the strike’. The 
risk underlined by the employers was that ‘in order to offer disproportionate 
protection for a few innocents, we support the malicious games of those who are 
not’.72 A different interpretation would have created a collective action problem, 
allowing individual firms a free ride on the whole employer class while decreasing the 
costs of labour strife for the unions. 
The position was reiterated by the President of Confindustria, Angelo Costa, 
who in July 1951 wrote to one of its local offices, speculating on the reasons behind 
the decision of the Special Committee. According to the President:  
 
‘the committee did not so much consider the legal aspect of workers as a collectivity – 
that is the unions […] but the substantial aspect of it, namely the existence of a 
homogenous […] social category. Within this category, everything that affects a group 
of workers has repercussions on the whole collectivity. This unity has to be taken into 
account by those who want to strike’.73  
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An emerging consensus was solidifying around the INPS and Confindustria to 
prevent short time work from being used during strikes. Yet, single firms continued to 
take advantage of possible loopholes, particularly at the local level. The close 
connection between the employers’ representatives in the provincial CIG committee 
and the local business community made it easy to take advantage of the system. 
 Furthermore, and most worryingly, the Ministry of Labour was not convinced 
by the interpretation provided by the employers and the INPS, and its representatives 
often tried to back the unions in favour of more permissive rules.74 At the beginning of 
February 1952, Costa was openly complaining to the Ministry of Labour because it 
had accepted the appeal of a company that had used the CIG during an external strike. 
The Ministry of Labour stated that a strike inside the same factory prohibited the use 
of short time work. However, it also recognised that in the case of outside labour 
unrest ‘it was not possible to hold workers accountable for something in which they 
did not partake, directly or indirectly’. Costa was extremely dissatisfied, and invited 
the Ministry to consider how this dangerous interpretation played into the hands of 
organised labour:  
 
‘on the territory, the unions are organised in horizontal institutions that coordinate the 
actions of all their members […] across different sectors. As such, it is never possible 
to rule out entirely the possibility that workers from one company indirectly 
participated in the strike in another’.75 
 
 The dispute between Confindustria and the Ministry of Labour continued into 
the latter part of the 1960s. The employers’ association received the support of INPS 
representatives and that of the Ministry of Treasury, both interested in keeping 
expenditure down. Yet, the Ministry of Labour kept interfering within central 
decision-making bodies, particularly when the cases under consideration had high 
political significance.76 
The existence of competing interpretations of the rules of the CIG made it 
difficult for both local employers and unions to organise their strategies, affecting the 																																																								
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dynamic of contention at the factory level. At times, companies filed requests for 
short time to local commissions with the expectation that they would not to be 
accepted.  In other times, it was the unions that tried to prolong minor strikes in the 
expectation that workers would receive the support of short time work. In the first 
three years of the 1960s, the CIG Special Committee took into consideration twelve 
cases in which companies from all over the country, especially in the textile sector, 
made use of the CIG due to strikes. In each case, the Committee decided against the 
granting of benefits. 77 But the cases brought up at the central level represented only a 
minor fraction of the total and the evidence seems to suggest that there was 
widespread complacency at the local level within provincial CIG commissions. As the 
overall rate of labour strife in the Italian labour market grew during the mid-1960s, 
single companies increasingly resorted to short time benefits to absorb the costs of 
strikes, partly under the pressure of the very workers.78 
The solution to the problem of how to treat strikes in relation to CIG benefits 
arrived only in the mid-1960s, as the Ministry of Labour asked for an official decision 
by the Consiglio di Stato, the State Council, the supreme legal consulting body of the 
Presidency of the Republic. During a meeting in January 1966, the State Council 
opposed the ‘right to strike’ to the ‘right to work’, recognising that workers - even 
within the same factory - cannot legally be considered as collectivelly liable:  ‘for 
those workers that are not striking or are in a department that is forced idle because of 
a strike […] there is a cause of force majeure, of objective impossibility to continue 
working’. The response of the State Council concluded: ‘as a social event, the strike is 
a collective act.  However, the decision whether or not to participate in it – by single 
workers – is a clear manifestation of will’.79  The new interpretation provided by the 
State Council solved the legal conflict, favouring a broad interpretation of the 
functions of short time work. The CIG was now allowed to intervene in case in which 
workers had been forced idle because of industrial strife. Furthermore strikes would 																																																								
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not longer entail a subtraction from the total amount paid by short time. In no small 
part, these legal changes were due to the transformations in the Italian political 
context. The 1960s were marked by a general shift towards center-left politics with 
the 1963 government, led by Christian Democrat Aldo Moro, that opened the alliance 
with the PSI. The reformist and pro-labour stance of the new governments of the time 
might explain the more accommodating rules, seemingly meeting the demands of the 
Ministry of Labour and the unions.80 
The general disposition of the State Council was sui generis and it was up to the 
CIG Special Committee to be more specific, implementing a concrete policy line. In 
late 1968, the Committee decided to proceed by rule of thumb, assessing the relative 
position of strikers in the context of the productive system of the single company that 
applied for short time.  The CIG could be used only in cases in which the strike 
engulfed only a sector of the factory ‘for motives concerning only that very sector’. If 
a general strike erupted in the factory, even if some workers decided not to partake in 
it, the intervention of the CIG was not allowed. If, on the contrary, workers staged a 
strike with demands pertaining only to their work team or department, other workers 
would be allowed the benefit of the CIG.81 In order to favour the implementation of the 
new directives and harmonise the workings of the provincial commissions, the Special 
Committee decided to centralise temporarily the decisions regarding strikes, asking 
local INPS representatives to forward details regarding number of strikers and issues. 
Shortly afterwards, in mid-January 1971, the INPS returned the authority to decide 
over strikes to the provincial commissions. With the momentous changes that 
intervened after the Hot Autumn, the spread of industrial strife and factory micro-
conflict rapidly overloaded bureaucratic capacity at a central level, forcing 
bureaucrats to decentralise again the decision-making process.82  
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2.5 The disciplinary use of the Cassa Integrazione in the car industry 
The advice of the State Council was not binding and a lot of discretionary freedom 
remained with local and central committees. Yet, the pronunciation of such an 
authoritative institution conditioned the stance of many key players, especially among 
the government and bureaucrats, altering the official position of the CIG Special 
Committee. The content and timing of this new decision proved crucial, as the cycle 
of industrial conflict entered a new, drastically different, phase. The choice to allow 
the intervention of the CIG-O in case of localised strikes opened new pathways for the 
management of industrial micro-conflict in the Fordist factory system.  
The car industry is the pivotal point to gauge the impact that the changes in the 
jurisprudence of short time had on the dynamic of industrial relations on the factory 
shop floor. There also were several instances of the CIG-O being used to target 
strikers in the capital-intensive chemical sector and in the textile industry, where the 
smaller average company size and the relative weakness of the unions - due to a long 
tradition of employer paternalism – made the use and abuse of the CIG-O very 
frequent. 83  The automotive sector, however, remained the epitome of Fordist 
manufacturing. The principles of mass production work organisation and vertical 
integration had firstly been developed for the car industry and this is where industrial 
concentration reached its peak level. The growth of the car industry not only altered 
the landscape with its large factories, but also, in the most radical instances, 
restructured the whole urban setting. In Turin, aptly labelled the ‘automobile capital’ 
of Italy, car companies reorganised the entire social life of the city around their 
industry84. When the wave of strikes of the Hot Autumn engulfed the country’s 
industrial system, the car industry is where it hit first and most fiercely.85  
By virtue of their large size and the high degree of industrial organisation 
integration, car factories were the most exposed to the disruptions caused by wildcat 																																																								
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strikes and the damage of unregulated industrial conflict. Furthermore, the socio-
economic significance of the car industry meant it had greater political weight, with 
developments in its industrial relations system often providing a model for the rest of 
the national polity. In many other countries, big car companies often led innovation in 
collective bargaining practices.86 This was even more the case for Italy, where the 
smaller average size of industrial units rendered automotive companies the towering 
giants of its industrial economy. During the Hot Autumn and its aftermath, the car 
industry provided a laboratory for both union politics - with the first development of 
bottom up workers’ democracy and ameliorative plant level agreements – and 
managerial manpower policies. In April 1974 the centrality of the car industry was 
confirmed by the election of Giovanni Agnelli, owner of FIAT, to the Presidency of 
Confindustria. 87 Both because of its weight and vulnerabilities to micro-conflict, the 
car industry offers a valuable case study to asses the way in which short time 
interacted with industrial conflict, shedding light on wider trends across Italy.  
 
 The manpower policies of FIAT, Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino, the largest 
private automobile company in the country, provide a good starting point. As early as 
the interwar period, FIAT tried to selectively implement the main tenets of Fordist 
manufacturing in its factory of Mirafiori, opened in 1939, and immediately began full 
throttle production to fuel the war effort. The partial implementation of scientific 
management, however, continued to coexist with forms of organised craftsmanship. It 
is only since the mid-1950s that the application of mass production practices started to 
take up the pace. In 1956, FIAT Mirafiori was expanded to accommodate increased 
production, creating the Mirafiori-Sud extension unit. The assembly line was 
restructured with the introduction of automated equipment and the company launched 
a new vehicle, the 600.88 During the post-war period, the number of employees grew at 
a fast rate: between 1948 and 1965 the workforce in Mirafiori grew by 164%. By 
1969 the factory had more than 46,000 employees, making it the largest in Italy. In 
1967, FIAT had already inaugurated another car factory in the Turinese area, Rivalta, 																																																								
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which host more than 11,000 workers.89 Both Rivalta and Mirafiori were organised 
around the principle of vertical integration, with long and parallel moving assembly 
lines that covered the whole vehicle production cycle, from metal pressing to road 
trials.90 
The extremely streamlined process of production and the high concentration of 
workers made the Turinese auto industry a bedrock of workers’ militancy, particularly 
in Mirafiori. With the unions often unable to keep up with the most radical demands 
that emerged after 1969, many blue-collar factory employees drifted towards radical 
far left groups, which were more prone to direct industrial action.  During the summer 
of 1969, the company granted some concessions, introducing assembly line worker 
delegates and new working time regulations, with longer breaks and fixed daily 
production targets. Instead of mitigating conflict, however, the agreement with the 
unions opened a spiralling wave of strikes. As the metalworking unions seized on the 
mobilising potential of the factory, the first embryos of worker democracy were fully 
developed towards the creation of a factory council. The council was officially 
recognised by the company in 1971 and included more than 500 representatives, 
including union members, making it the largest in the country.91 The number of cars 
that FIAT lost due to strikes remained high throughout the first half of the 1970s, with 
relevant spikes in 1969 and 1973 in connection with the periodic renewals of the 
metalworking national contract. 
 
Tab. 2.1 industrial conflict at FIAT (1969-1975)92 
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The need to diffuse labour conflict and absorb its costs led FIAT to widespread 
use of the CIG-O from the very beginning of the autumn of 1969. Indeed, the 
intervention of the CIG-O operated as a powerful accelerator for the strikes wave, 
tying in with the very origins of the cycle of labour conflict. In the beginning of 
September, FIAT management decided to suspend 20,000 Mirafiori workers for more 
than a week because of strikes that had erupted in the factory. At the end of the 
holiday break, after mid-August, many teams and groups of workers inside the factory 
were in agitation, clamoring against the delays in the improvement of their job 
qualification schemes. By early September, the tide of protests had grown to the point 
that a whole mechanics department and workers from the assembly line of the 500 
went on strike. Against the disruption that risked spilling over, FIAT decided to put 
both the assembly and bodywork production departments on CIG-O, bringing the 
assembly line to a complete standstill. By suspending a large number of workers 
downstream in the production cycle, the company hoped to raise the organisational 
costs of micro-conflict, imposing a monetary loss via short time on workers who were 
not actively striking. The metalworking union FIOM, through the pages of l’Unità, 
likened the use of the CIG-O to a lockout: ‘a clear attempt to create a climate of 
distrust between the unions […] and division among the workers in order to disavow 
the agreements and suffocate the struggles inside the factory’.93  
Notwithstanding the official endorsement of Confindustria, which supported 
FIAT, the decision of the company backfired. In the context of the upcoming autumn 
negotiation for the renewal of the metalworking sector’s national contract, the unions 
wanted to show their strength and keep up with their increasingly radical base. They 
called for a general strike of the auto industry, which enjoyed substantial success and 																																																								
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Year Cars lost to strike (thousands) Total hours by contract/effective hours (yearly)
1969 273 2022 / 1800
1970 88,3  1991 / 1839
1971 87,3 1976 / 1746
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1973 146,3 1856 / 1584
1974 92,9 1879 / 1516
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reached FIAT plants across the country, in Milan and Florence. This prompted the 
company to impose another round of work-time reduction in its two factories of 
Lingotto and Rivalta, in Turin, bringing them to a complete standstill. On the 5th of 
September a reporter from l’Unità recounted accounts of factories wrapped in a 
suspenseful silence: ‘today the gates of Mirafiori were deserted. Not a single car is 
coming out the auto empire anymore. The suspended workers now amount to thirty 
thousand […] it is an inexorable war of attrition’.94  
According to the unions, FIAT’s decision was not fortuitous and had been 
planned well in advance as a warning bell for the upcoming autumn. Allegedly, a 
close aide to FIAT’s owner Giovanni Agnelli had stated: ‘it is clear, the factory was at 
war and FIAT went to war’, implicitly likening the use of the CIG-O to a weapon 
against the strikers. 95  The official motivation that the company gave for the 
suspensions appeared preposterous to the unions, with three entire factories brought to 
a halt due to an initial strike of less than a thousand employees. 
Grassroots union pressures for the government to intervene led the Christian 
Democrat Minister of Labour Carlo Donat Cattin to take a stance on the issue. On the 
11th of September, reporting to the XIII Permanent Parliamentary Commission on 
Labour and Social issues, Donat Cattin recognised that the motives of FIAT were 
‘arguable’.96  The massive suspensions of workers due to technical reasons, namely the 
absence of semi-finisheds, had little justification. The Minister tasked the labour 
inspectorates of Genoa and Milan to help the Turin office to carry out an independent 
investigation on FIAT, fearing the excessive proximity between local public 
institutions and the heads of the company. Yet, Donat Cattin warned against 
exaggerations. According to him, FIAT’s stance could not be considered explicitly 
anti-union, but rather proved the understandable reluctance of the company to allow 
strikes and engage in negotiations with undefined counterparts. The Minister’s 
critique pointed at the incapacity of official labour movement to rein in autonomous 
worker action and at the increasing pressure of the rank and file on official union 
structures.97  
Only towards the end of September did Donat Cattin officially condemn FIAT’s 
behaviour, recognising that the company’s application for the CIG-O was not 																																																								
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motivated by a ‘state of necessity’. The initial report of the investigation committee 
appointed by the Ministry of Labour stated: ‘at the time of the adoption of the 
suspension there were not enough stockpiles to continue production’. Yet, the 
Minister noted, the reactivation of all the factories was very sudden after the end of 
the strike; too sudden not to cast doubt over the righteousness of FIAT’s request for 
short time work, with the likely probability that the company had consciously stashed 
away semi-finished. The unions cheered at the official confirmation ‘that the half 
lockout of Mirafiori was nothing but a premeditated political act by Agnelli and his 
general staff, independent of any technical necessity’. 98  In the Chamber, the 
communist MP Pietro Ingrao denounced that ‘one of the most recent and dangeours 
abuse of the bosses […] was financed through the Cassa integrazione, hence, with 
state funds’99. 
It was not the first time that the turinese auto industry resorted to work-time 
suspensions in such a carefree way. It had already done so during the slowdown that 
ensued at the end of the economic miracle, in the midst of the 1963 campaign for the 
election of the unions’ internal commission of Mirafiori.100 Yet, unlike past examples, 
the scale of the intervention in September 1969 was perceived as a blatant provocation 
by organised labour, which now had the organisational power to resist it. The 
condemnation issued by the Ministry of Labour had an immediate impact on FIAT’s 
attitude. There is no evidence of large-scale use of the CIG-O in the Turinese auto 
industry during the high tide of the conflict in autumn, 1969.  
It was only after the signing of the new metalworking national contract in 
January 1970 that FIAT started to resort again to massive work-time stoppages to 
cope with industrial conflict. On the 3rd of July, the company used short time benefits 
to bring the Rivalta factory in Turin to a halt, justifying the choice with the strikes that 
had erupted in the engine test department in Mirafiori. Almost 12,000 workers were 
affected, with an additional 4,750 in the factory of Lingotto and 3,000 in the 
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Autobianchi factory of Desio, a subsidiary of FIAT in the outskirts of Milan.101 The 
metalworking unions not only denounced the arbitrariness of short time, but blamed 
the company's bad management planning and the increasing rigidity of Fordist 
manufacturing. By resorting to the CIG-O, the unions accused, ‘the company 
explicitly admitted that its production organisation has severe defects, so much so that 
a single glitch in a department can lead to the halt of four large plants with tens of 
thousands of workers’.102  
The growing use of short time led the labour movement to develop a new 
jargon: the word messa in libertà - literally the act of ‘setting the workers free’ – 
began to be used to indicate when a company suspended the workers with little or no 
forewarning due to strikes and technical stoppages of the production cycle. The 
sudden and arbitrary use of short time created extreme confusion on the factory shop 
floor, and it was often difficult for the unions to precisely estimate what proportion of 
wages had been lost due to the intervention of the CIG: in February 1971, for 
instance, almost 30,000 thousands workers in Turin saw their weekly hours reduced 
as a consequence of a strike in the plastic industry. The suspensions affected various 
factories to different degrees and the unions could provide only a rough estimate of 
the monetary loss, ‘on average between 14,000 and 16,000 lire per employee’.103 
 The impact of the CIG on the workers’ income was problematic not only 
because of its net replacement rate of wages being lower than their actual value, but 
also because it often took time for local commissions to process short time work 
applications. The sluggishness of bureaucratic procedures severely delayed the 
payments of the CIG-O, sometimes for months after actual suspensions.104 Employers 
were supposed to anticipate the payment of CIG-O on monthly payslips, to be 
reimbursed by the INPS later, but could only do so with official authorisation. At the 
end of November 1970, the CGIL representative in the provincial CIG commission of 
Turin, Remo Savio, reported that it had been necessary to call a special meeting to 																																																								
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consider all the requests for short time work related to strikes that had been piling 
up.105 
The effects of the CIG-O on the dynamic of factory shop-floor relations created 
rifts not only between workers in different departments, but most importantly between 
the official union movement and radical worker groups. Autonomous worker groups 
were particularly vocal in denouncing the strikebreaking use of the CIG-O and offered 
the most consistent analysis of it. In the mid-1970s, a LC research committee 
published a comprehensive report of the various managerial strategies put forward by 
FIAT. The company resorted many times to the outright sacking of radical factory 
vanguards. Yet, it was the mandata a casa – ‘sending the workers home’ - that 
represented the most powerful weapon. The CIG-O was used by FIAT ‘plain and 
simply, as a lockout’.106 LC identified at least four levels at which the use of short time 
work had an effect on industrial conflict:  
 
‘In the first place, work suspensions […] incite resentments between fellow workers. 
On a second level, the company avoids paying unproductive workers. Thirdly, the 
extension of the struggle is reduced, fourthly, the union is forced to take a stance 
regarding the rightness of a strike’.107  
 
The report identified not only the direct impact of the CIG-O on single strikers 
but also the way in which it altered contention strategies, pushing the unions, albeit 
reluctantly, to take a strong stance towards wildcat actions. In the spring of 1975, this 
perspective was also echoed in the radical review of Primo Maggio, where Biagio 
Longo argued on the disciplinary use of the CIG and used the case of FIAT to show 
how short time work was used in coincidence of ‘chessboard and articulated strikes 
[…] as a surrogate of an employer’s lockout’. According to Longo, ‘momentary 
production difficulties are exaggerated on purpose and exploited as anti-strike 
blackmail’108. 
LC recognised that the use of the CIG-O ‘led to changes in the way squad 
strikes are born and develop’, but it was often not in the direction FIAT intended. 
According to Enrico Deaglio - a militant from the group and later on director of the 																																																								
105  Camera Confederale del Lavoro di Torino, Segr. Sindacale ai Sindacati Provinciali, Torino, 
20/11/1970, Oggetto: Cassa Integrazione scioperi, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 609, f. 4.  
106 Enrico Deaglio (Ed.), La Fiat com’è. La ristrutturazione davanti all’autonomia operaia (Milano: 
Feltrinelli, 1975), p. 55. 
107 Ibidem, p. 55. 
108 Longo, ‘Meno Salario, Più Reddito’, p. 27. 
		 99	
newspaper between 1977 and 1982 - the company never successfully managed to 
foster division: ‘the workers reaction to this mini-lockouts helped to build the 
understanding that this is an anti-worker instrument. Even the union was forced to 
oppose it officially and declare new strikes as a form of protest’.109  Instead of quelling 
strikes, short time could prove to be a double edged sword for management. It could 
be transformed into an instrument for autonomous groups to spiral industrial conflict. 
A strike would cause the intervention of the CIG, which, in turn, would engender 
protest of the suspended workers, triggering a vicious circle in which strikes and 
work-time reductions chased after one another. LC was stating: 
 
‘the teams that are sent home remain and create a procession with the other strikers to 
go and halt the assembly lines that are still working. Often there are strikes the 
following day, requesting salary payment […] and by now the union cannot oppose 
them anymore. What used to be an instrument to divide the workers, is now a weapon 
to generalise the struggle'.110 
 
Instances in which the use of the CIG-O, instead of stopping strikes, triggered 
new ones, were not amiss: on the 7th of September, 1971 FIAT used the CIG-O in two 
bodywork production shops of Mirafiori as a retaliation against the strike of forty 
workers in the painting department. The day after, the relieved employees, together 
with workers from the painting department, protested the suspensions, demanding the 
full payment of wages, to which the company replied by imposing a further round of 
suspensions in the assembly lines of FIAT 124 and 125 models.111 
Union stewards shared the broad lines of LC’s interpretation of the CIG-O, but 
they inferred a drastically different lesson in service of their own strategy. 
Autonomous worker groups had a magmatic understanding of industrial conflict, 
believing that strikes would spill over on the strength of their own momentum. For the 
unions, instead, the use of short time work posed the problem of how to plan and 
organise strikes in a way that would thwart the managerial use of the CIG-O. 
According to the historian Andrea Graziosi - one of the few to take into consideration 
shop floor politics of the early 1970s - short time was a preventive deterrent for the 																																																								
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official labour movement: ‘they forced every industrial action, even if localised, to 
drag in and mobilise all the workers of the factory’.112 Autonomous wildcat actions, 
uncoordinated and limited to single departments, risked engendering broad 
retaliations. As early as in 1969 the unions criticised radical groups, warning of the 
dangers of excessive individualism: ‘small groups of workers who want to impose 
new strikes, different from those that we have decided together, are only playing into 
the hands of the bosses’.113  
The CIG-O had a deleterious effect on strike mobilisation, but the threat of its 
intervention could be successfully used also by the unions to discipline the most 
radical workers, accused of pursuing their individual interest. In March 1971, the 
factory council of Mirafiori outlined its strategy: recurrent autonomous strikes had to 
be refused, because they forced many workers to ‘remain home, dispersed’. Protest 
actions had to be articulated coherently, through the unitary direction of the Council, 
so as not to give the company any ‘justification for suspensions’. Hours of strike 
should be distributed evenly ‘in every sector, but most importantly in every plant, 
according to a common plan and with perfect timing among the various teams […] 
and assembly lines’. Leaving strikers isolated meant, ‘getting beaten by the boss […] 
allowing him to crack down on single groups of workers’.114  
When the unions decided to back a strike, their official support was 
accompanied by a massive campaign of information and propaganda throughout the 
various departments of Mirafiori and in the other factories, so as to ensure all workers 
understood the motives and objectives of individual strikes. They did so, for instance, 
in the first part of 1972, when the workers tasked with bulk handling inside Mirafiori 
opened up a struggle with the company for the improvement of their job classification 
scheme. Against their strikes, the company resorted to the CIG-O. It did so on the 7th 
of March, when it suspended 3,000 workers in the bodywork department of the 
factory and again a month after, on the 7th of April, when it sent home 3,000 workers 
from the assembly department115. The unions tried to resist these decisions, but most 
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importantly, tried to communicate the motives behind the strikes. A flier distributed in 
another factory - that of Rivalta - read: ‘the bulk handlers are under attack and 
marginalised. FIAT sends home all the other workers connected to the supply of 
materials. […] In order to beat the isolation it is necessary to extend the struggle […] 
in Rivalta’.116 Another union flier invited workers to ‘discuss forms and durations of 
strikes also with the others who are not directly involved […]. In case of new 
suspensions, in all assembly lines, it is necessary to remain in our places”.117  
The strategy of the unions to generalise and expand the scope of strikes to avoid 
the intervention of the CIG-O was not without drawbacks. The need to mobilise many 
departments of the factory at once forced the strikers to move from concrete, squad 
specific problems, towards large but vague political objectives, which risked 
remaining unclear. In a November 1972 note, the metalworkers unions underlined 
how ‘FIAT uses downstream-upstream suspensions to exasperate the workers and 
deviate the struggle towards improvised and generic goals, with the sole aim of 
regulating the right to strike’.118  
In this context, autonomous worker groups criticised organised labour for 
quelling the demands of the rank and file. The opposing strategies of the unions and 
the radical left, jostling for consensus on the factory shop floor, left the door open to 
the continued use of short time work to stem strikes. Still in April 1973, on the eve of 
the oil crisis, the press office of the newly created unitary metalworkers federation, 
the FLM, presented a report with an entire chapter dedicated to all the episodes of 
anti-union behaviour at FIAT between 1972 and the first trimester of 1973. The 
introduction to the report read:  
 
‘employers used lockouts, mass suspensions, refusals to allow employees to work (with 
the consequent nonpayment of contractual working hours) during wildcat strikes. This 
attitude was clearly in line with the attempt to negate the strikes and the most 
fundamental worker rights’.119 																																																																																																																																																															
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The use of the CIG-O proved crucial at FIAT to stem strikes and cushion the impact 
of micro-conflict on the highly integrated production cycle of Fordist manufacturing. 
The CIG-O helped to contain the costs of strikes and isolate protesters, driving a 
wedge inside the unity of the rank and file. Most importantly, it forced both the unions 
and radical groups to alter their contention tactics, becoming a source of discord and 
competition between the two. Organised labour had always regarded FIAT as a 
particularly harsh employer, with the memory of its authoritarian tactics during the 
1950s still well ingrained in union stewards.120 Yet, its managerial manpower policies 
proved to be the norm, rather than the exception, even if we look at the publicly 
owned industrial sector.  
The case of Alfa Romeo, the second largest Italian automobile group and 
flagship of the state shareholding system, shows that even public management 
resorted to the CIG-O as a disciplinary device to regulate industrial conflict. The 
company was not part of Confindustria, but was organised in the Intersind, the public 
employers association, which often proved to be more open to negotiation with the 
unions.121  
The advent of mass production at Alfa Romeo was even more delayed than at 
FIAT. The company was established at the beginning of the twentieth century, with 
craft like production techniques, a highly skilled workforce and a very narrow target 
market. Initially, production was concentrated in the factory of Portello, inside the city 
of Milan.  In the early 1920s, the economic crisis following the end of World War I 
led the company to the brink of failure and forced the intervention of the state, with 
the transformation of Alfa into a state owned company.122 It was only at the beginning 
of the 1960s that the management at Alfa Romeo decided to shift to the 
implementation of Fordist labour organisation. In 1963 the new factory in Arese was 
inaugurated to supplant the one at Portello. The plant was built on almost two million 
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square meters on the outskirts of Milan and had a workforce of 16,000 workers, 
making it the third largest in the country.123 
Just as the new factory was about to reach full capacity in 1968, Alfa Romeo 
planned a new investment, with the opening of a new factory in the town of 
Pomigliano d’Arco, in the area near Naples. The plant, called AlfaSud, was 
inaugurated in 1973, on the verge of the oil crisis. Compared to previous cases, 
Pomigliano implemented the principles of scientific management to an even higher 
degree. The workforce, lacking in skills and completely outside the range of official 
labour unions, was pulled from non-industrialised areas of the South.124 Internally, the 
factory revolved around a single continuous assembly line built across different 
departments, organised both vertically and horizontally; a highly integrated system 
that soon came to be nicknamed by the workers as the ‘big snake’, to mock its 
extreme rigidity.125 
 When the wave of strikes of the Hot Autumn engulfed the country, the size and 
high concentration of workers in the two factories made them a hotbed of industrial 
conflict. In Milan, Arese soon became the ideological epicentre of metalworker 
unions and radical groups alike, which could tap on the mobilisational potential of a 
large and already politicised workforce. The factory came to be known in the area as 
the ‘metalworkers' cathedral’ and the first factory council that emerged out of the 
strikes of the early 1970s could count on close to 400 members, second only to the 
membership of Mirafiori.126 Even at the highest peak of output, in 1973 when the 
factory churned out 123,309 cars, endemic industrial conflict kept production far 
below its intended maximum capacity.127 Pomigliano d’Arco represented an even more 
extreme case: the almost total absence of industrial union structures in the South and 
the fact that the workforce had never before been socialized to the routine of Fordist 
factory work thwarted any attempt to control strikes. In the context of a newly 
industrialised area, unions competed against one another and with radical groups to 
attract the most members and were prone to second the radical demands to boost their 																																																								
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support. Pomigliano represented a politically and socially fertile territory, where the 
various organisations could try and test the validity of their ideologies and strategies. 
Lotta Continua even sent a delegation from the North to set up its organisation in 
Naples. As early as the first two years, 1974 and 1975, after its inauguration, 
Pomigliano averaged more than one hundred micro-conflict actions per month, 
making it almost ungovernable128 
Similar to FIAT, evidence of consistent use of the CIG-O at Alfa Romeo started 
to emerge after the signing of the metalworking national contract in January 1970 and 
the receding of the autumn wave of strikes. In February 1970, in retaliation for a strike 
in the pressing department of Arese, the company resorted to a massive round of 
suspensions in the assembly department, blaming the strikers for ‘acting selfishly 
without consideration for the other employees.’129 Not only did management resort to 
the same repertoire of accusation as in FIAT to try and pit employees in various 
departments against one another, but also the response within the unions was broadly 
similar, with factory council stewards accusing the company of staging ‘a political 
act’.130 In June 1971, when the workers responsible for bulk handling in the assembly 
and pressing departments of Arese entered into strike over the refusal of management 
to grant a pay increase, the company immediately resorted to a complete suspension 
of work via the CIG-O for more than 3,000 workers; a move that the factory council 
denounced as part of a ‘repressive policy line’, urging the workers to ‘avoid any form 
of disintegration, division and to be always united’.131 In public and private companies 
alike, the intervention of short time served to achieve the same end result, quelling 
conflict by increasing its organisational costs and its negative impact on workers’ 
incomes. 
The usage of the CIG-O in combination with strikes was not the result of 
particularly devious manpower policies, but a necessity dictated by the fragility of 
Fordist manufacturing in the face of micro-conflict. The extreme integration of 
production in automobile factories made them vulnerable to disruption. Indeed, often 
short time was concentrated in those departments that were particularly crucial to the 																																																								
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overall organisation of the factory or were characterised by production flow 
bottlenecks.  The foundry department of Arese was examplary. The department was 
the most important of the whole complex, supplying metal sheets and rough material 
to not only the factory, but the entire company, including its other two units in 
Portello and Pomigliano d'Arco.132 Working conditions in the foundry were harsh, with 
employees constantly exposed to noxious fumes and high temperatures, forced to 
work at appalling rates and with few brakes. Partly due to the importance of the 
department, the management had shown a rather uncompromising stance towards any 
attempt at reform. Only at the beginning of 1973 did the struggle for betterment of 
working conditions emerge strongly in Arese. The factory council started to campaign 
for a drastic change in organisation of production in the foundry, demanding to work 
at a slower pace, with the introduction of additional breaks, and to restructure the 
working environment so as to have more space and oxygenations areas.133  
The preferred form of strikes in the foundry department was work-to-rule, with 
workers slowing down production arbitrarily, but always in compliance with the base 
minimum set in plant-level agreements. The stated aim was to bring a disruption to 
production while also bringing into light the severe flaws existing in the rules 
governing the factory, which was congested because of the excessive productive 
burden. The factory council and the FLM had always underlined how the supply 
problems in the foundry were due to the fact that production was organised on the 
basis of an unrealistic target.134 Against rank and file mobilisation in the department, 
Alfa Romeo used the CIG-O. In March 1973, for instance, Alfa suspended 6,000 
workers for an entire day because of a strike in the foundry.135 In September of the 
same year, several workers in the engine and assembling department were put on 
short time because of the lack of upstream supply of metal sheets.136 A memo from the 
company in November 1974 clearly underlined the problem at hand with strikes in the 
foundry and the need to resort to the CIG-O:  
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‘the rigidity of the plant and the high level of production cycle integration led to a 
situation in which few people who abstain from work, even for a short period of time, 
[…] but who are located in a crucial position, can amplify enormously the damage done 
to factory efficiency’.137 
 
Alfa Romeo used the CIG-O in Arese to streamline the manufacturing process 
and avoid strikes causing bottlenecks among the sectors of the factory. As in FIAT 
Mirafiori, Fordist industrial organisation in Milan proved ill suited to absorb the 
increased rate of industrial conflict, forcing the management to use work-time 
suspensions to square manpower imbalances and discipline the workforce. The same 
problems were magnified in Pomigliano d’Arco. Left wing parties and unions put a 
lot of hope into the Alfasud factory becoming a kernel for the development of 
employment in the South. 138  Yet, they also understood the severe organisational 
problems of the factory. In a mid-1975 flier, the FLM reported: 
 
‘the AlfaSud had been planned before 1968 and was completely unprepared to 
tackle the unions' demands regarding [...] labour organisation and work 
environment, which emerged from the hot autumn. Beyond the external facade, 
today the factory is the oldest and most rigid Italian automobile factory in terms 
of productive organisation’.139  
 
Almost immediately, the competition between unions and radical groups, with 
the need to constantly mobilise the workforce, produced a very adversarial stance in 
Pomigliano. This, in turn, resulted in management's retaliation, with arbitrary 
suspensions and disciplinary measures hitting the strikers, even before the factory was 
actually inaugurated. In December 1972, the company suspended 3,000 workers from 
its body shop for two days because of a general strike called by the FLM in all public 
industries, and it did so again a month after, when 3,500 workers were left home.140 
The departments that were targeted by the CIG-O were those in which working 
conditions and the restlessness of workers made the potential for conflict higher, such 																																																								
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as the painting shop. Since November 1971, the unions had set up a commission to 
oversee the construction of the AlfaSud factory and intervene where working 
conditions were more dangerous. However, they never managed to make substantial 
inroads into the painting department, which became a bastion of radical workers’ 
groups. In May 1973, the factory council was explicitly criticised by LC for not 
endorsing a strike because of the fear of suspensions, which punctually came, in 
downstream departments. At Pomigliano, the threat of the CIG-O immediately 
became an issue of contention between unions and autonomous worker groups, with 
the former accusing radicals of fomenting an individualist behaviour and the latter 
condemning organised labour for helping management to pacify the shop floor.141 In 
early July 1973, the workers in the painting cabins disrupted production, asking for a 
betterment of hygienic conditions and were countered with the downstream 
suspensions of the body shop department. In almost all cases, autonomous groups 
asked workers to remain at their places, ignoring the directives of the the factory 
council, which ‘does not do anything to organise the struggles and shamelessely 
opposes workers’ demands […], mechanically defending the bureaucrats’.142 
 
The brief overview of manpower policies in the Italian car industry during the high 
tide of industrial strife in the early 1970s shows that the ordinary short time work 
scheme played a key part in the politics of the factory shop floor. In the face of rising 
industrial conflict and increasingly ungovernable factories, the enduring use of the 
CIG-O emerged as a regulative response to the failures of Fordist industrial 
organisation. Whether we consider private or public companies, the use of short time 
work provided a key instrument to introduce manpower flexibility, coping with the 
abnormal antagonism of organised labour and the rank and file. Far from being a 
simple instrument of income maintenance - as traditional power resource theory 
would have had it – the CIG-O played a direct part in quelling labour strife, targeting 
the mobilisational capacity of the strikers. It did not only make the factory system 
more resilient to endogenous social disruptions. The repeated threat of suspensions to 
counter strikes exposed the structural differences between the competing strategies of 
official unions and autonomous worker groups, adding to the internal divisions of the 																																																								
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Italian industrial working class.  
The delay with which Fordist mass production was introduced in the Italian 
industrial system is key to understand these developments. The country’s managerial 
class invested many political and economic resources into the introduction of Fordist 
manufacturing precisely at the moment in which system started to show its 
limitations. This not only explains the sudden and unregulated burst of labour strife in 
1969, but also why Italian capitalism chose to stall bottom-up workers demands 
through the misuse of the welfare system. Instead of introducing early technological 
change and a negotiated industrial restructuring that would have jeopardized their 
recent investment, large Italian companies sought to confront industrial restructuring 
and social conflict through what they had at hand, short time work schemes.  
The parallel expansion of the CIG-S, during these years, can be analysed in a 
similar light. The chemical and textile industries felt the brunt of the upcoming 
economic crisis of the 1970s earlier and more strongly. Growing international 
competition undercut their profits while exposing their structural problems of 
industrial overcapacity. The situation was aggravated by the incapacity of state 
industrial policy to put forward a coherent set of proactive measures to foster 
industrial growth, with the government effectively paralysed by the failure of its 
centre-left policy formulas, torn between the need to foster technological change and 
that of guaranteeing an income to redundant workers. Ahead of the rise of labour 
unrest, the use of the discretionary CIG-S emerged as a way for employers’ to 
sidestep organised labour’s demands for control over the process of industrial 
restructuring, dampening on the state the social cost of manpower redundancies while 
helping to demobilise workers on the shop floor.  
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3. Economic crisis, class politics and the ‘guaranteed 
wage’, 1973-1975 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 unemployment and intra-left competition. 
In the early 1970s, the CIG became a highly flexible social policy device that allowed 
the state to intervene into the everyday life of Italian factories. The use of short time 
work emerged as the organisational response of Italian capitalism to the dual pressure 
exercised by a slowing rate of growth and the rise of social conflict. The introduction 
and further expansion of the CIG-S allowed the state and business to absorb the social 
costs of industrial restructuring, resorting to prolonged redundancies without 
provoking worker unrest. In parallel, the persistent use of the CIG-O served to diffuse 
the impact of industrial conflict on the factory shop floor, regulating the pace of 
strikes and targeting the organisational resources of worker councils and local union 
structures.  
Fordist work organisation - particularly in the automobile industry – was the 
most exposed to the damages of industrial contention. By the early 1970s, the 
feasibility of mass production strategies started to be questioned by increasing market 
volatility. The inevitable risk of job losses, which organised labour tried to resist, 
often resulted in factory occupations. The rise of industrial strikes proved particularly 
efficacious in disrupting the high product cycle integration on which Fordist work was 
based, severely hampering productivity.1 The use of the CIG rose to absorb and 
diffuse these strains.  
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The previous chapter showed how the use of short time work influenced 
industrial labour and the pattern of worker mobilisation. Concentrating on the 
organisational effects of the CIG, however, the analysis has presented trade unions 
and factory councils in a somewhat passive manner. Worker organisations have 
proven to be the object of pressure for social regulation exercised by short time, but 
never as an active subject of the transformation of social policy. This chapter takes 
into consideration how trade unions and factory councils perceived and sought to 
transform industrial redundancy policies. The use of the CIG for the suppression of 
industrial conflict altered the tactics of the labour movement, but, in a process of 
negative institutional feedback, also created a new set of bottom up pressures to 
change the system in a way that would prevent its arbitrary use by the employers.2 
Throughout the first half of the 1970s, street slogans increasingly called for a 
‘guaranteed wage’ and the trade unions progressively took up the idea of obtaining 
complete protection of worker incomes, requesting employers and state officials to 
strengthen the monetary benefits of the CIG and allow union control over the 
management of short time. The radicalisation of union demands was partly due to the 
political competition exercised on their left by autonomous worker groups, which 
often denounced what they perceived as a submissive attitude of organised labour 
towards redundancies and work-time reductions.3 The strong employment protection 
demanded by the unions and the centrality of industrial wage earning within their 
social policy proposals were influenced by a radical left ideology, which posed wages 
as a ‘fixed’ variable of the economic system and favoured an extremely rigid labour 
market management, opposed in principle to any kind of layoff.4  
The unions had begun to expand proposals for a comprehensive reform of the 
CIG since the late 1960s, when the use of short time work started to pick up. Yet, it 
was only after the autumn of 1973 that the issue of the guaranteed wage was brought 																																																								
2 The term ‘institutional feedback’ is used here in a slightly different sense than the literature on 
historical institutionalism. The exploitation of short time benefits to alter the industrial relations power 
balance on the factory shop floor created a set of bottom up pressures for its reform. Instead of 
reinforcing it, the feedback operated negatively, fostering institutional change and not continuity. See 
Paul Pierson, ‘When effect becomes cause: policy feedback and political change’, World Politics 45 
(1993), 595-628; Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social 
Policy in the United States (Cambridge MA: Belknap, 1992), p. 58. 
3 Nanni Balestrini and Primo Moroni, L’orda d’oro, 1968-1977, La grande ondata rivoluzionaria e 
creative, politica ed esistenziale (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2011), pp. 422-426; Della Porta and Tarrow, 
‘Unwanted Children’, p. 611. 
4 Fabrizio Loreto, ‘La sinistra socialista operaista e la questione sindacale’, in Socialisti e il Sindacato, 
1943-1984, eds. Enzo Bartocci and Claudio Torneo (Roma: Viella, 2017), 149-184. 
		 111	
more forcefully to the fore. The explosion of the oil crisis severely deepened the 
industrial crisis of the country, forcing many businesses to shut down or curtail 
production. As the threat of unemployment emerged, the labour movement began a 
nationwide campaign for the strengthening of the CIG and the introduction of stricter 
public control over the administration of short time, so as to prevent it from being 
used to disguise permanent layoffs.5  
The employers initially met union demands with a cold shoulder, believing the 
clauses of the guaranteed wage to be an excessive impingement on entrepreneurial 
autonomy. Only a yearlong mobilisation of the labour movement led Confindustria to 
accept a tighter regulation of short time work. In January 1975, organised labour and 
employers signed the so-called Lama-Agnelli inter-confederal agreement - from the 
name of the General Secretary of the employers’ association, Giovanni Agnelli and 
the leader of the CGIL, Luciano Lama. The agreement increased the benefits of the 
CIG-O, introduced higher contributory requirements for companies that made use of 
short time and forced them to consult organised labour over their restructuring plans. 
These provisions were later implemented, under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Labour, as an official law in May 1975.6 
Italian labour historiography has always underlined the importance of the 1975 
agreement as key moment for the country’s social history. In the context of a poorly 
regulated and adversarial system of industrial relations, the Lama-Agnelli agreement 
seemed to bring much needed order to a strained economy, signalling the will of 
employers and organised labour to cooperate in solving the economic predicament of 
the country, sowing the seeds of an Italian way to corporatist bargain.7 The social 
contract that never materialised during the post-war economic expansion, as in other 
European states, appeared to emerge now under the threat of the economic crisis. 
Even the press at the time significantly labelled the agreement a ‘producers’ pact’.8 
The new CIG provisions, however, represented only a part of the agreement. 
Together with the reform of short time, the January 1975 pact substantially 																																																								
5 Andrea Rapini, Lo Stato Sociale (Bologna: Archetipolibri, 2010), p. 183. 
6 Donato Antoniello and Luciano Vasapollo, Eppure il Vento Soffia Ancora (Milano: Jaca Book, 2006), 
p. 152. 
7 Lorenzo Bordogna, ‘Le relazioni industriali in Italia dall’Accordo Lama-Agnelli alla riforma della 
scala mobile’, in L’Italia Repubblicana nella Crisi degli anni Settanta, Partiti e Organizzazioni di 
Massa, eds. Francesco Malgeri and Leonardo Paggi (Roma: Rubettino, 2003), 189-211, pp. 202-208. 
8 Giovanni Agnelli and Arrigo Levi, Intervista sul Capitalismo Moderno (Bari: Laterza, 1983), p. 103; 
Bedani, Politics and Ideology, pp. 202-204.  
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strengthened the Italian wage indexation system, the instrument that ensured the 
automatic adjustment of workers’ income to inflation, called the scala mobile, ‘sliding 
wage scale’. The protection of workers’ purchasing power had been one of the key 
demands of the labour movement to stave off the social consequences of a rising 
inflation rate. The 1975 agreement introduced equal pay rises across all industrial 
sectors. However, the automatic nature of the wage indexation afforded by the scala 
mobile led to harsh criticism: liberal economists pointed out that the system increased 
inflationary pressures on the national economy, leading the price index and wages to 
chase one another, spiralling out of control.9 At the same time, industrial relations 
scholars underlined the pernicious effects of wage indexation on the very labour 
movement that championed its establishment. By making pay rises automatic, the 
indexation system deprived local union structures of their capacity to negotiate on the 
monetary aspect of industrial wages, curtailing their mobilisation capacity on the shop 
floor.  
The undeniable importance of wage indexation led both contemporary observers 
and historians to push the reform of the CIG to the sidelines, undervaluing the long-
term effects of the clauses of the guaranteed wage approved in 1975. However, the 
two aspects of the agreement cannot be separated. Thinking back to his experience as 
General Director of Confindustria, in the early 1980s, Franco Mattei recognised that 
wage indexation was not at the centre of the institutional arrangements of the 1975 
agreement, with employers rather interested in obtaining ‘greater labour mobility’ 
through the reform of short time.10 
 Following a more comprehensive approach, the chapter will re-evaluate the role 
of the 1975 Lama-Agnelli agreement, placing the CIG at the centre stage of the 
analysis. It will track the history of negotiations, showing how the demands of 
organised labour emerged progressively on the back of the economic crisis. The dual 
pressure exercised by the threat of job losses and the intra-left competition of 
autonomous worker groups led the unions to articulate their demands by targeting 																																																								
9 For a comprehensive review of the debate at the time, see Andrea Brandolini, Piero Casadio, Piero 
Cipollone, Marco Magnani, Alfonso Rosolia and Roberto Torrini, ‘Employment Growth in Italy during 
the 1990s: institutional arrangements and market forces’, in Social Pacts, Employment and Growth: a 
reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli’s Thought, eds. Nicola Acocella and Riccardo Leoni (Heidelberg: 
Physica-Verlag, 2007), 31-68, at p. 33. Of particular relevance are: Franco Modigliani and Ezio 
Tarantelli, ‘Forze di mercato, azione sindacale e la curva di Phillips in Italia’, Moneta e Credito 29 
(1976), 165-198; Luigi Spaventa, ‘Salario protetto dal meccanismo di scala mobile a "punto 
pieno"’, Moneta e Credito 29 (1976), 387-402. 
10 Giuseppe Berta, L’Italia delle Fabbriche, p. 231. 
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labour market insiders, requesting guarantees on workers’ wages and control over 
industrial restructuring, postponing a wider reform of the Italian unemployment 
welfare system. Despite formal limitation of private control over the CIG, the 
employers accepted union demands, hoping to make organised labour a more 
cooperative and reliable partner, co-opting it in a subordinate position within the 
management of industrial restructuring.11 
Industrial relations in the automobile industry represented one of the main 
kernels of development, providing a laboratory for institutional innovation and setting 
the stage for negotiations at the national level. Whilst being considered by many 
contemporary observers as a decadent industry, with few growth prospects and an 
already saturated market, the political weight of the automobile industry actually grew 
during the mid-1970s. The head of FIAT, Giovanni Agnelli, assumed the presidency 
of the Confindustria in April 1974, pushing the interest of large enterprises into a 
strong position within the employers’ association.12 In the autumn of the same year, 
FIAT's decision, closely followed by other automobile companies, to adopt massive 
work-time suspensions, provided a powerful spark for the campaign of the unions on 
the reform of the CIG. Even before being implemented at the national level, the main 
clauses of the guaranteed wage agreement had been introduced through company 
level negotiations between the FLM, FIAT and Alfa Romeo.13 
 
 
3.2 The 1973 oil crisis and the Italian economy. 
The economic crisis of the early 1970s, bringing to a close the era of unabated 
economic growth that had characterised the first post-war decades, led to a complete 
overhaul of established political economy paradigms. The sudden international spike 
in energy prices caused by the first oil crisis of 1973 triggered a process of spiralling 
inflation that chipped away at the Keynesian welfare state, impairing state capacity to 
resort to counter-cyclical fiscal measures and expansive employment policies. 14 																																																								
11 According to Luciano Barca and Marco Magnani, the 1975 agreement is to be interpreted as an 
attempt by organised labour and Confindustria to centralise wage bargaining. See Barca and Magnani, 
L’industria tra Capitale e Lavoro, pp. 45-47. 
12 Bazzichi, Cent'anni di Confindustria, p. 85. 
13 Lucio Libertini and Bruno Trentin (eds.), L'industria italiana alla svolta: sindacato, partiti e grande 
capitale di fronte alla crisi (Bari: De Donato, 1975), pp. 98-106. 
14 Andre Gunder Frank, ‘Crisis of Ideology and Ideology of Crisis’, in Dynamics of Global Crisis, eds. 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi and Andre Gunder Frank (New York and 
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Policymakers found their toolbox to be inadequate in the face of stagflation, the 
unprecedented coupling of growing inflation and unemployment, which had hitherto 
been considered a chimera by prevalent economic theories.15 Increasing domestic 
strains were amplified by the rising competition of newly industrialised countries, 
ushering in a period of growing international market volatility. This was in stark 
contrast with the global macroeconomic stability ensured by the Bretton Woods 
monetary system, which came to a formal end in 1973.16 
The annus horribilis of 1973 was not a sudden disruption, but represented only 
the ‘peak of a series of destabilising developments’, as Peter Starke and others have 
argued.17 International energy prices had been on the rise for quite sometime, even 
before OPEC intervention. Most importantly, since the late 1960s inflation rates had 
grown across the board in many European countries, trailing the surge of social 
conflict. This was one of the so-called ‘political consequences of full employment’ 
already identified by the economist Michael Kalecki in 1942. The growth of 
employment in many European economies curtailed the capacity of businesses to 
discipline their workforces through arbitrary firings, increasing the bargaining power 
of the unions. In turn, the pressure exercised by rising wage rates on profits was 
absorbed by price increases.18  
Following this interpretation, in the mid-1970s Crozier, Huntingdon and 
Watanuki identified inflation as the signal of a broader crisis of democracy: the 
‘breakdown of traditional means of social control’, inherent to the very logic of full 
employment, pushed increasing demands on the state, overloading its finances and 
exacerbating inflationary pressures. 19  Charles Maier put forward a very similar 
interpretation: the rising expectations fuelled by decades of post-war growth and the 
growing politicisation of the working class led organised labour to make increasing 
demands on the employers and the state. Inflation was a way for public authorities to 																																																																																																																																																															
London: Monthly Review Press, 1982), 109-166, at p. 132; Charles Issawi, ‘The 1973 oil crisis and 
after’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 1 (1978): 3-26; Mancur Olson, ‘The productivity 
slowdown, the oil shocks, and the real cycle’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1988), 43-69. 
15 Alan S. Blinder, Economic policy and the great stagflation (New York: Academic Press, 1979), p. xi. 
16 David Hammes and Douglas Wills, ‘Black gold: The end of Bretton Woods and the oil-price shocks 
of the 1970s’, The Independent Review 9 (2005), 501-511. 
17 Peter Starke, Alexandra Kaasch and Franca van Hooren, The Welfare State as a Crisis Manager. 
Explaining the Diversity of Policy Responses to Economic Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), p. 54. 
18 Michael Kalecki, ‘Political Aspects of Full Employment’, The Political Quarterly 14 (1943), 322–31. 
19  Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntingdon and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: on the 
Governability of Democracy. Trilateral Commission Report (New York: University Press, 1975), p. 8. 
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broker antagonist interests, cushioning the disruptive potential of organised interest 
groups.20 Inflation offered the possibility of safeguarding profits while allowing for 
moderate redistribution towards the core of the workforce; it ‘let the struggle proceed 
and […] non-politically scaled down all its outcomes’.21 
Italy offers a paradigmatic example of the strains suffered by advanced 
capitalist economies in the early 1970s. The country had traditionally been resource 
scarce and was particularly affected by the international surge in raw material prices 
which characterised the decade. Rising import costs were further exacerbated by 
international monetary instability, leading to a worsening of the terms of trade and to 
severe capital losses.22 In the first half of 1973, after a further devaluation of the US 
dollar, the government led by Giulio Andreotti was forced to leave the European 
monetary ‘snake in the tunnel’, letting the lira fall by as much as 15%. Domestic 
inflation aggravated the problem, averaging at 5% a year between 1970 and 1972, 
before growing to 10.8% in 1973.23  
The increase of union bargaining power led to a surge of unit labour costs that 
exerted an upward pressure on prices. The growing importance of factory level 
negotiations and the extremely varied responses of employers fragmented the 
panorama of Italian industrial relations, causing an uncontrolled wage spiral. The 
problem was not absolute wage growth per se, which was not far off from the 
European average, but the fact that industrial productivity was slacking. Inflation 
cushioned the effects of wage growth and allowed enterprises in labour intensive 
sectors to stall on new technological investments.24 
The conscious use of an inflationary strategy, combined with a weakening of the 
lira, proved effective in masking the structural weakness of the Italian economy, 
postponing a solution to the economic and social imbalances that were the source of 
social conflict. Such policy would continue to dominate the political economy of the 
1970s in what the economist Franco Modigliani defined as a ‘hellish cycle’, with 																																																								
20 Maier, In Search of Stability, p. 193. 
21 James Tobin, ‘Inflation and Unemployment’, American Economic Review 62 (1972), 11-19, at p. 13. 
22 Donald Sassoon, Contemporary Italy: Politics, Economy and Society Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 
1997), p. 62. 
23 Vera Zamagni, ‘I mutamenti dell’economia internazionale e l’Italia’, in Italia Repubblicana nella 
crisi degli anni settanta, Tra guerra fredda e distensione, eds. Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons 
(Roma: Rubettino, 2003), 233-240, at p. 234. 
24 Leon Lindberg and Luciano Aleotti, ‘L'inflazione Degli Anni Settanta: Una Prospettiva Politico-
Istituzionale’, Stato e Mercato 5 (1982), 259–294; Michele Salvati, Economia e politica in Italia dal 
dopoguerra a oggi (Milano; Garzanti, 1984), pp. 172-185. 
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inflation and devaluation constantly chasing one another in the attempt to secure both 
social peace and external competitiveness.25 In the short term, however, the first oil 
shock forced an inevitable economic adjustment. In late November 1973, the new 
government led by the Christian democrat, Mariano Rumor introduced a first round of 
austerity measures, implementing severe energy consumption restrictions. The 
following year these were followed by an outright deflationary policy.26 
Up until that point, Italian firms had suffered from increasing international 
competition and rising labour costs. But industrial employment had expanded at least 
until 1971 and price increases ensured a substantial margin of profit for private 
enterprises. Even in 1973, the country’s GDP growth reached 7.1%. The inflation rate, 
reaching a staggering 18.5% in 1974, determined a phenomenon that economists 
dubbed ‘drugged recovery’, a cyclical upswing of the economy in connection with 
price index growth.27  The continuing crisis of low value added labour intensive 
sectors, such as textiles, and the onset of industrial restructuring processes in the 
electro-mechanic sector, involving delocalization of new investments and 
outsourcing, pointed at some enduring structural weaknesses. The recessionary impact 
of 1974 deflationary measures proved to be a wake-up call. By the end of 1975, GDP 
growth was negative, at minus 2.7%, for the first time since post-war reconstruction.28  
Energy intensive industries in the steel, chemical and, most importantly 
automobile sectors, suffered severe disruptions. In 1973, FIAT sold 1,486,000 cars, 
almost 130,000 fewer than the previous year, roughly an 8% drop in sales. The 
Turinese carmaker was severely affected by the rise in energy prices and the crowding 
out of the automobile market, but also by a sudden increase in labour costs. Wages 
increased from a total of 730 billion the previous year to 909 billion in 1973. Faced 
with rising manpower costs and in the impossibility to proceed to permanent 
employment reduction due to union opposition, the company planned a ban on new 
hiring for 1974, hoping to reduce its wage bills through natural turnover.29  																																																								
25 Pier Francesco Asso, ‘Franco Modigliani e l’Italia’, in L'impegno civile di un economista: scritti editi 
e inediti sull'economia e la società italiana, eds. Franco Modigliani and Pier Francesco Asso (Siena: 
Protagon Editori, 2007), 3-52, at p. 31. 
26 Augusto Graziani, Lo sviluppo dell’economia Italiana. Dalla ricostruzione alla moneta europea 
(Roma: Bollati Boringhieri, 2000), p. 126. 
27 Giovanni Balcet, L’Economia Italiana. Evoluzione, problemi e paradossi (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1997), 
p. 64. 
28  Antonio Bassanetti, Martina Cecioni and Giordano Zevi, ‘The Main Recessions in Italy: A 
Retrospective Comparison’, Bank of Italy Occasional Paper 46 (2009), 5-36, at p. 32. 
29 Carlo Catena, ‘L’industria dell’Automobile ed il gruppo Fiat’, Politica e Economia 4 (1974), 35-42. 
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Publicly owned companies were in no better position and were already plagued 
by widespread overcapacity once the crisis came. New investments in the public 
enterprise system reached a peak of 6,375 billion lire in 1972 but stagnated thereafter. 
The Industrial Reconstruction Institute (IRI) - the public holding that comprised heavy 
industries in the steel, naval and automobile industries - had been operating at a loss 
since the beginning of the decade.30 The situation of the Alfa Romeo group was 
particularly dire. Between 1973 and 1974, total car production plummeted from 
123,000 to 93,400, and by the end of the year inventory stockpiles had risen to a 
dangerous level of 44,000 cars, almost double of what was considered to be the 
maximum threshold.31 
Large enterprises were not in a position to curtail their workforce, given the 
presence of strong and militant factory councils. Firings and work-time reductions 
initially affected the most marginal rim of the industrial labour market, among small 
and medium size companies with less stringent employment protection legislation. 
The impact of the crisis did not translate immediately into an increase in the official 
unemployment rate, which reached its lowest point of the decade in 1974, at 2.88%.32  
Despite severe business strains and the deflationary monetary policy implemented by 
the Rumor government, the state implemented an array of industrial and social policy 
interventions to stem the threat to employment. In 1971, the Italian government had 
established the Gestione e Partecipazione Industriale (GEPI), a publicly funded joint 
stock company with the aim of buying out shares and providing credit to bankrupt 
firms, with the goal of restoring them to profitability.33  
In practice, the GEPI often served to stem employment crises and prevent 
factory shutdowns, with both the unions and local party establishments pressuring the 
company to intervene in rescue operations.34 By the mid-1970s, the scope of GEPI 
interventions encompassed firms employing a total of 40,000 workers and the 																																																								
30 Locke, Remaking the Italian Economy, p. 55. 
31 Alfa Romeo, Direzione Alfa Romeo alle R.S.A Alfa Romeo Portello and Arese, Arese, 02/07/1975, 
ADL, Alfa Romeo, CDF Portello, f. 33. 
32 In July 1973 the Agnelli Foundation, a research centre affiliated with Fiat, organised a conference in 
Turin titled ‘the crisis in small and medium size enterprises and capital structure’. See AA.VV, 
Crisi della piccola e media industria e strutture finanziarie, Atti del Convegno di Torino del 12 luglio 
1973 (Torino: Fondazione Agnelli, 1974). See also FLM, le Decisioni del Consiglio Generale dei 
Metalmeccanici, Mezzogiorno - Salari - Organizzazione del Lavoro, Torino, -/11/1973, IPAG, 
Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 621, f. 2. 
33 Fulvio Coltorti and Giuliano Mussati, Gepi e Tescon. Due interventi delle partecipazioni statali, 
(Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1976); Pontarollo, ‘Italy: effects of substituting political objectives’, pp. 50-54. 
34 Guido Crainz, Autobiografia di una Repubblica (Milano: Donzelli, 2009), p. 122. 
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company acquired losses for 86 billion lire, far outstripping its initial capital.35 GEPI 
was not the only such instrument to favour discretionary government intervention in 
industrial policy. The Ente Gestione Attività Minerarie (EGAM) was a public holding 
- founded in 1958 to intervene into the mining sector, that began its operation only in 
1971 - when it started acquiring control of many mining companies, which were 
increasingly unproductive. Even the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno - an institution created 
in 1950 to aid economic growth in the south of the country through public works and 
infrastructure investment – stepped up its role in industrial acquisitions and 
development.36 
The crisis of 1973 coincided with a strengthening of state intervention in the 
industrial sector, reinforcing a trend that had already emerged since the late 1960s. 
Discretionary public intervention had been key in fostering economic growth during 
the early decades of the post-war period, targeting heavy industries such as energy 
and steel, and compensating for the lack of private investment in key economic 
sectors.37 During the early 1970s, by contrast, Italian industrial policy assumed an 
increasingly indiscriminate nature, investing and providing easy credit to industrial 
firms with an eye towards the guarantee of employment, and thus social stability, 
rather than following sound economic planning.38 
 The increase in the use of the CIG was part of a broader trend in which 
industrial and social policy gradually overlapped. In some cases, short time benefits 
intervened to tackle severe episodes of business crises and prolonged industrial 
reorganisation. They allowed large enterprises to temporarily float their manpower, 
partially absorbing the short term shocks of the combined rise in energy prices and 
austerity policies. The number of total working hours subsidized by the CIG rose from 
55,063 million in 1973 to 88,441 in 1974, skyrocketing to 285,186 million in 1975. 
Most of the increase was absorbed by the CIG-O, which grew more than tenfold in 
just two years. Compared to previous years, when the crisis of the textile sector and 																																																								
35 Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, Italian politics, Adjustment under Duress (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2005), p. 175.  
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37 Marcello De Cecco, ‘Splendore e crisi del sistema Beneduce: note sulla struttura finanziaria e 
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38 Giampaolo Vitali and Secondo Rolfo (Eds.), Ripensare la politica industriale oggi. Innovazione e 
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the difficulties suffered by the state chemical industry drove short time expansion, it 
was the metalworking sector which suffered the most from the crisis and made the 
most extensive use of the CIG, accounting for almost 35% of its total hours in 1975. 
In many instances, standard unemployment benefits were also used to cushion layoffs. 
While the unemployment rate did not soar in the short term - with some workers 
slipping out of the active population - the total expenditure of unemployment 
insurance rose between 1973 and 1975, more than doubling from 225 to 487 billion.39 
 
 
3.3 Italian unions and the battle for social reforms 
The crisis shook the economic basis of the country. The threat to employment levels 
superseded the perceived deterioration of the standard of living, eroded by inflation. 
The employers consciously manipulated the prospect of massive redundancies, albeit 
tempered by short time benefits, to pressure factory councils into more a subservient 
attitude. This context forced the CGIL-CISL-UIL union federation to take a strong 
stance on the defence of employment and reconsider the scope of its action for an 
encompassing reform of economic and social policy.  
The period before the autumn of 1973 saw widespread advances for organised 
labour inside the factories. Strong wage growth was accompanied by a substantial 
betterment of working conditions and a sharp rise in union membership rates. 
However, this was not complemented by wider social and economic improvements 
outside of the industrial shop floor. The unions often denounced how urban centres in 
the north of the country were overcrowded and plagued by run down infrastructures 
and inefficient public transportation systems. Social policy was unbalanced and 
particularly lacking for the weakest social groups, such as the unemployed and those 
with larger families. An unjust taxation system aggravated the situation of the most 
needy, while the South of the country lagged, having been left behind by sudden 
industrialisation of the miracle years. To face the situation, the unions had to become 
an autonomous ‘political subject’, able to negotiate policymaking directly with the 
state institutions, beyond the industrial relations arena and the political monopoly of 
parties. This was supported by the most radical stewards and the left of organised 
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labour, a diverse political group across the three main unions, which included Pierre 
Carniti, Vittorio Foa, Bruno Trentin and others.40  
Social conflict loosened the chain of transmission that traditionally linked 
unions and parliamentary parties. The process of rapprochement between the CGIL, 
the CISL and the UIL - culminating in the creation of the unitary federation in 1972 - 
weakened their ties with their respective political counterparts and increased the 
autonomy of organised labour to formulate independent policy proposals on issues 
such as health, welfare and taxes.41 Bolstered by their renewed strength inside the 
factories, the unions sought to engage the government directly. The attempt to enter 
the political arena was based on the belief that the political establishment lacked 
within itself the power to reform. During the 1960s, the centre-left coalition formula, 
bringing together the Socialist and Christian Democrat parties, had raised great 
expectations for political and economic progress. The hope for a structural reform of 
Italian capitalism, however, came largely short of initial ambitions. By 1973, when 
Rumor again exhumed the alliance with the socialist party, it was clear that the 
‘Centro Sinistra had exhausted its political vitality and outlived its time’.42 
The reform strategy put forward by the labour movement ranged from a reform 
of fiscal policy and the lowering of consumption taxes to an expansion of welfare 
provisions. Most importantly, the unions demanded a greater say in the control of 
industrial investments, so as to channel resources towards the development of the 
South and employment creation policies. ‘It was necessary’, according to a 
communiqué of the CGIL-CISL-UIL, ‘to define policies to orient public and private 
investments, through sectoral and regional plans, and intervene in the infrastructural 
system and public services’.43 The unions asked for more control in the private sector, 
where factory councils pressed employers to obtain information rights over 
restructuring plans and new investments. Most importantly, publicly-owned industry 
was at the centre of the labour strategy: state owned companies, by their very 																																																								
40 See Pierre Carniti, L’Autonomia alla prova: il sindacato italiano negli anni della crisi (Roma: Coines, 
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definition, were considered more democratically accountable and could be steered 
towards the fulfilment of social objectives, such as employment creation, beyond the 
strict logic of profit.44 
The strategy for a broad based reform of Italian society was not conceived in 
opposition to factory based struggles. Negotiations with the state should not come at 
the expense of continuation of social conflict within workplaces. On the contrary, the 
transformation of state institutions was seen as a way to prolong and secure the 
advantages obtained in the factories. This perspective was put forward in 1969 by the 
militant minority of the CISL, in its national congress held in Rome.45 The Catholic 
labour movement had always been attentive to the reform of social policy and already 
in 1957 had promoted a conference on the issue, advocating for an abandonment of 
the insurance-based welfare system and the adoption of more universalistic coverage 
for all citizens.46 By the end of the 1960s, however, the importance of industrial labour 
within the policy outlook of the CISL had grown.  Under the influence of its 
metalworking federation, Federazione Italiana Metalmeccanici (FIM), which 
captured grassroots demands for industrial democracy, the CISL championed a class-
based approach, in which the strength and unity of the blue-collar working class had 
to be used to force political change.47  
The political role of the trade unions was justified as it served the purpose of 
securing the social fabric of working people’s lives, entrenching contractual gains 
through a comprehensive reform of state institutions. The ideological centrality of 
industrial wage labour and the focus on labour market insiders were also shared by 
other union categories in the chemical and metalworking industry, both in the CGIL 
and UIL, a galaxy of political groups, federations and shop stewards, cutting across 
catholic and Marxist influences and coalesced around the FLM and the unitary 
chemical workers federation, FULC.48 
The importance attached to the industrial working class of large enterprises 
conditioned the policy demands of the labour movement. At the same time, it also 																																																								
44 Regini, I Dilemmi del Sindacato, pp. 111-114. 
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48 Bedani, Politics and Ideology, p. 178; Loreto, L’ “anima bella” del sindacato, p. 130.  
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influenced the tactics and the ways in which it sought to negotiate with the 
government. The everyday experience of social struggle on the factory shop floor led 
parts of the CGIL-CISL-UIL to believe they could use public protests and strikes as a 
way to pressure state institutions, transforming their participation in policy formation 
into a dispute. The experience of bargaining with employers in the industrial sector 
was simply transferred to the policymaking arena without any change. Emerging 
forms of corporatist governance of the labour market in other continental European 
nations were based on the capacity of the unions to negotiate an agreement with 
capital and the state. In Italy, by contrast, the early 1970s were characterised by the 
anomalous continuation of unruly and disruptive union strategies. Economic strikes 
were increasingly accompanied by rallies, street demonstration and political strikes.49  
Nonetheless, this belief in the vanguard role of the industrial working class of 
large companies and the strategic importance attached to social conflict as a method 
of negotiation was not shared by everybody within the labour movement. The CGIL 
had always been the most attentive to the problem of employment and to the need for 
the union to engage in policymaking, particularly when compared to the often narrow 
contractual approach of its catholic equivalent. Yet, many in the CGIL were critical of 
the grassroots demands for excessive political autonomy and believed the role of the 
union had to be coordinated with that of established left wing parties, such as the PCI 
and the PSI. While recognising the importance of broad-based social reforms, the 
secretary of the CGIL, Agostino Novella contested the ‘pan-unionism’ of the 1969 
struggles and warned against the risk of isolation.50   
Luciano Lama, who succeeded Novella at the head of the CGIL in 1970, further 
developed this argument. Lama was aware of the limits of a ‘political and institutional 
context that remained deaf to demands for change’ and recognised the need for the 
union to engage the government, bringing in ‘the active participation of a mass 
movement’.51 Yet, he was also wary of a class-based approach that concentrated too 
much on labour market insiders. In opposition to the left of the labour movement, 
Lama’s feared that focusing solely on the factories would encourage ‘workerism and 																																																								
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[…] class radicalism’ that risked damaging the wider role of unions within Italian 
society. 52 On the contrary, Lama urged against class individualism and the inherent 
tendency of the strongest segments of the labour movement to reap benefits for 
themselves. At the VIII national congress of the CGIL, held in Bari in the summer of 
1973, Lama put forward his proposal for the labour movement: it was ‘not sufficient 
to change the balance of forces within the factory, nor to extend this power from the 
factory to society’. The union had to engage the ‘state, regions and local institutions’ 
and in order to do so it had to build wide social alliances, between the employed and 
the unemployed and the north and the south of the country.53 In the words of Adolfo 
Pepe - one of the foremost historians of the Italian labour movement - Lama’s strategy 
represented the attempt ‘to administer the long waves of the workers struggles of 
1968-1971 and channel them towards the axis of negotiations and a global agreement 
with the political system and the employers’.54 
Two souls coexisted within the political strategy of the labour movement. One 
was rooted within the working class of large Fordist factories and the ‘rank-and-
filism’ of the 1969 protests. The other was anchored to the disciplined tradition of the 
post-war CGIL, which cut across the various segments of the labour force, attentive to 
the problem of employment and the wider political system. The balance between the 
two proved unsteady, particularly as the economic crisis deepened.  
During the summer of 1973, the CGIL-CISL-UIL proposed a reform of the old 
age pension scheme, the system of family allowances and, most importantly, the 
unemployment insurance mechanism. Standard unemployment insurance, set in 
nominal terms at 400 lire a day, was absolutely insufficient, representing less than 
10% of the average blue-collar salary. The unions asked the government to raise it to 
1,000 lire and, at the same time, extend its coverage to seasonal and precarious 
workers. The CGIL Office for Social Security noted that the reform would cost state 
coffers between 182 and 196 billion lire. 55   While it was a sizable sum, the 																																																								
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unemployment insurance fund showed a positive balance of 183 billion lire at the 
beginning of 1973 and the unions believed there was financial room for the reform.56 
In July 1973, the government agreed to set up a commission bringing together 
experts from the INPS, the Ministry of Labour and union officials to examine the 
proposal for a reform of unemployment benefits. However, progress was slow due to 
the deflationary measures introduced in the autumn of 1973 and the opposition to any 
further increase in spending. In December 1973, a joint meeting of the CGIL-CISL-
UIL denounced the ‘deflationary and restrictive policies’, and launched a mobilisation 
for the beginning of 1974.57 In February, the unions organised a general strike in the 
industrial heartlands of Turin and Milan, followed by another national action twenty 
days later, with the explicit aim of pressuring the government on the reform of social 
policy.58 At the beginning of the year, the mobilisation of the national unions was 
aided by the fact that many industry level union federations were campaigning for 
company-level supplementary contracts in large enterprises. In January 1974, the 
FLM reopened negotiations with FIAT, Alfa Romeo, the public steelmaker Italsider, 
and other companies in the electro-mechanic sector, such as Olivetti, Zanussi and 
Indesit. Common to all the disputes was the demand for an adjustment of wages to 
compensate for inflation, a guarantee that industrial restructuring would not curtail 
employment levels and, most importantly, the demand to divert new investments 
towards the South.59 
In March 1974, under the combined pressure of national and sector 
mobilisations, the government introduced a law on the reform of social policy, raising 
the minimum threshold for many benefits. Unemployment insurance was raised to 
800 daily lire, still short of the demands of the labour movement. Presenting the law 
to the Parliament Bertoldi, the Minister of Labour, recognised that: 
 																																																								
56 CGIL, Ufficio Sicurezza Sociale, p. la Segreteria V. Verzelli alle Camere Confederali del Lavoro, ai 
Comitati Regionali CGIL, alle Federazioni Nazionali di Categoria, Circolare 3092, oggetto:  pensioni, 
assegni familiari, indennità di disoccupazione, Roma, 02/10/1973, ASCGIL, Segreteria Generale, Atti e 
sorrispondenza, Problemi sociali e del lavoro, b. 32; see also CGIL-CISL-UIL, Nota per precisare le 
principali richieste della vertenza formalmente aperta con il governo su pensioni, assegni familiari, 
indennità di disoccupazione, Torino, 02//09/1973, Archivio Storico di Torino (thereafter AST), FLM di 
Torino, b. 715, f. 1.  
57 Redazione, ‘Sindacati e Governo, una sfiducia crescente’, Consigli 2 (1974), 3-4. 
58  Gabriele De Rosa, ‘A che punto è l’unità sindacale? Il paese dello sciopero facile’, La Civiltà 
Cattolica 125 (1974), 280-292, at pp. 288-289. 
59 Loreto, L’ “anima bella” del sindacato, p. 137; FLM, Relazione introduttiva e Convegno Nazionale 
Delegati Fiat su organizzazione del lavoro e inquadramento unico, Torino, 18-19/02/1974, AST, FLM 
di Torino, b. 618, f. 1. 
		 125	
‘such an increase […] does not guarantee the unemployed an adequate maintenance. At 
the current moment, however, it represents a significant commitment and serves to 
absorb the existing surplus in the unemployment insurance fund […] the current law 
decree does not jeopardize the plan for a further reform of subsidies to redundant 
workers’.60 
 
 
 
3.4 The metalworkers federation and the right to a guaranteed wage 
By the time the new law on unemployment benefits was introduced, the priorities of 
organised labour were shifting. The economic crisis started to bite into union 
constituencies inside the factories, exposing the inherent contradiction between the 
needs of labour market insiders and the political strategy of the unions. Between 1972 
and the end of 1973, the efforts of the CGIL-CISL-UIL for a broad reform of state 
institutions and social policy had inevitably come at the expense of issues of factory 
labour organisation. As inflation continued to rise and industrial restructuring 
threatened more and more factories, the defence of existing jobs and wages became 
paramount. Neglecting blue-collar workers, particularly in large factories where 
radical group competition was fierce, could prove a severe blow to the unions’ 
support. As early as November 1973, the first issue of Consigli, the monthly magazine 
of the FLM, reported the disgruntled opinions of some shop stewards from the factory 
council of Mirafiori, warning that 
 
‘a rift is opening between the workers and the factory council, and between the council 
and the bureaucratic upper echelon [of the union]. We are talking about things that are 
completely outside the heads of the workers. They just want more money. Not because 
of corporatist battles, but because for the past six month there has been an aggressive 
robbery on wages by the bosses. They attacked the wages because that is where they 
could bend us’.61   
 
The wage issue was exactly where autonomous worker groups and the extra-
parliamentary left attacked the unions. LC, for instance, was extremely critical of the 
reform strategy of the unions. The attempt to control industrial investment, at the 																																																								
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centre of the union strategy in the metalworking sector, was denounced as a fig leaf to 
cover up the indifference of organised labour towards real wages and working 
conditions inside the factories. Concentrating on broad social reforms was a 
‘dangerous and suicidal illusion’, because it did not alter the workings of the capitalist 
system and proved inefficacious in terms of employment creation.62 To LC’s militants, 
‘workers’ struggles were the real reform’.63 
The national executives of the CGIL wanted to subordinate wages to the issue 
of worker control over industrial restructuring. Lama, for instance, opposed the 
narrow workerist view: 
 
‘the wage is part of the main issue, […] but it does not have to be the determining 
factor. The determining factor is the power of the union to intervene in such situations, 
[…] where there are problems of short time work, where work has to be reduced. The 
union has to participate, direct and have a say in governing these situations’.64  
 
By early 1974, however, many within the unions started to champion a staunch 
salary defence. Already in November 1973, on the pages of the magazine l’Espresso, 
one of the secretaries of the FULC, Danilo Beretta, criticised the strategy of reform, 
‘which inevitably required a long time’. For him, instead, the unions should have been 
pursuing immediate wage increases. ‘The factory movement cannot wait any longer. 
[…] the salary is the only thing that is certain’.65  Most importantly, the metalworkers 
were showing signs of unrest. In January 1974, Pierre Carniti, the charismatic leader 
of the FIM, intervened on Consigli: 
 
‘the purchasing power of workers is the lynchpin of a permanent politics of support for 
internal demand. […] Against inflation, the compression of consumption and threat of 
the cassa integrazione, it is necessary to put forward a policy of wage guarantees and 
increases’.66 
 
Initially, wage increases were confined to company level agreements. Only 
during the summer of 1974 did the unions decide to put forward a coherent national 
negotiating proposal. On the one hand, organised labour asked for an enhancement of 
the wage indexation system in place since the early post-war period, introducing 																																																								
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automatic pay raises, a demand pushed through by factory councils against a certain 
discomfort of the CGIL, which had remained anchored to the tradition of skilled 
labour. Most importantly, the unions asked for a full ‘guarantee of the wage’, a 
strengthening of the CIG to safeguard both workers’ purchasing power and jobs.  
These demands highlighted an understanding of wages as fixed variables of the 
economic system and a refusal to accept the predominant employers’ perspective, 
which urged the unions to respect the fluctuations of the capitalist market system, 
tying wages to productivity increases. Asking for a guarantee on the wage was key for 
the unions to ensure they would be able to control the process of industrial 
restructuring, safeguarding employment levels while ensuring workers’ wages. In 
Mirafiori, the factory council was asking the union to maintain an absolute ‘rigidity of 
the workforce’, in terms of shifts and tasks, making sure that workers ‘would not lose 
a single lira’ in cases of work time suspension.67  The project for a reform of short time 
work was part of the larger attempt to protect workers’ incomes from both individual 
life cycle risks and the vicissitudes of markets, combining welfare provisions with 
business agreements. Since the late 1960s, the metalworkers unions had championed 
the idea of a mensilizzazione of the wage, literally ‘monthisation’, a guarantee that no 
matter the working time of employees, the hours spent on sickness leave or out of 
production, they would receive the standard wage at the end of each month, even if 
companies had to anticipate out of their own pockets welfare payment for sickness, 
disability and short time.68 
The FLM proposal for a comprehensive reform of short time work focused on 
two aspects. The first was the monetary one. The CIG-O still subsidised only 66% of 
employees’ hourly wages during work-time reduction, short of the 80% of the CIG-S. 
Companies had often abused the ordinary CIG during the first half of the 1970s, 
covering up permanent employment losses or using it as weapon to stem strikes and 
curtail worker mobilisation inside the factories. The unions asked that the two CIG 
funds be combined into a single short time work instrument, or at least equalise the 
benefit between the two. Furthermore, companies making use of the CIG should have 
paid an additional quota, introducing a partial system of pay-as-you go contributions 																																																								
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into the financing of the CIG. This served a double purpose: de facto, it guaranteed 
the complete substitution of the real wage for suspended employees. At the same time, 
it served to discourage the abuse of short time work, making it more expensive for 
employers to gain access to it. Lastly, the unions demanded companies to pay short 
time benefits upfront, or at least in part, without waiting for the official authorisation 
of the Ministry of Labour or provincial commission. The delays between the 
application for the CIG and the actual authorisation amounted to some months. On top 
of the loss of salary, thus, workers had also to wait before receiving compensation for 
their suspensions, and provincial commissions had to work retroactively. This often 
led labour representatives to endorse authorisation even in cases of strikes or other 
abuses, fearing that workers would lose both their normal salary and the CIG.69 
Strengthening the income protection afforded by the CIG was only a part of the 
reform proposed by the metalworkers federation. The unions had often criticised the 
welfarist aspect of short time work and the fact that it had been used to curtail 
employment levels, diffusing the social consequences of layoffs without preventing 
them. On the pages of Consigli, the labour law academic Tiziano Treu criticised the 
‘protectionist logics of the Cassa and […] the absence of any programming strategy 
behind its intervention’. On its own, the rigid defense of wages was not sufficient and 
sustainable in the long term, if it was not paired with a certain degree of control over 
industrial restructuring. The labour movement, instead, had to accompany the 
protection of jobs with a proactive stance in directing and targeting the use of the CIG 
to control the labour market, negotiating redundancies wherever possible.70 The unions 
asked for short time work applications to be supplemented by ‘an investment 
blueprint, detailing the aim of restructuring and reconversion, and the guarantee of 
employment, under the scrutiny of public authority and the unions’.71  
The paperwork forwarded to CIG provincial commissions around the country 
shows that far too often companies justified the intervention of short time work with 
generic and aleatory expression, such as ‘lack of work, lack of orders, crisis, etc.’ The 
FLM wanted to obtain periodic information rights and the possibility of negotiating 
with employers the modalities of short time, in terms of hours lost, worker mobility 
and training, before the intervention of work-time suspension.  																																																								
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The staunch defence of wages and jobs within the framework of greater union 
control over redundancies highlighted the way in which the metalworkers understood 
the economic problems at hand. For them, the industrial crisis of the country was not 
the result of the impersonal forces of the market, nor could it be simply ascribed to 
external shocks. Rather, it pointed towards the ‘absence of social and democratic 
controls over the process of production’ and to the poor policy choices made by elite 
economic groups.72 If the crisis was no accident, in the original philosophy of short 
time subsidies, it should not be the workers who would end up paying its social costs. 
The reform of the CIG, pairing income protection with workers’ supervision over 
redundancies, paid lip service to the need of labour market insiders, but showed also 
the persisting influence of the reform strategy of the unions, seeking to transform the 
CIG into an active industrial policy instrument to steer industrial restructuring.  
The guaranteed wage plan was not supported by all in the labour movement. 
The most moderate union executives had often judged the demand as too radical for 
modern industrial manpower policies, which required a certain degree of flexibility. 
From the beginning, instead, the influence of workerist ideology and autonomous 
radical left groups figured prominently. The fliers of LC and Potere Operaio, another 
faction of the extra-parliamentary left, made many references to the guaranteed wage, 
often in explicit contrast to the unions.  LC had been particularly critical of the early 
proposals for the mensilizzazione of salary put forward by the metalworkers unions. 
As it stood, the unions’ plan for an insurance of monthly salaries was just an 
‘accounting facility for company’s bookkeeping’. Instead, the radical group asked for 
a stronger guarantee that ‘the bosses would pay, with or without the help of the CIG, 
the full wage in cases of suspension and work-time reduction’.73  
Workerist militants theorised the guaranteed wage as a revolutionary instrument 
that would push forward the crisis and help overcome the capitalist system. Their 
approach to factory work conceived the wage as a ‘political issue, not a business one’. 
In their view, the mass worker of the Fordist assembly line was not interested in 
changing the organisation of production or better his position within the factory 
system, but to abolish it altogether.74 Theorizing the wage as politically fixed and 
autonomous from the interplay of market, disregarding the business predicament of 																																																								
72 Stefanelli, La Cassa Integrazione, p. 12. 
73 Redazione, ‘A che punto è la piattaforma dei metalmeccanici’, Lotta Continua, 12/05/1972, 4. 
74 Potere Operaio, Fuori dalla Linee, foglio quotidiano di agitazione degli operai Fiat in lotta, n.2, 
Mercoledì 27 Febbraio 1974, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 718, f. 1. 
	130	
single companies served to destabilise the overall system. Worker control over labour 
organisation and industrial investments, instead, served only to play down conflict. 
According to Asor Rosa, director of the radical journal Contropiano, a struggle based 
on wages was the only way to prevent ‘the system from reaching a static condition; 
worker struggles begin again the day after a new contract is signed. We have to 
dissolve all the conditions for capitalist accumulation’.75 In the case of the guaranteed 
wage, the fact that the CIG was partly financed by the state was not a problem. 
According to the most radical operaisti, the state itself was the arena in which to push 
class struggle and revolution. The factory was only a stepping-stone.76 
Pizzolato argued that by the beginning of the 1970s, the radical left was already 
losing its influence, after having played a pivotal role in favouring the meeting 
between students and blue-collar workers in the 1968-1969 upheavals. Autonomous 
groups were outflanked by the development of factory councils and by the 
democratisation of official union structures. The Workers’ Statute opened up new 
channels of institutional negotiation with company managers, leaving radical groups 
out. However, the presence of LC and radical groups remained strong within the 
factories, at least until the middle of the decade. In March 1973, radical groups could 
still muster the strength to stage an important occupation of the Mirafiori factory, 
helping to seal the negotiations for the renewal of the metalworking national contract.77 
The official labour movement was now more resilient, but could not underestimate the 
organisational threat on its left.  
As the impact of the CIG increased, the dynamic of intra-left competition led 
the unions to embrace the demand for a guaranteed wage. It is not by chance, after all, 
that it was the FLM that spearheaded the platform on the reform of the CIG. The 
metalworkers federation was one of the most rooted within the factories and the most 
open to the influences of the rank and file. Furthermore, radical worker groups often 
accused local unions and factory councils of complacency towards the employers’ use 
of the CIG and accepting far too easily its intervention in cases of strikes. Organised 
labour had always called for a careful planning of strikes and coordination of 																																																								
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mobilisation to avoid the anti-union use of the CIG. Often it urged worker squads or 
departments not to strike on their own. For LC and Potere Operaio, this represented 
an unacceptable watering down of class conflict. The way out of the conundrum 
posed by the CIG was represented by the relentless, almost vitalistic, expansion of 
industrial conflict, which reverberated through factory departments, making it 
impossible for employers to suspend the whole workforce. If workers were prevented 
from entering the factory walls, they simply had to push through the blockade, with 
violence if needed. 
Left-wing criticism of organised labour was even stronger where severe 
business crises threatened jobs, leading to prolonged use of short time benefits. In 
such cases, workerist groups lamented that the unions did not even try to resist 
redundancy, passively accepting the CIG without resorting to factory occupations. At 
the end of the summer of 1974, for instance, a radical group at Alfa Romeo 
Pomigliano, the Formazioni Marxiste-Leniniste, was criticising the unions for their 
complacency:  
 
‘in order to secure our jobs and obtain a full wage guarantee […] we have to choose: 
either we do like in the Fiore factory of Caserta, where workers won because they 
dared to occupy the train station […] or we do like at Indesit in Turin, where, despite 
the cassa integrazione, not a single hour of strike was called, all thanks to the decision 
of the unions’.78  
 
In certain instances, the radical left demand for a guaranteed wage went beyond 
labour market insiders towards a unified system of income maintenance that would 
both protect the employed and the unemployed. This was particularly the case for 
cities like Rome and Naples, where industry was poorly developed and the urban 
workforce were employed in the service sector or in precarious jobs. In this context, 
the strengthening of the CIG was to be accompanied by that of unemployment 
insurance, leading to the creation of a universal social salary.  
The experience of the unemployed workers’ committee of Naples is particularly 
telling. The plague of joblessness had always affected the city and at the beginning of 
the 1970s there were more than 100,000 unemployed. Towards the end of 1974, The 
Disoccupati Organizzati emerged out of neighbourhood councils, affordable housing 
movements and local militants of the new left, championing the cause of casual 																																																								
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labourers and the unemployed. 79  They asked for a strengthening standard 
unemployment insurance, to be brought to a level close to that of the average blue-
collar worker salary. These demands were often accompanied by explicit criticism 
against the unions. Organised labour was accused for its excessive focus on labour 
market insiders and the clientelistic way in which they tried to control new hiring.80  
Outside the factories, the slogan of the guaranteed wage resembled the demand 
for a minimum income system for all citizens, overlapping the needs of waged and 
unwaged workers. In March 1973, factory committees broadly identifying with the 
radical autonomy camp held their first national conference in Bologna. The 
introductory remarks highlighted the guaranteed wage as a way ‘to break the binomial 
relation between bread and work’, refusing the division between the employed, the 
underemployed and the unemployed. A minimum income for everybody served ‘the 
political need’ to bridge the gaps between different social categories, ‘unifying the 
class on the general issue of wage’. The policy proposals put forward by autonomous 
groups reflected this approach: short time benefits covering 100% of workers’ wages 
during suspensions, coupled with a guaranteed income system for laid off workers, 
both entirely financed by the employers, as a ‘tax on profits’.81  
The calls for a universal income maintenance system, opposed to a narrow wage 
protection for labour market insiders merged with a radical refusal of factory work.82 
This was linked to the theoretical evolution of operaismo and the organisational 
fragmentation of the radical groups such as Potere Operaio, disbanded in 1973, that 
had dominated in earlier years.83 During the Hot Autumn and its immediate aftermath, 
workerist thought identified low skilled workers of the Fordist assembly line as the 
vanguard social class around which to build their political organisation. This was 
based on the idea that factory alienation could be used to foster political mobilisation 
and, most importantly, on the belief that industrial work would expand to encompass 
all of society. The economic crisis and the ensuing process of industrial restructuring 
and delocalisation, threatening employment and the business model based on large 																																																								
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productive units, forced a deep rethink: radical intellectuals started to talk about a new 
political subject, the ‘social worker’. According to Toni Negri, the reorganisation of 
capitalism that followed social unrest led to a fragmentation of working class 
composition. A new social group was emerging, bringing together the urban 
lumpenproletariat, the unemployed and knowledge workers in the service sector. The 
demand for a universal guaranteed wage served to bring together the needs of this 
varied social category.84 
In sum, the labour movement, or more precisely its metalworkers federation, 
found itself stuck between the often contradictory criticism of the radical left, which 
conceived official unions as a kernel for the reinforcement of the capitalist system - as 
Mario Tronti argued in Operai e Capitale– and the moderate left, in the official 
political parties and the national executives of the CGIL-CISL-UIL, which remained 
somehow sceptical of creating extreme labour market rigidities and wary of impinging 
on managerial prerogatives.85 The proposal for a guaranteed wage had to navigate a 
narrow path, between the pressures of the rank and file for increased social protection 
and the need to strike a working agreement with the state and the employers.86  
These difficulties were reflected in the way the plan to strengthen the CIG 
developed through time. Before becoming part of the CGIL-CISL-UIL bargaining 
platform in the summer of 1974, the guaranteed wage was first adopted at the factory 
level. Everyday industrial relations on the shop floor allowed ideological 
contamination with the rank and file and progressively altered the negotiating stance 
of organised labour, forcing the unions to chase behind radical worker groups. The 
policy proposals for a guaranteed wage developed through the years from the bottom 
up, appearing first in those local contexts where serious threats to company 
employment levels forced worker mobilisation.  
Already during the mid-1960s, there were instances of the CIG being 
supplemented by additional monetary benefits in the textile sector. In June 1966, for 
example, a large group of workers in the state-owned woollen mill Lanerossi, in 
Schio, was fired and put on the CIG-S for a full year. The company decided to top up 
short time benefits with a monthly allotment of 26,000 lire for a year, thanks to the 
creation of a private welfare fund. This was not a guarantee of the wage: the 																																																								
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company’s contribution was a lump sum, not a fixed replacement rate, and workers 
were formally discharged, ‘without a valid guarantee of employment stability’, as the 
CGIL lamented.87 Yet, the episode shows early institutional experimentation.  
The first guaranteed wage clause appeared in company negotiations only at the 
beginning of the 1970s, in the electro-mechanics sector. Production of home 
appliances and light goods had suffered severe setbacks at the beginning of the 
decade, caught between decreasing consumer demands and the increasing competition 
of developing countries. National business leaders such as Indesit, Zanussi, Singer 
and Zoppas, in the Northeast and in the area around Turin, tried to resist decline by 
intensifying labour usage. However, due to slacking technological innovation, they 
were often forced to adopt manpower redundancies and suspensions.88 Throughout the 
post-war decades, companies in the electro-mechanics sector had been characterised 
by paternalistic strategies of control, with the workforce socialised to factory work 
thanks to the development of private welfare and other benefits.89  
The prospect of mass redundancies engendered widespread conflict. In February 
1971, the threat of suspensions for 8,000 workers at the main Zanussi factory in 
Pordenone led the unions to stage protests and open a dispute with management over 
the restructuring process and the guarantee that employment levels would not be 
curtailed. Autonomous groups were pressuring union stewards to adopt a radical 
negotiating stance. The summer of 1970 saw the birth of the Comitato Operaio 
Zanussi, a sizable faction affiliated with Potere Operaio and influenced by the 
Venetian autonomous movement, was organised within the territory around 
Pordenone.90 After five months of negotiations, during which Zanussi management 
often tried to stall by preventing paid permits for shop stewards taking part in talks, an 
agreement was reached in July. This included a guarantee of workers’ income with 
the company willing to top up the CIG up to 85% of workers’ previous earnings.91   																																																								
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The interpretation of this clause did not always prove pacific. In September, 
when Zanussi decided to adopt work time suspensions on a rotating basis for almost 
9,425 workers - to last until December 1971 - different readings of the agreement led 
to a harsh dispute between management and the unions. Yet, the agreement opened 
the door to a more negotiated use of the CIG at the company level, progressively 
allowing  unions to take part in the management of redundancies. In March 1973, the 
company decided to resort to the CIG-S for its factories in Pordenone and in the 
outskirts of Turin. Before the intervention of work time suspensions, it signed an 
agreement with the metalworking unions, thanks to the brokering of the Ministry of 
Labour, ‘guaranteeing all jobs and assuming managerial responsibility for the 
reemployment of the workforce’, agreeing to periodically inform shop stewards of the 
status of business restructuring. 92   
The agreement reached at Zanussi contained all the main elements of what 
would become the negotiating platform of the CGIL-CISL-UIL, representing an 
embryo of the guaranteed wage and an explicit point of reference in other factories. 
Yet, it was only when the issue was taken up in the automobile industry that the 
demand for a guaranteed wage obtained a national echo and was widely discussed 
beyond trade union circles, among employers and the national press. In the summer of 
1973, the factory councils of Alfa Romeo Arese and Pomigliano asked the 
management of Alfa to ensure 100% of wages in all cases of work-time suspension.93 
During the same months, the bargaining platform of FIAT’s factory council 
concentrated on pay bonuses and dining hall prices, asking the company for a 
commitment to protect employment levels. 
Alfa Romeo provided a fertile ground for the guaranteed wage campaign. The 
company was owned by the state and the unions held it socially accountable to ensure 
the continuity of employment. In Arese, the repeated use of the CIG-O to stem strikes 
and regulate the flow of production throughout the early 1970s had made the 
workforce susceptible to the need to protect their income against arbitrary 
suspensions. Radical groups inside the factory often exploited the issue to rally 
workers and boost support. In late 1973, the Collettivo Politco Alfa Romeo, a radical 																																																								
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group affiliated with Milanese autonomous groups, published its demands on the 
journal Rosso: 
 
‘In case of suspension, the boss has to pay us 100% of the wage, all of the payroll, even 
if the cassa integrazione does not intervene. This way, the boss cannot pull any trick. 
[…] The boss made workers believe that it was their fellow colleagues’ fault that they 
lost money. The guaranteed wage is our weapon to assure victory against the weapon of 
the boss: the suspension. This way we will have a solid background so that single 
struggles may be successful’.94 
 
The threat of job loss and wage reduction was particularly felt at Alfa Romeo, 
because its workforce had felt first-hand the problem of unemployment, especially in 
the south of the country, where the company had just opened its new factory. The 
dramatic social conditions in Naples and the high rate of unemployment in the area 
exerted pressure on newly hired workers and made protection against arbitrary 
suspensions and layoffs even more vital than in Arese. Due to logistical problems and 
the high level of micro-conflict, the use of work-time reduction in the factory of 
Pomigliano d’Arco was more frequent than in the North and autonomous groups 
tapped into employees’ dissatisfaction. Just as the building of Pomigliano’s plant was 
being completed, construction workers subcontracted by Alfa started to campaign to 
be hired in the new factory, led by the PCd’I-Lotta di lunga durata, a sizable radical 
formation that attacked the unions.95 The LC section of Pomigliano tackled the issue of 
the guaranteed wage more directly, criticising the factory council itself for ‘doing 
nothing to organise the struggle, opposing workers’ needs […] and mechanically 
defending union bureaucrats’. In order to obtain the guaranteed wage, LC urged 
workers to ‘organise and refuse to go home, remaining in the factory to organise 
assemblies and protests’.96 
The negotiations between the Intersind and the FLM began in January 1974 and 
got stuck on the issue of the guaranteed wage. The discussion immediately centred on 
the relationship between strikes, industrial organisation and the use of short time 
subsidies, with the unions lamenting the fact that Alfa Romeo had often resorted to 
the CIG to suspend workers during strikes. The rebuttal of management was 																																																								
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reminiscent of the legal debate on the use short time work during strikes that had 
inflamed the special committee of the CIG during the first post-war decades. Alfa 
stated that ‘it is not right for workers to strike on their own, disconnecting themselves 
from the rest of the workforce’. The unpredictability of social conflict within the 
factories, coupled with increasing market volatility, made it impossible for them to 
subsidise a complete guarantee of the wage. The unions, instead, stressed the political 
aspect of labour organisation and claimed that full wage protection during suspension 
was the only way to ensure the right of workers to strike:  
 
‘The organisation of labour is made so that the company has substantial advantages in 
terms of production. We ask that the company also pay for the negative aspects that are 
created when workers exercise their right (to strike) […] The missing provision of 
semi-finished is not caused by the workers, it depends on the extreme rigidity of the 
production cycle that you realised so as to obtain more production’.97 
 
The new company contract was signed at the end of April 1974, after months of 
strikes, and contained most of the desiderata of the FLM. Alfa accepted topping up 
the benefits paid by the CIG up to 90% of gross wages and to put a ceiling on the 
maximum hours of short time to be used for the rest of the year.98 This was in line with 
organised labour’s attempt to make businesses more responsible towards the financing 
of the CIG and introduce checks in its use. Both the PCI and the unions saluted the 
agreement positively. However, the guaranteed wage clause introduced at Alfa 
Romeo was strongly criticised in the press, starting with the very same IRI managers 
who negotiated it. In the Espresso, Walter Mandelli, President of the Federmeccanica, 
attacked the agreement, calling it a ‘nonsense’, which risked making factories 
ungovernable, depriving companies of the managerial instruments to control 
unregulated strikes. Mandelli’s position betrayed the fears of private employers that 
the guaranteed wage agreement would be applied in other companies, but also 
highlighted their approach to the political economy of factory work: the guaranteed 
wage agreement was particularly pernicious because it severed the ‘natural link’ 
between labour costs and productivity, decoupling wages from employees’ effective 
working hours, making the company financially responsible for all downtime.  Il Sole 
24 Ore, the daily newspaper owned by Confindustria, deplored the clause because it 																																																								
97 FLM, resoconto della trattativa per la Vertenza Alfa Romeo al Tavolo dell’Intersind: Garanzia del 
salario, Roma, 28/01/1974, ASCGILC, FIOM di Pomigliano d’Arco, b. 428. 
98 Consiglio di Fabbrica Alfa Romeo Alfa Sud, FLM Piattaforma aziendale Ipotesi di accordo per i 
delegati, Pomigliano -/04/1974, ASCGILC, FIOM di Pomigliano d’Arco, b. 424. 
	138	
forced Alfa Romeo to become a surrogate of the state, transforming a business into ‘a 
society based on welfarism, guaranteed income and the refusal of any risk’.99  
 
 
3.5 FIAT, the state and the Lama-Agnelli agreement 
The de-politicisation of labour organisation issues and the pursuit of the Fordist dream 
of technical efficiency had been key throughout the period of post-war economic 
expansion to ensure factory discipline.  The goal of industrial productivity had been 
presented as a politically neutral issue and industrial relation bargaining had mostly 
concentrated on non-monetary rewards for workers, to compensate them for the most 
brutal aspects of factory life. The harsh implementation of piecework rate systems – 
and, later on, the technocratic management of the human relations school of Elton 
Mayo, which stressed a collaborative approach to industrial relations – ensured the 
stability of the wage-productivity nexus.100 Organised labour was either co-opted or 
marginalised from negotiations and the issue of productivity remained above the daily 
strife of class politics. The introduction of a guaranteed wage clause at Alfa Romeo, 
albeit imperfect, shattered this paradigm, posing the wage as an independent variable 
of factory organisation, to be guaranteed in times of social conflict and market 
volatility.  
The daily administration of the new agreement on the CIG proved immediately 
difficult, with both the Alfa management and the unions enmeshed in bureaucratic 
skirmishes over its interpretation.101 Radical groups denigrated the agreement, saying 
that the introduction of a cap on the yearly usage of the CIG ‘missed the point of the 
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problem’, which was that of ensuring absolute labour rigidity.102 Despite this criticism, 
the new Alfa contract emboldened organised labour and propelled the guaranteed 
wage onto the national negotiating platform of the CGIL-CISL-UIL in the summer of 
1974. The relative success of company contract renewals during the first half of the 
year and the introduction of new austerity measures in July led the unions to place 
wage protection more firmly at the centre of their negotiating platform, coalescing 
bottom-up demands into a nationwide campaign for the strengthening of the wage 
indexation system and the generalisation of the guaranteed wage. In August 1974, 
Pierre Carniti was setting the stage for the upcoming dispute with the Confindustria, 
noting: 
 
‘If we want to avoid the fragmentation of the movement, the dispersion of the struggle 
into thousands streams, […] a guarantee on wages is crucial. The recent interventions 
of the CIG […] interconnect together market problems, restructuring of production and 
anti-union attacks. […] It is inconvenient to face such problems with exhausting case-
by-case struggles. Conquering the guaranteed wage must be intended as a weapon in 
the hands of all workers in cases of industrial restructuring’.103 
 
The CGIL proved more timid. In his introductory remarks to the executive 
committee in mid-September 1974, the Adjunct General Secretary Agostino 
Marianetti attacked ‘those left-wing groups for whom the priority of the salary is 
something to be sanctified’. He warned against the CISL’s ‘excessive emphasis on the 
wage’.  For Marianetti, the generalisation of wage demands should not have come at 
the expense of a broad strategy for social reform and should not have absorbed the 
‘full mobilisation potential’ of the labour movement.104 Peter Lange underlined the 
political splits between the CGIL and the CISL, stressing how the CGIL was less 
‘uncompromising’ on the issue of wage protection and indexation, compared to a 
CISL that remained firmly anchored to the ‘themes and demands […] of the Hot 
Autumn’.105 
The hesitations of the CGIL and the internal discord within the labour 
movement were soon overtaken by events. At the beginning of October 1974, FIAT 																																																								
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made the unprecedented decision to suspend 65,000 employees via CIG-O. Work-
time reductions would be applied differently to the various departments of the 
company’s factories in the Turinese area and beyond, also affecting the subsidiaries of 
Lancia and Autobianchi. On average, workers were set to lose thirty-two days of 
production, with suspensions distributed across three months, until January 1975. 
FIAT put forward an application, through the Industrial Union of Turin, to obtain a 
formal declaration of crisis for the auto sector, hoping to make use of the CIG-S.106  
According to Cesare Annibaldi, head of industrial relations at FIAT, the intervention 
of short time benefits could not be postponed, as the company had already piled up 
almost 300,000 cars in its storehouses, forcing a reduction of production: 
‘overstocking creates a problem of space. […] There is also a financial aspect: large 
inventories mean an immobilisation of hundreds of billions’. 107  
FIAT’s decision was unilateral, but did not come abruptly. The official 
announcement of redundancy was preceded by a short-lived negotiation with the FLM 
during September. Since the summer months, the unions had been denouncing how 
the company was emphasising the overstocking problem through a press campaign. In 
August, the newspaper La Stampa, close to the business elite of Turin, warned of the 
difficult autumn ahead, writing of ‘rumours of cassa integrazione for thousands of 
workers and of the risk of severe work time reductions at FIAT’.108   
In March 1974, the FLM signed a contract that bound FIAT not to resort to the 
CIG until the end of September. The supplementary contract burdened the company 
with additional costs, raising the monthly salary of blue-collar workers by 18,000 lire 
and forcing FIAT to commit to new investments in the South, for a total of 8,000 new 
hires. Despite the alleged financial unsustainability of these terms, Agnelli was forced 
to acquiesce, in order to bring to a close ‘tension and widespread violence in the 
factories’.109 The Ministry of Labour played no small role in this instance, as Agnelli 
himself underlined in the company’s bulletin in March:  
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‘The Minister put us in front of an alternative: accept a solution that is dictated by 
political motives, economically unsustainable for the company, or bear the 
responsibility for yet another interruption which would worsen the situation, inside and 
outside the gates of the factories, even more’.110 
 
The intervention of the state in the dispute earlier in 1974 left a scar on relations 
with FIAT, which suffered the contract as an external imposition, instilling into the 
company a revanchist spirit against both the unions and public authorities.  When 
FIAT announced mass redundancies in October, the Ministry of Labour proposed 
filling in as arbiter, but to no avail. Minister Bertoldi asked the company the 
permission to formulate ‘a definite and binding proposal’ for both parties, but FIAT 
refused, claiming absolute jurisdiction over  ‘a strictly industrial matter […] that 
pertains only to the company’. Despite the vehement protests of both the unions and 
the government, Agnelli was adamant, considering a governmental intervention as ‘a 
political act that would have distorted the functioning of economic laws and sound 
industrial management’.111  
According to Giuseppe Berta, starting in 1973, impulses for reform were 
mounting at FIAT, with the company’s upper echelons progressively growing aware 
of business social responsibilities and the need to redresses the distributional problems 
of Italian capitalism.112 Driven by Umberto Agnelli, adjunct CEO of the company since 
1970, FIAT spearheaded a strong critique of the economic model that underpinned the 
development of the boom years. To weather the storm of the crisis, it was necessary 
for the state to harness ‘new collective consumptions’ and investments through careful 
economic planning, stepping up its redistributive role. The resources would have been 
collected by attacking the ‘secular inefficiencies’ and wastages caused by rent-seeking 
and the ’corporatist arrogance” of certain social classes, in bureaucracy, finance and 
real estate but also in certain parts of the labour movement and the business elite. 
Society had to be reorganised around the needs of productive classes, with industry at 
its centre.113 
In many respects, Agnelli’s proposals for a ‘euthanasia of the rentier’ resonated 
with Lama’s approach. Even a prominent left-wing economist such as Claudio 																																																								
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Napoleoni, close to the positions of the PCI, underlined the perverse effects of 
‘unproductive labour’ and ‘parasitism’ on the structure of Italian capitalism. 114 
According to Berta, FIAT was also in favour of the revision of social shock absorbers 
to protect labour market insiders from restructuring. Instead, the position of the 
Turin’s carmaker drastically diverged with that of the unions on the issue of ‘control’. 
While politics had to concern itself with redistribution, business had to have complete 
autonomy over the management of industrial organisation, ‘rigidly dividing the 
reasons of production efficiency from those of social advancement’.115 FIAT was 
protective of its managerial independence: the state had to compensate for, not distort, 
the workings of market forces. The refusal of FIAT to allow the Ministry of Labour to 
intrude into the management of work-time reductions in October 1974 must be seen in 
this light.  
For its part, the Ministry of Labour saw the dispute between FIAT and 
organised labur as an opportunity, hoping to push through a reform of the CIG. The 
effects of the crisis were straining the institutional setup of short time work. Reporting 
to the XI parliamentary commission on labour issues, the Minister of Labour Bertoldi 
warned how:  
 
‘Short time can even work against its own objectives. As it is, the fund burdens the 
state with almost the entire cost of companies’ manpower reductions. The mechanism 
does not encourage companies to reorganise their production while maintaining the 
workforce, it pushes them to get rid of it. Single companies are incentivised to resort – 
through the CIG – to public unemployment support’.116 
 
Bertoldi’s denunciation of the institutional failures of short time work was part 
of a broader critique of the labour policies that had prevailed in the country since the 
mid-1950s. The Minister underlined how Italian labour policies had been too casual, 
leaving employment creation to spontaneous market outcomes without introducing a 
clear regulation regarding layoffs and redundancies. There was a need to make the 
CIG more coherent and uniform, introducing a stronger guarantee on wages, at a 
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higher cost for companies, and to link subsidised redundancies with professional 
retraining.117  
These proposals were not new and had circulated within the Ministry of Labour 
at least since the winter of the previous year. An internal memo from November 1973 
highlighted many problems, particularly regarding overlapping between the ordinary 
and extraordinary CIG funds. The latter was used in a very carefree way, with the 
‘frequent recognition of very dubious industrial restructuring plans and the official 
declaration of local crises that, at most, affect a company or two’. This led to ‘an 
artificial freezing of employment levels […] without any link to re-employment, even 
in the long term’. The deferral of dismissals through the CIG was a practice 
encouraged by the unions, the document noted, and happily accepted by companies, 
exploiting the ‘political opportunism and clientelism’ encroaching on the workings of 
provincial CIG commissions.118 The proposal put on the table by Bertoldi was to 
abolish the CIG-O altogether, generalising the functioning of the CIG-S and 
introducing greater automatism in the concession of benefits.  
This is something that was positively received by organised labour, which had 
often denounced the anti-union role and the paucity of benefits afforded by the CIG-
O. However, the failure of the government to provide an immediate solution to the 
industrial relations crisis created by FIAT’s abrupt decision caused the unions to 
adopt a confrontational stance. The Ministry of Labour kept a channel open to 
organised labour, but did not interfere directly with negotiations. In early October 
1974 a joint statement by the CGIL-CISL-UIL and the FLM denounced the fact that 
‘FIAT extremism’ had no real basis in the concrete corporate situation of the 
company, and called for a general strike, bringing all facilities in Turin to a complete 
halt.119   
The importance of FIAT into the industrial apparatus of Piedmont meant that 
work-time reductions in the company had an instant impact on the automotive supply 
chain. The unions estimated that for every worker suspended at FIAT at least three 																																																								
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others were at risk in related industries. The Cromodora and Solex, two companies in 
the automotive components network, went on complete shutdown in the wake of 
FIAT’s decision.120 In mid-October, Alfa Romeo also announced work-time reductions 
for 13,000 employees due to overstocking, sanctioning the general crisis of the 
automobile sector.121 
The unions feared that accepting the unilateral decision of the company, without 
mounting any kind of resistance, would have put the whole labour movement on the 
back foot. This was a very delicate moment, when the CGIL-CISL-UIL was 
negotiating with the employers’ association and with the government on the reform of 
the wage indexation system and the CIG. In the wake of FIAT’s decision, the talks 
with both the Confindustria and the Intersind came to a halt, with the unions 
lamenting the ‘standstill attitude’ of the employers.122  
The employers association was willing to reform the system of family 
allowances, increasing their monetary contribution, but resisted most of the other 
points raised by the unions. It refuted the egalitarian wage policy proposed by the 
CGIL-CISL-UIL. Most importantly, it maintained that the control of industrial 
restructuring and decisions over employment levels should remain a prerogative of 
managerial decision-making and should be negotiated neither with factory councils 
nor with public authorities. Only with these conditions, were the employers willing to 
introduce a system of penalties and fines for the companies that made excessive use of 
the CIG.123  By the end of the month - after the CGIL-CISL-UIL had made an 
unsuccessful attempt to pressure the local CIG commission to deny the authorisation 
for short time benefits at FIAT – negotiations at the national level broke down.124 
The intransigency of the company made the whole labour movement coalesce 
around the metalworkers federation, with the positions of the FLM and the CGIL-
CISL-UIL on the guaranteed wage gradually overlapping one another. The 																																																								
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negotiations between the metalworkers and FIAT and those between the employers’ 
and union confederations became practically undistinguishable, with national 
bargaining on reforms waiting for a breakthrough in the predicament of the auto-
sector.  
At FIAT, the FLM presented a counterproposal to management, aiming to 
reduce of the number of work days lost and spread work-time suspensions throughout 
1975, with the guarantee that jobs would not be lost. The unions accepted the reality 
of the economic crisis in the automobile sector, but tried to settle for only twenty-one 
days of work lost, distributing them to coincide with holidays and weekends, until 
April 1975.125  The request of the company for the intervention of the CIG-S was 
particularly worrying, as it foreshadowed possible employment losses. In a joint 
statement, the union confederation and the FLM asked the state to oversee the 
restructuring plans of the company. Most importantly, they asked for these to be 
negotiated with organised labour and be made conditional upon a plant-level 
agreement on the entity and durations of suspensions.126 
 The provincial and regional union cadres in Turin and Piedmont proved key in 
translating the demands emerging from the FIAT struggle into a national platform 
with the employers’ association, pressuring the national confederation to more 
strongly raise the issue of the guaranteed wage. In a document prepared in preparation 
for the regional assembly of the 25th of October, the Piedmont sections of the CGIL-
CISL-UIL stated the need to elaborate a coherent and unified position on the reform 
of the system of short time. The reform of the CIG had to become a national 
campaign, ‘with the same force and the same importance as wage indexation’. 
According to the document, a new law on the CIG was needed to discourage its 
excessive use:  
 
‘our choice on this issue points towards the introduction of rigidities and ties (in 
manpower policies), forcing single employers who want to make use of short time to 
pay for it, individually or through a general contribution, and subjecting its approval to 
a thorough negotiation with the union’. 127   
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The regional cadres did not conceive the reform of the CIG as a purely 
defensive battle, but one that had to be inextricably mixed with the demand for new 
investments and industrial diversification, at the regional and sector levels. This 
position was reiterated in mid-November by the Piedmont regional office of the 
CGIL: The threat of redundancies made it difficult to ‘keep up the usual pace of 
strikes’ […] What is needed is to make political use of the strike, linking it with 
initiatives investing in civil society and institutions’. The CIG was ‘an ambiguous 
instrument’, but the unions had to cope with that, introducing a system of penalties for 
its misuse and tighter control by the unions.128 
These perspectives were echoed at a national level, albeit in more moderate 
tones. At the beginning of November, Franco Bentivogli, Secretary of the FIM, 
intervened on the topic of the CIG during the general meeting of the FLM in Rome. 
Bentivogli stressed that the unions were opposed to any form of ‘luddism’ and 
accepted the need for industrial restructuring, but also urged for the creation of a 
stable system of negotiation between employers and factory-based unions over 
industrial transformation, so as to ensure that organised labour could participate into 
the management of work-time schedules and workforce mobility. The demand for a 
guaranteed wage was key to this approach. It was not a welfare benefit to mitigate 
layoffs, but an instrument to protect workers’ income while guaranteeing their re-
employment and social identity within Fordist society. As the CIG was increasingly 
used as a ‘political tool to weaken the labour movement by keeping workers outside 
the factories for prolonged spans of time, the guaranteed wage would have prevented 
such abuses’.129 
The end of the stalemate at FIAT provided the opportunity to push through the 
reform of the CIG at the national level. On the 30th of November, after a month-long 
mobilisation by the unions, the company signed an agreement with the FLM, at the 
presence of its three national secretaries, Bruno Trentin, Giorgio Benvenuto and 
Franco Bentivogli. FIAT accepted to stop work-time reductions, halting the massive 
use of the CIG and offering the guarantee that it would maintain its employment 
levels throughout the following year. Most importantly, the union obtained new rights 
of information on the status of industrial production and labour organisation. FIAT 																																																								
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would thereafter be forced to participate in a periodic ‘joint exam’ with the union and 
factory councils on various relevant matters, ranging from overtime and the arbitrary 
use of short time to new investments.130  
The concessions from the company did not come without a quid pro quo. While 
FIAT agreed to limit the use of the CIG, the company made the union accept the idea 
that the use of short time work was to be made conditional to the problem of stocks. 
Every three months the company would disclose to the factory council the data on 
selling and car stockpiles, and decide how to adjust working time so as to keep the 
number of cars in the inventory between 220,000 and 250,000 units. This clause 
effectively tied manpower policies to market outcomes and it was not a coincidence 
that the FIAT management saluted it positively, in company’s newsletter Il Giornale 
dei Capi, writing that the agreement signalled ‘a substantial step forward in co-
responsibilisation of the union in the management of the crisis’. 131  The unions 
vindicated the value of the agreement, rebutting criticism from their left by stating 
that ‘negotiated control over production levels was not a form of co-determination but 
a way to revamp the power of worker delegates and factory councils on work 
organisation’, as stated by UIL Piedmont regional secretary Ferruccio Ferrari.132 
The agreement reached at FIAT immediately provided a blueprint for other 
companies, with Alfa Romeo management striking a similar deal just few days later.133 
The wide mobilisation of workers around the demand for a guaranteed wage and the 
success of the negotiation at FIAT led the national executives of the CGIL-CISL-UIL 
to bring the reform of short time to the national table of Confindustria, counting on 
the openness already displayed at the company level by Agnelli, who wanted to bring 
the strike wave of the winter to a swift close. On the 25th of January 1975, the national 
union federation and the employers’ association signed an agreement that accepted 
organised labour’s demands for the strengthening of the wage indexation system and, 
most importantly, the reform of short time work, bringing previous plant level 
experiences with the guaranteed wage into a unified national framework.134 																																																								
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The employers agreed with organised labour to a series of institutional 
adjustments to present the government, including the strengthening of the monetary 
benefits of short time, the equalisation of the CIG-O, to be brought on par with the 
CIG-S, the revision of employers’ contributions, with the introduction of a surcharge 
for companies that wanted to make use of short time, and, most importantly, a system 
of pre-emptive consultation between factory councils and management to gain access 
to short time benefits.  
The many concessions made by Confindustria on wage increases and the 
management of short time reflected the need of the employers to rein in industrial 
conflict, which was coupling with the severe market downturn of the second half of 
1974 to cripple profit. The local branches of the employers’ association in Turin and 
Milan recognised that the January agreement entailed ‘rising financial burdens’ for 
companies. Yet, a breakdown of negotiations with the unions would have meant 
dragging on and aggravating social tensions and would have probably forced the state 
to intervene, a disruption which the employers seemed to want to avoid. The 
Industrial Union of Turin was particularly wary of another round of factory level 
agitations. The aim of Confindustria was that of normalising its relations with 
organised labour, creating a more ‘organic system of negotiation at a national level’, 
so as to prevent excessive autonomy at a local level.135  
Indeed, during the first half of 1975, Giovanni Agnelli repeatedly pressed the 
new Minister of Labour, Mario Toros for a speedy approval of the legislation 
necessary to implement the content of the January agreement. 136  After all, the 
provisions for short time work devised by the employers and organised labour 
intercepted a need for reform that existed within the bureaucracy of the Ministry of 
Labour. In January, the outgoing Minister of Labour Bertoldi - in the pages of Avanti, 
the official newspaper of the PSI - stressed the need for a change in regulation of the 
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CIG, welcoming the debate on the guaranteed wage and the possibility to reform the 
framework of law n. 1115.137  
Even Gino Giugni, an eminent labour jurist who had written large parts of the 
Workers’ Statute, saluted the Lama-Agnelli agreement, as a sign that ‘social partners 
were conscious of the need to take care of the problem of industrial restructuring’. For 
Giugni, the guaranteed wage provisions could bring new flexibility to the Italian 
labour market, helping to establish a well-codified system of bargaining between 
employers and unions on the issue of industrial restructuring.138 Both men, however, 
warned that the strengthening of the CIG needed to be integrated into a larger 
employment creation mechanism. Left alone, the guaranteed wage clause risked 
becoming a kernel of further market sclerosis: ‘a simple measure of social assistance, 
not an economic one. A wage support system, detached from the productive 
utilisation of resources’.139 
Law n. 164 was formally presented to the Parliament by the Minister of Labour 
in late March and substantially accepted all the main points of the January agreement. 
First and foremost, the new law scheme equated the benefit of the CIG-O and the 
CIG-S, raising the replacement allowance of the ordinary fund to 80% of previous 
wages.  Furthermore, it introduced important updates regarding the financing of short 
time work benefits. Up until that point, the state had completely funded the CIG-S. 
However, it did so renewing state aid on a year-by-year basis. The law made state 
contributions permanent. The financing system of the ordinary fund, instead, was re-
devised so as to prevent its excessive use. The law introduced additional contributions 
to the companies that made use of the CIG-O, creating a dual regime whereby large 
companies, above fifty employees, would pay 8% of gross wages on top of the normal 
contribution, while smaller companies paid 4%.140 During the parliamentary discussion 
on the law, Minister Toros explicitly referred to the ‘moralising effects’ of this 
provision.141 																																																								
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Article five represented the keystone of the new guaranteed wage law, 
drastically increasing the role that social partners - and unions in particular - played in 
the management of short time. It envisioned the introduction of special procedures for 
the consulting of organised labour in all cases in which the CIG intervened for more 
than sixteen hours a week. Formally, union approval and demands were not binding 
for the employers, but in practice the consultation process increased the overseeing 
power of the unions. The consultation of organised labour before the intervention of 
the CIG was compulsory and granted union stewards the right to request information 
over business restructuring plans. At the provincial level, instead, the chairing of local 
CIG commissions was taken away from INPS officials - who traditionally had a very 
conservative stance regarding the concession of benefits - and handed over to the 
directors of regional labour offices, at the direct dependency of the Ministry of 
Labour, effectively depriving the INPS of gatekeeping powers at the local level. The 
restructuring of the decision-making and financing system of the CIG was 
complemented by an array of other policy innovations, strengthening employment 
rights during downturns. Among other opportunities, the new law introduced 
compulsory training and reskilling courses for workers on extraordinary short time 
work. These were to be managed by regional labour offices, together with local 
unions, and served to guarantee workers’ professional and social identity while 
updating their skill sets.  
The institutional changes proposed by law n. 164 were in line with those 
suggested by the Confindustria and the CGIL-CISL-UIL, but engendered vocal 
opposition from organisationally weaker actors, those that were left out of the January 
agreement. For instance, the CONFAPI, the employers association representing small 
and medium size enterprises, complained to the Ministry of Labour, denouncing the 
‘vertical nature’ of the agreement and the institutional design of the guaranteed wage 
system, which suited large enterprises but could prove quite oppressive for smaller 
ones, strangled by credit restrictions and declining consumer demand.142 The President 
of the CONFAPI explicitly stated that ‘the interests that prevailed in the guaranteed 
wage agreement were those of great enterprises; those of the small ones were stepped 
on’, marginalised by an alliance of interests between large employers and the core 																																																								
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industrial working class.143 Within the government, instead, it was the Ministry of 
Treasury who most radically criticised the guaranteed wage law, asking the 
government to make the financing of short time work scheme more sustainable. 
Fearing a possible deficit in the CIG fund, the Treasury requested the introduction of 
an automatic system of contributions adjustment, raising the cost of the scheme 
depending on its yearly expenditures.144 
Despite such criticisms, law n. 164 on the guaranteed wage was approved by the 
parliament on the 20th of May 1975. This new law sanctioned the reform of short time 
work and, with it, the seemingly newfound intent of employers and organised labour 
to govern together industrial restructuring, negotiating redundancies in a conciliar 
framework. On the morning that the law scheme was approved, the Ministry of 
Labour signalled the significance of the reform with a press release, pointing towards 
the fact that Italian industrial relations were finally moving towards a form of northern 
European continental corporatism. Indeed, Minister Toros underlined how the most 
significant part of the reform of the CIG was the introduction of mandatory 
consultations between social partners: ‘a fact of notable political relevance, […] as the 
maturity of the largest trade unions represents a guarantee for a more responsible 
participation of workers into the everyday life of enterprises’.145 
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4. Imperfect corporatism and the failure of Italian industrial 
policy, 1975-1980 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 The labour market and the contradictions of organised labour  
The agreement between the unions and Confindustria on the guaranteed wage, 
transformed into law in May 1975, strengthened the monetary replacement afforded 
by the CIG-O. Most importantly, it introduced additional financial contributions for 
employers who made use of short time and a system of non-binding consultation on 
work-time reductions between business and local unions. The Lama-Agnelli 
agreement opened a new page in Italian industrial relations. The demands for wage 
security and stronger job protection had initially emerged in the metalworking sector 
and were championed by the FLM. Only later were they accepted by the CGIL-CISL-
UIL. The national unions channeled bottom-up demands and cemented them into a 
clear negotiating platform with the employers. For its part, Confindustria was willing 
to concede to the unions’ demands in order to secure labour restraint and help in the 
regulation of strikes and industrial action.1 
For the first time in the 1970s  - and, effectively, during the whole post-war 
period - organised interests groups showed the capacity to bargain for a 
comprehensive platform on income and job security, with an exchange of benefits and 
the establishment of a system of mutual and seemingly binding obligations to 
guarantee it. The five years prior to the 1975 agreement were described by Marino 
Regini as a ‘conflict-negotiations’ period: the unions were regularly consulted on a 																																																								
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wide range of issues, particularly by state authorities. Yet, the most solid results for 
labour had always been achieved through the adoption of a confrontational stance 
with the backing of mass mobilisation and strikes, while the employers had rarely 
shown the willingness to sit at the negotiating table, unless under the direct threat of 
social upheaval.2 The establishment of a clear set of rules for the mechanics of wage 
indexation and work-time reduction in 1975 seemed to bring order to the until then 
unregulated pattern of industrial relations, seemingly aligning the Italian experience to 
that of other continental European countries in which corporatist arrangements had 
been prevalent since the beginning of the post-war period.3  
 As a result of law n. 164, unions found themselves enmeshed in daily 
negotiations in work-time reductions and suspensions. Sometimes these amounted to 
only a few days to address the problem of unsold inventories. As the second half of 
the 1970s rolled in, however, business crises became more severe and organised 
labour faced increasingly long spells of CIG. The economic crisis showed no signs of 
receding and many companies were forced to shut down, obliging the state to 
intervene directly to buy them out or to provide access to industrial credit. 4 As a 
consequence, the use of the extraordinary short time fund, up until that point in line 
with that of the CIG-O, started to pick up.  By the end of the decade, the CIG-S was 
business’s preferred form of labour market intervention to finance manpower 
redundancies.5 
In this context, the unions concentrated on the protection of existing industrial 
jobs, attempting to steer short time benefits and state investment to control the social 
consequences of market instability.  The attempt was to tie welfare intervention to a 
set of proactive industrial policies to foster employment creation and stem the tide of 
industrial layoffs. At the turn of the decade, the advent of the so-called ‘historic 
compromise’ governments, with a rapprochement between the communists and 
Christian democrats, opened a door for organised labour to influence policymaking 
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more consistently.6 In the summer of 1977, the approval of law n. 675 led to a 
comprehensive overhaul of Italian industrial policy, increasing public funding for 
industrial restructuring and introducing development plans at the sector level to 
rationalise state intervention. Within the framework of the new law, the CIG-S should 
have operated as a conduit of manpower flexibility, allowing income maintenance for 
companies that conformed to industrial reorganisation plans.7 
This chapter argues that, in seeking to deal with the industrial crisis of the late 
1970s organised labour, employers and the state developed a system of imperfect 
corporatist bargaining that ultimately doomed their attempt to govern redundancies. 
The existing literature has already underlined the difficulties faced by the introduction 
of corporatist practices in Italy: the country’s system of industrial relations was 
characterised by weak institutionalisation and a high degree of interest group 
fragmentation which were not conducive to peak level negotiations between capital 
and labour.8 Yet, few scholars took into consideration the effects that the failure of 
corporatist arrangements in the 1970s had on Italian unemployment social policy. 
This chapter will broaden this perspective, showing how the incapacity of the state to 
broker a corporatist arrangement between employers and organised labour led to the 
segmentation of the labour market between an overly protected core and a marginal 
fringe with no income guarantees.9 In this context, the CIG that was intended to foster 
labour market flexibility and ease the social consequences of industrial restructuring, 
was instead increasingly used as a narrow surrogate of unemployment insurance, 
further fossilizing the labour market. 
Despite the introduction of new legislation, the regulations governing industrial 
policies remained weak and confusing, while state authorities exercised no control 
over business decision-making. This made it impossible to combine the protection of 
labour market insiders and the need for employment creation policies to cope with 
rising unemployment. Without an enforcement mechanism to compel companies to 
conform to their restructuring plans and safeguard employment levels, many 																																																								
6 Emilio Reyneri, ‘Movimento sindacale, crisi economica e sociale, compromesso storico’, il Mulino, 
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regolazione’, il Mulino, Rivista bimestrale di cultura e di politica  1 (1998), 103-111, at pp. 104-105. 
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employers adopted a dismissive attitude towards the issue of redundancy, favouring 
business delocalisation and smaller production units over the industrial organisation 
model embodied by the large factory.10  
In the absence of strong guarantees regarding prospects for re-employment, the 
unions made very rigid use of the CIG, attempting to protect their own constituencies 
by opposing layoffs whenever possible. This, however, had a pernicious effect on 
their organisational strength. The system of consultation designed by the guaranteed 
wage law dragged organised labour into a co-determination of work-time suspensions 
and redundancies that eroded its basis of support, creating a chasm with the rank and 
file and setting the stage for the wider retreat of labour power into the 1980s.  
 
 
4.2 Corporatism: a discussion of the Italian case 
In the 1970s, the emergence of peak level negotiations between capital and labour in 
the poorly institutionalized context of Italian industrial relations underscored the 
growing importance of the state in managing the problems of advanced capitalist 
economies. This was a Europe-wide trend. The social crisis of the late 1960s and the 
international market downturn that immediately followed led to a sharp expansion of 
social policy and state intervention in the industrial sector of many Western nations. 
The Keynesian welfare state reached its apex in the early 1970s, with an expansion of 
social programs that encompassed a larger than ever population - from pensioners to 
the unemployed. In parallel, state participation in the economy grew to directly 
govern a huge chunk of the industrial apparatus of many European countries, often as 
a result of private business crises and public rescue operations.11  Until the early 1980s, 
the combined increase of social policy and direct state control made public 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP grow in almost every country.12 
The increasing role of the state as a ‘crisis manager’ spurred scholars to rethink 
the relationship between state institutions and the economic sphere, with a reappraisal 
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of the multifaceted effects that public intervention has on the economic and social life 
of the polity.13  
An important side of the new debate on the state concerned the role played by 
public authority in coordinating industrial relations and, more broadly, how state 
institutions interact with organised interest groups. The category of corporatism, up 
until then limited to the analysis of authoritarian regimes in the interwar period, 
started to be used to define the societal arrangements of the 1970s, with the new label 
of ‘neo-corporatism’. 14  In 1974, Philippe C. Schmitter argued that advanced western 
economies had seen the re-emergence of corporatism. To differentiate between the 
authoritarian and modern use of the word, Schmitter adopted a broad definition, 
describing corporatism as a ‘system of interest and/or attitude representation […] for 
linking the associationally organised interests of civil society with the decisional 
structures of the state’.15 The constituent units of corporatist arrangements had to be 
‘singular, compulsory and non-competitive’ and had to be recognised by the state, 
which granted them ‘representational monopoly within their respective categories’.16   
In the same years, Gehard Lembruch offered an alternative codification of 
corporatism. Rather than concentrating on the structure of interest representation, 
Lehmbruch stressed the importance of how economic and social policies were 
discussed and implemented. In his definition, corporatism is ‘an institutionalised 
pattern of policy formation in which large interest organisations cooperate with each 
other and with public authorities […] in the articulation of interests and […] in the 
authoritative allocation of values’.17   
Towards the end of the decade, Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno tackled 
the issue of corporatism from a different perspective, linking the rise of corporatist 
arrangements to the attempt to rein in the explosive social conflict of the 1970s. 
According to Crouch, corporatism is a ‘hierarchical and non-conflictual’ system of 
interaction between the state, capital and labour.18  This definition built on Pizzorno’s 																																																								
13 Starke, Kaasch and Van Hooren, The Welfare State as Crisis Manager, p. 173. 
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		 157	
key concept of ‘political exchange’: a kind of relationship between the state and 
organised interest groups, in which the first is willing to trade access to public goods 
in exchange for the acquiescence of the latter. By foregoing the possibility of 
disrupting the social order, organised groups can reap important organisational 
benefits. The state guarantees for itself a lever of control over society, exchanging the 
cooperation of organised interest groups for their increased participation into the 
process of policy formation.19 
The rise of strong organised interests groups, with their monopoly over labour 
and capital, undermined the very logic of liberal market economies but opened up a 
new opportunity.20 The possibility of negotiating the future behaviour of organised 
interests could have bolstered state capacity for economic planning and its power to 
mobilise resources towards the promotion of employment creation, while keeping 
inflation in check through income policies.21 This was particularly important in times 
of economic crisis, which disrupted the fabric of capitalist societies and heightened 
the need to rein in social conflict. Capitalism, Crouch argued, is only able to 
incorporate the working class through the redistribution of benefits allowed by a 
constant rate of economic growth. When the engine stalls, corporatism emerges as a 
response to ‘re-institutionalise’ social conflict, with the state allowing organised 
interest groups greater control over policymaking.22   
 Western European societies in the 1970s offered the perfect breeding ground 
for corporatist institutional experiments. The high rate of industrial conflict across the 
continent and the relative strength of the labour movement forced employers and 
many governments to open up negotiations with organised labour for the reform of 
welfare policies.23 Austria, Germany and other northern countries had a long tradition 
of corporatist bargaining in industrial relations, grounded in the ordoliberalism of the 
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early post-war period.24 The Iberian peninsula, still on the eve of its transition towards 
democracy, was anchored to the authoritarian tradition of the Portuguese Estado Novo 
and Francoist corporatism.25 Even France and Great Britain, in which corporatism had 
been typically weak throughout the post-war period, showed a high degree of interest 
group incorporation into the state machinery during the 1970s.26 
Italy has always been considered somewhat of an exception by the neo-
corporatist literature, ‘the Cinderella of Europe’.27 Since the early post-war period, the 
weakness of state institutions and the fragmented nature of Italian industrial relations 
prevented the introduction of corporatist arrangements. In the immediate aftermath of 
the war, interclass cooperation seemed to open up the space for concertation practices. 
The break-up of the union movement and the rise of Christian democracy, however, 
deprived the country of two conditions sine qua non of corporatism: an 
organisationally cohesive labour movement and a pro-labour government willing to 
engage in negotiations. The internal fractures of Italian unions prevented the creation 
of a labour interest organisation with a monopoly over worker representation and the 
authority to speak to the government with one voice. While the CGIL had an ample 
constituency, its conflictual strategy and tight linkage with the PCI marginalised it as 
a political interlocutor. The CISL represented a more suitable candidate for a 
corporatist experiment, not only because of its connection with Christian Democracy, 
but also because corporatism represented an important part of Catholic social thought. 
However, the Christian union remained a minority in terms of numbers.28 Even in the 
promising environment of the 1960s, when the PSI joined coalition governments, 
corporatist arrangements failed to materialise. The rise of the centre-left brought with 
it a stronger focus on national economic planning and, with it, greater attention to the 																																																								
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cooperation of social partners. The unions, on their side, took an important step 
towards their institutionalisation. In 1959, the government sanctioned the universal 
applicability of collective work contracts, strengthening the authority of organised 
labour and opening the official recognition of worker plant level structures, the 
Commissioni Interne.29 Despite these important inroads, the CGIL remained sceptical 
of the efficacy of institutionalised negotiations on wider social issues, while the 
employers feared that supporting national economic planning would have furthered 
business nationalisation and encroached on their freedoms. 
It was only at the turn of the 1970s that Italian industrial relations acquired the 
‘centralised organizational capacities’ necessary for corporatism to develop.30 The 
Workers Statute strengthened the monopoly of already established unions, giving full 
authority and rights only to the ‘most representative’ worker organisations on a 
national level. The creation of the federation CGIL-CISL-UIL reinforced the process 
of organisational re-composition, unifying labour negotiating positions towards the 
state and Confindustria. 31  The government and the employers realised that a 
compromise needed to be reached to bring to an end the tumultuous industrial conflict 
that made the factories ungovernable and hampered a speedy recovery from the crisis. 
The 1975 agreements on short time work benefits and wage indexation became the 
‘building block’ of the Italian way to corporatism, with employers conceding stronger 
income protection in exchange for conflict moderation. The reform of the Scala 
Mobile was costly for companies’ finances, but it introduced an automatic system of 
wage adjustment to inflation that substituted demands for pay rises at the plant-level, 
depriving the unions of the opportunity to mobilise workers on direct wage issues, 
thus attenuating strikes. The automatic nature of wage indexation insulated union 
leadership from rank and file pressures on wages, making them more available to 
compromise. According to Locke and Baccaro, between 1976 and 1978, wage costs 
decreased and industrial investment grew, leading to a partial curtailment of 
inflation.32   
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The attempt to sustain a corporatist rearrangement of Italian industrial relations 
during the second half of the 1970s was supported also at the political level, with the 
establishment of governments backed by the Communist Party. After the failed 
experiment of the centre-left policy formula during the late 1960s, the PCI stepped up 
to provide external support for Christian Democracy-led governments, opening the 
so-called phase of the ‘historic compromise’ between communists and Christian 
Democrats. The eruption of political violence and terrorism, combined with persistent 
employment problems, threatened the stability of the country. Following the elections 
of 1976, where the communists achieved their largest result of the post-war period, 
with 34% of vote, the PCI decided to abstain in parliament and support a minority 
government led by the Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti.33 In the eyes of Enrico 
Berlinguer, the Secretary of the PCI, the alliance had to be based on a series of 
economic reforms that, respecting the essence of liberal market economics, should 
nonetheless protect workers’ living standards and achieve the social transformation of 
Italian society.34 
The political formula of the ‘Historic Compromise’ did not fit squarely with the 
standard definition of ‘pro-labour government’ offered by neo-corporatist theorists. 
However, it opened important venues for capital and labour collaboration. The unions, 
and in particular the national executives of the CGIL, saw the cooperative attitude of 
the PCI as an opportunity to let go of the excessive rank-and-filism of the previous 
period and transform their support into policymaking influence. As the 1970s went 
on, the Italian institutional environment looked to be converging with that of other 
European countries, towards a corporatist rearrangement of society. The increasing 
centralisation of organised interest groups made peak level negotiations between the 
unions and the employers more viable, while Historic Compromise governments 
offered a political umbrella guaranteeing the exchange between social partners.35 																																																								
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Despite this, the application of the concept of corporatism to Italian industrial 
relations in the 1970s remained extremely problematic, not least because the labour 
movement itself resisted such label. The historical memory of the Fascist period 
remained fresh and the word corporativismo inextricably linked with the industrial 
relations system of the 1930s, when independent unions had been outlawed. The word 
came to be used as pejorative, to criticise groups of workers and professional 
categories that decided to pursue their own narrow interests, signing separate 
agreements with the employers, eschewing collective regulations.36  
The General Secretary of the CGIL, Luciano Lama was not only the main 
architect of the rapprochement with the Confindustria but, paradoxically, also one of 
the staunchest critics of corporatism. According to Lama, the conflict prone and 
autonomous attitude of the strongest sector unions in the large factories of the 
metalworking and chemical sector represented a risk. In the context of a very 
unbalanced labour market, the corporatism of these categories could create a fracture 
in the labour movement. In this sense, corporatism was intended as a reflection of 
worker individualism, the tendency to interpret the union as a simple organisation of 
members of the same trade, on the Anglo-Saxon model, and not as a champion of 
larger class interests. Still towards the end of the decade, when the labour movement 
officially accepted income policies at the EUR Conference of 1978, the unions 
rejected the corporatist epithet.37 The terminological confusion regarding the meaning 
of corporatism reflected the duality of the Italian labour movement, torn between the 
political appeal of championing wider class issues and its everyday working as an 
interest organisation.  
This was not the only problem plaguing the attempt to introduce corporatism in 
Italy. Regini underlined how, by its very nature, the dynamic of political exchange is 
an asymmetrical one: the benefits offered by organised labour, in terms of strike and 
wage moderation, have an immediate impact on the employers and state counterparts, 
while worker control over policymaking and co-determination of business strategy 
takes time to kick in. This creates a problem of political trust between social partners 
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and requires the state to take into consideration the time inconsistency and the short 
run inequality of benefits embedded in corporatist systems.38  
Italy was poorly positioned to achieve this, as the country lacked a tradition of 
cooperation among social partners. Representatives of the employers and the unions 
were sitting together on supervisory boards at the INPS and, at least since the 1960s, 
the Ministry of Labour had tried to broker negotiations among social partners through 
a series of informal meetings. However, there were no institutional venues for 
organised interests to influence policymaking, nor they were consulted in a systematic 
manner. When in 1977 the Parliament approved law n. 675, creating the Inter-
ministerial Committee for Industrial Policy, the employers and the unions were not 
part of it. The Italian pattern of corporatist negotiation remained poorly 
institutionalised and informal, lacking a system to enforce the reciprocal 
commitments of corporatism and unable to compensate for the imbalances of political 
exchange.39 
This was particularly problematic for labour, because the weak 
institutionalisation of Italian corporatism opened up a crisis of representation for the 
unions. According to Leo Panitch, organised labour is able to sustain corporatist 
arrangements only if its leadership is ‘insulated’ from the plant-level pressures of the 
rank and file.40 Despite the attempts of the CGIL-CISL-UIL federation to attenuate the 
relationship with factory councils, the federation was unable to shield itself from the 
pressures emanating from the bottom up. The absence of a credible institutional 
mechanism to enforce employment creation policy and industrial investments by the 
employers and the state made it difficult for labour constituencies to swallow 
redundancies and self-imposed conflict moderation.41 
The 1975 agreement on the guaranteed wage, despite its important concession, 
exhibited the institutional shortcomings of an imperfect corporatism. Law n. 164 
introduced a compulsory consultation procedure between the employers and plant-																																																								
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level unions for the utilisation of short time work, making the CIG much less flexible 
than before. The approval of organised labour, however, was not binding, at least 
from the official point of view. Employers only had to forward detailed information 
on their production plans and a clear timetable for business restructuring. Where the 
unions could back up their negotiating position with strong worker mobilisation, this 
provided an effective supervision over the unilateral management of short time work. 
The so-called ‘information rights’ were perceived by the unions as a way to control 
the CIG and thus avoid suffering work-time reduction passively, linking them instead 
to a comprehensive control over investments and the restructuring of labour 
organisation. However, this policy formula did not provide enough guarantees for an 
effective control of short time where organised labour could not muster the 
organisational strength to threaten the employers’ positions. 
As a consequence of the new legislation, the relative preference of business for 
the CIG-O was lessened: after having peaked in 1975, the hours subsidised by the 
CIG-O declined from the height of almost 230 million to 59 million in 1979. In 
parallel, the CIG-S picked up, almost doubling, from 55 million hours in 1975 to 133 
million in 1979.42 The relative preference of the employers shifted towards the scheme 
that allowed them to tap more directly on public resources, with the extraordinary 
short time fund being completely financed through state aid. This was also due to the 
worsening business prospects of many firms. During the second half of the 1970s, 
industrial redundancies grew longer in their duration and the CIG-S was better 
designed to tackle structural crises. After having grown in the previous years, total 
industrial employment remained almost stationary between 1975 and 1979: the 
absolute number of workers in the sector increased only slightly from 7,902,400 to 
7,986,100, while industry as a percentage of total employment declined for the first 
time in the post-war period.43 Layoffs still remained substantially frozen, but important 
firms - such as the car producer Innocenti, the light engineering company Singer and 
the food manufacturer Venchi Unica, started to fail - bringing on the omens of a larger 
crisis. 
The corporatisation of the policymaking and daily administration of welfare had 
some important effects. The overtaking of the CIG-O by the CIG-S signaled that 																																																								
42 INPS, Rendiconti dell’Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (Roma: Inps, 1976 to 1980). 
43  Stephen Broadberry, Claire Giordano and Francesco Zollino, ‘A Sectoral Analysis of Italy’s 
Development, 1981-2011’, Quaderni di Storia Economica 20 (2011), 3-83, at p. 57. 
	164	
redundancy was becoming a structural feature of the Italian industrial labour market. 
By 1978, for the first time in the post-war period, the combined total expenditure of 
the CIG exceeded that on standard unemployment insurance and remained above it 
for the following decade. The attempt to govern the crisis through corporatist 
negotiations created a divergence between the social needs of the employed and the 
unemployed, steering social policy towards the protection of labour market insiders. 
Standard unemployment insurance remained anchored to a nominal lump sum and 
was rapidly devalued by inflation. The total expenditures on standard unemployment 
insurance actually declined by 30% between 1975 and 1980, even as the 
unemployment rate soared.44  
This was particularly problematic for the unions. With a social policy targeted 
towards the industrial sector and labour market insiders, the unions were left 
demanding employment creation policies that were late in coming. A growing 
distance opened between the ‘guaranteed’ – those in industrial sectors covered by the 
CIG - and a plethora of new social subjects, the ‘second society of the non-
guaranteed’, in the words of Alberto Asor Rosa.45 In January 1977, this fracture was 
made blatantly clear when the CGIL Secretary Luciano Lama was forced out by 
students from an assembly in the occupied university of Rome.46  
The rift that was opening up between labour market insiders and outsiders 
mirrored a growing dissatisfaction of the rank and file towards the union leadership. 
The corporatist arrangements behind the reform of short time work allowed 
employers to co-opt organised labour into the daily management of the CIG, but did 
not offer strong guarantees to enforce bottom-up control. Both the unions and the 
state, at the local and central levels, lacked a mechanism to enforce employers to 
comply with restructuring plans and productive investments, particularly where 
business crises lasted longer, affecting a whole region or industrial sector. Even when 
the state took matters in its own hands, through public buyouts and state owned 
companies, it did so with shortsightedness, stemming immediate social crises without 																																																								
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a coherent and comprehensive plan to foster the structural transformation of industry. 
The failure of law n. 675, which the unions hoped would become the new framework 
for industrial policy, epitomised the lack of public power. 47 Strangled between the 
need to foster employment creation policies and the defense of already employed 
workers, the contradictions within organised labour deepened, alienating the 
sympathies of both public opinion and its own constituencies. Radical groups and the 
rank and file - particularly in the most riotous workplaces - came to see factory 
council stewards as somewhat complicit in the management of work-time reductions.48 
For Sergio Garavini – Secretary of the chemical union FULC and previously 
leader of the FIOM-CGIL – the conundrum of trade union politics had become 
apparent already in early 1975. Intervening in mid-February at a union training 
seminar held in Florence, Garavini was positive about the recent agreement on the 
CIG. For him, the task of the labour movement was to push for the simultaneous 
defense of real wages and employment, which needed to ‘be controlled in all 
companies, both in terms of staffing levels and in terms of working hours’. However, 
Garavini also recognised the need to reach a transitory compromise, one in which the 
unions had to accept a certain degree of workforce mobility ‘and go through phases of 
work-time reduction’. The point of such a strategy for the union leader was ‘to speak 
in military terms, […] about saving the army and staying inside the factories, which is 
the primary condition to resist’.49  
 Garavini – and with him most of the national executives of the CGIL and the 
PCI - realised that an excessive intransigence of worker control over labour 
organisation risked jeopardising further private investments. They were thus ready to 
accommodate some of the employers’ demands for flexibility, based on the 
assumption that the rank and file would rally behind the new course of union 
leadership. The reality of industrial redundancies and the growing threat of permanent 
layoffs, however, put the organisational resilience of organised labour to the test, 
ultimately dooming the attempt of the unions to steer a middle course between the 
protection of labour market insiders and the broader interest of the Italian working 
class.  																																																								
47 Nicola Bellini, Stato e industria nelle economie contemporanee (Roma: Donzelli, 1996), p. 101. 
48 Bruno Trentin referred to ‘a rarefaction of the democratic life of the union’. See Trentin, Il Sindacato 
dei Consigli, p. 257. 
49 Sergio Garavini, Crisi, Ristrutturazione Industriale e formazione, FLM, Torino, 17/02/1975, AST, 
FLM di Torino, b. 800, f. 1. 
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4.3 The CIG-O and the management of market flexibility 
Throughout the most turbulent phase of industrial conflict, in the first half of the 
1970s, the CIG-O served as way to counter strikes and control the factory shop floor. 
The guaranteed wage agreement introduced stronger checks on such repressive use of 
short time. This did not prevent employers from resorting to the CIG-O, but shifted 
the gears of its workings. Whereas before the ordinary short time fund had operated 
on the internal dynamic of factory organisation, regulating the flow of production to 
cope with the dislocations caused by social unrest, starting from early 1975 the CIG-O 
was increasingly used to cushion large factories from the impact of external shocks.  
In the wake of the oil crisis, the international macroeconomic environment was 
characterised by sudden demand fluctuations. Many companies experienced rapidly 
changing market shares and sales at both the international and the domestic level.50 In 
such an unpredictable market environment - with the impossibility of implementing 
sudden changes in the organisation of labour and pay structure due to the resistance of 
factory councils and local unions – employers were in need of a system to favour the 
rapid adjustment of labour costs to momentary lows in production.51 The devaluation 
of the lira in 1976 proved helpful in propping up companies relying on exports, but 
could not solve the structural rigidity of Italian industrial labour markets.52 
Companies started resorting to the CIG-O to eliminate increasing stocks of 
unsold products. Ordinary short time requests were often attached to data on 
inventories and negotiated months in advance with union stewards, with the latter 
apparently more ready to accept redundancies for shorts spells of time – most of the 
time a few days spread throughout each month. In this way, the CIG-O intervened to 
cushion the effects of a temporary mismatch between demand and employment levels, 
covering the costs of unsold inventories. The use of short time represented the 																																																								
50 Enzo Cipolletta ‘Gli anni Settanta: una frattura nel processo di crescita’, in Storia dell'IRI. 3. I difficili 
anni '70  ei tentativi di rilancio negli anni '80, ed. Francesco Silva (Bari: Laterza, 2013), 69-113, at pp. 
74-79;  Lorenzo Mechi and Francesco Petrini, ‘La Comunità Europea nella divisione internazionale del 
lavoro: le politiche industriali, 1967-1978’, in Alle origini del presente. L’Europa occidentale nella 
crisi degli anni Settanta, ed. Antonio Varsori (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2007), 251-283. 
51 Paolo Garonna and Fernanda Panizon, ‘Riforma della Cassa Integrazione guadagni e agenzia del 
lavoro’, Economia e Lavoro 1 (1983), 51-70, at p. 44. 
52 Peter Nichols, ‘On the Italian Crisis’, Foreign Affairs 54 (1976), 511-26; Antimo Verde, ‘La crisi 
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transplanting of the logic of the market to the management of manpower on the shop 
floor, allowing the flexible use of labour while avoiding its permanent layoffs.53 As 
argued by Tarantelli, in such cases the CIG provided an even more elastic system of 
adjustment than a more liberal regulation on layoffs would have otherwise permitted.54 
The automobile industry was particularly exposed to the turmoil of the 
international market, with cars being deeply affected by the ups and downs of energy 
prices. FIAT, Alfa Romeo and other carmakers such as Innocenti saw their 
inventories pile up, with considerable slack in their capital stock. Even in the 
domestic market, Italian companies’ shares fluctuated sharply due to foreign 
competition. For the first time in 1975, FIAT’s market share dropped below 50% and 
continued decreasing until 1980. Alfa Romeo experienced a surge until 1975, 
reaching a record 9.2% share of the Italian car market, but dropped thereafter, 
remaining around at 7% for the rest of the decade. Such unpredictable market trends 
made rigid manpower policies costly for managers.55 
It was not only demand instability that required more flexibility in the 
management of the workforce in the automobile industry. Large car factories were 
plagued by high rates of absenteeism. This impaired the efficiency of the centrally 
organised system of Fordist industrial organisation and often left workers idle. In an 
interview given to the company’s journal il Giornale dei Capi, Umberto Cuttica, 
Central Director for Personnel at FIAT, underlined the impact that absenteeism had 
on the elasticity of workforce utilisation:  
 
‘absenteeism at FIAT has a “sawtooth” nature, […] the heads of production are forced 
to re-do the production plan every morning, on the basis of the real presence of workers 
in the factory. […] As such it is impossible to make any prediction and thus introduce 
correction that would make plant utilisation more linear.’56 
 
																																																								
53 A note from the FLM, quoting an unspecified ‘employer’s document’, calculated that firms could 
save up to 77% of hourly wages with CIG financed work-time reductions. See FLM, Ufficio Sindacale 
per Segreteria, apparato FLM, Leghe FLM, Nota esplicativa sulla cassa integrazione guadagni, tratto 
dalla nota dell’ottobre 1979 dell’ufficio sindacale, Torino, -/10/1979, AST, FLM di Torino, b. 271, f. 1. 
54 Ezio Tarantelli, ‘The Management of Industrial Conflict during the Recession of the 1970s’, in The 
Management of Industrial Conflict and the Recession of the 1970s: Britain, Germany and Italy, eds. 
Ezio Tarantelli and Gerard Willke (Firenze: European University Institute, 1981), 3-24, at p. 18. 
55 Data are taken from the yearly publications of Quattroruote, an Italian automobile magazine. See 
Quattroruote (Rozzano: Editoriale Domus, 1974-1981). 
56 Umberto Cuttica, ‘Come è possibile rilanciare la produzione’, Il Giornale dei Capi 2 (1976), 10-14, 
AST, FLM di Torino, b. 613, f. 1. 
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The combination of market volatility and unpredictable absenteeism led car 
companies to resort to the CIG-O to adjust labour costs to sudden temporary shocks. 
In the first half of 1975, Mirafiori alone experienced forty-eight days of short time 
among various groups of workers, with the highest peak in the pressing and foundry 
departments. By the end of the summer of the same year, Alfa Romeo in Milan had 
experienced a similar 41 days of total suspension.57 
Organised labour did not simply suffer managerial decisions, but tried to 
negotiate the use of CIG-O. The end of the 1974 winter dispute between FLM and the 
carmakers led to the introduction of a periodic system of consultation, in which 
factory councils would sit down with managers to assess market outlooks and together 
decide a calendar of work-time suspensions. At FIAT and Alfa Romeo, these 
meetings were held every three months, starting in January 1975, to reduce 
accumulated stockpiles. At Alfa, for instance, inventories had reached the critical 
threshold of 43,100 by the beginning of 1975 - far beyond the limit of 22,000 which 
management considered to be ‘normal stock.’ This led the unions to accept several 
days of short time suspension in Arese, with the promise that the company would 
discuss with the factory council every ‘reorganisation of the shop floor and 
transformation of work organisation’.58 
Organised labour hoped to exploit the system of periodic consultation to obtain 
greater control over new investments and shop floor restructuring. This perspective 
was put forward in January 1975 by the Consiglione – the official bulletin of the 
Mirafiori factory council - in an attempt to defend the FLM, which came under 
criticism for its choice to negotiate work-time reduction with FIAT. 59 The most radical 
groups at Mirafiori accused the union of becoming involved in the ‘co-determination 
of the crisis’. According to the factory council, instead, negotiations on the CIG-O 
were needed to prevent the company from unilaterally resorting to work-time 
suspension.60 The stated objective of’ the FLM was the promotion of employment and 
the control of labour organisation, but it was impossible to pursue these while 
maintaining a ‘rigid and prejudicial stance against mobility’. Instead, the FLM 																																																								
57 FLM, Lavoratori Metalmeccanici FIM-CISL, FIOM CGIL, UILM-UIL, la crisi dell’auto e l’azione 
sindacale alla Fiat, FLM Notizie, bollettino settimanale di informazioni e notizie della federazione, 
Torino, -/09/1975, AST, FLM di Torino, b. 733, f. 1. 
58 Alfa Romeo, Direzione Alfa Romeo alle R.S.A Alfa Romeo, Arese, 02/07/1975, ADL, Alfa Romeo, 
CDF Portello, f. 33. 
59 FIAT e FLM, Verbale Accordo, Torino, 18/01/1975, AST, FLM di Torino, b. 727, f. 1. 
60 FLM, ‘Accordo FIAT: Cogestione o nuovo livello di scontro’, il Consiglione 2 (1975), 2-3, at p. 2. 
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decided not to resist worker transfers and work-time reduction ‘a priori’, but to 
negotiate them ‘in a clear political framework […] even within single factories […] 
with a clear eye towards the development of labour organisation and managerial 
strategies’.61 In April 1975, when FIAT asked for further days of CIG-O for some 
departments of Mirafiori and smaller plants in Milan, Brescia and Bari, the union did 
not oppose.62 
By negotiating the use of short time with FIAT and Alfa Romeo, the union 
hoped to achieve greater control on the industrial shop floor, but also rein in the 
consequences that the decisions of automotive giants had on their wider industrial 
networks. Companies in the external supply chains of the automobile industry were 
often conditioned by their larger buyers and had to reduce their working time 
accordingly. Only in 1975, did 208 different companies under contract by FIAT resort 
to work-time suspensions. 63  In September 1975, Aspera Motors, a company 
specialising in engine production for the Turinese carmaker, had to declare twenty-
eight days of CIG-O due to the ‘worrying level’ reached by its stockpiles.64 Work-time 
reduction at a central level had wide reverberations on employment well beyond the 
single large factories, leading to business failures and layoffs that organised labour 
could not control because of its weaker organisational presence in smaller enterprises. 
Negotiating the use of the CIG-O at a central level offered a way to control such 
processes, impeding the ‘fracturing of the category’ by asking FIAT and Alfa to also 
guarantee employment also in their supply chains.65  
Factory council stewards and the FLM were ready to bargain with the 
employers on overstocking and work-time suspension, albeit with the permanent 
guarantee of employment levels. However, they were also conscious that such a 
strategy exposed them to the bottom-up criticism of their constituencies. When 
addressing the rank and file directly, the FLM proved much more critical of the 
recurrent use of the CIG-O. In a flier addressing the bodywork department of 																																																								
61 FLM, ‘Mobilità, Apriamo il dibattito’, il Consiglione 2 (1975), 5-6, at p. 2. 
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Mirafiori, the union encouraged the workers to ‘oppose the blackmailing of FIAT 
through […] the cassa integrazione’, denouncing how management was coping ‘with 
absenteeism through the elastic use of transfers and a reduction of the workforce’.66 In 
a June 1975 communiqué to the workers of Alfa Romeo Arese, the FLM denounced 
the ‘adventurist and extremely dangerous logic’ of the company, which made 
employment completely dependent on the market, forcing workers to endure ‘days 
and days of cassa integrazione’. 67 
As the car demand in the international market slowly recovered after the low 
point of 1975, the routine use of the CIG-O became more vexatious and difficult to 
accept. While resorting to short time for part of their workforce, car companies 
developed new strategies to increase productivity. In 1976, the Mirafiori factory 
council denounced the ‘strategy of unemployment’ followed by FIAT. According to 
union stewards, the economic crisis had allowed the company to pursue  ‘more 
efficient’ manpower policies, resorting to short time work and internal mobility 
measures to meet sudden demand surges. The flexible variation of working time and 
transfer of workers from one department to the other served a double purpose: it 
allowed the company greater saturation of the workforce and machinery, moving 
workers on short notice, depending on market demand. Furthermore, it weakened the 
power of organised labour, breaking up worker teams and depriving factory council 
stewards of a direct relationship with their constituencies. 68 More often than not, 
workers put on the CIG-O were then re-hired in different departments of the factory. 
In early 1977, the FLM’s review Consigli reported:  
 
‘in the past 24 months, there isn’t a single company that has not resorted to short time. 
The blackmail on jobs had its consequences […] there is a substantial worsening of 
working conditions, exacerbation of hierarchy and greater arrogance in the bosses’ 
behaviour’.69 
 
Company requests for overtime, in conjunction with the use of short time, were 
particularly detrimental to the union, as they defied the purpose of allowing 																																																								
66 FLM, Lavoratori della Carrozzeria!, Torino, 24/09/1975, AST, FLM di Torino, b. 722, f. 1. 
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corporatist management of the CIG-O in exchange for greater control of labour 
organisation and employment creation. For the FLM, the use of overtime could only 
be justified on the basis of technical reasons, not in order to obtain an increase in 
productivity to meet sudden needs. The abuse of overtime ran counter to the aim of 
forcing Alfa and FIAT to hire new workers. In 1977, the Consiglione underlined how 
the fight against overtime was important because it provided a ‘unifying point’ 
between labour market insiders and outsiders, allowing organised labour to bring back 
the jobless into its folds. It was necessary to overcome the ‘moderatism’ of the 
national policy line of the CGIL-CISL-UIL, favouring the ‘mass organisation’ of the 
unemployed in the battle against overtime.70 At Alfa Romeo, the local FLM decided to 
organise a ban on overtime for the entirety of 1976 and organised picket lines to 
impede access to the factory when the company unilaterally called for additional 
shifts.71 While the national metalworking contract prescribed a rigid weekly limit on 
working hours, the combined intervention of short time work and overtime allowed 
managers to tweak hourly labour cost to their advantage, while putting plant level 
worker organisation in disarray.72  
Having to defend total employment while also conceding on the manpower 
flexibility needed to cope with market fluctuations, organised labour was exposed by 
the contradiction of its own policy line. The corporatist management of manpower 
policies led to some relative successes. In 1977, the FLM signed an important 
agreement with FIAT, recognising an additional paid half-hour for lunch breaks. In 
the summer of the following year, the union negotiated the hiring of more than a 
thousand new workers, some of whom were directly pooled from the workforce of the 
Venchi Unica, a failed company in the Turinese area, sanctioning the principle of 
worker mobility between companies.73 In 1978, at Alfa Romeo, the FLM traded 
increased overtime with an expansion of employment. Alfa introduced eight 
additional Saturdays to the normal working calendar, the so-called Sabati delle 
Giuliette, ‘Giuliette’s Saturdays’, to support the launch of a new car model. In 
exchange, the company agreed to guarantee that several workers from another state-																																																								
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owned factory in the Milan area, the UNIDAL, operating in the food processing 
industry, would be employed in Arese.74  
The decision at Alfa, however, did not go down without strife. Factory 
vanguards criticised the moderatism of the factory council: on the planned Saturdays 
of overtime there were episodes of violence and sabotage of equipment, with union 
stewards forced to be present at the gates of the factory to prevent escalation. The 
attempt at winning the sympathies of the precarious workers in failing enterprises and 
the jobless through common battles on employment and overtime led the unions to 
alienate the rank and file of large factories, tempered in the social conflict of the 
previous years and critical of the FLM. The employment promises made by the 
companies were often postponed in time and did not have an immediate impact on the 
daily life of already employed workers, while internal mobility and suspensions 
affected them more tangibly. The comments of a militant worker from Lancia 
Chivasso, on the union journal Rosso Lancia, exemplified the perspective of the rank 
and file:  
 
‘once we accept the principle of company and inter-company mobility, it follows that 
the need for higher production, organisational bottlenecks and imbalances will all be 
dealt with through manpower flexibility. […] This does not serve to produce new 
employment, but leads only to short time suspensions. […] Increased production allows 
amassing stockpiles, which can then be used for the blackmail of the cassa 
integrazione’.75 
 
The rank and file did not perceived the immediate benefit of the strategy of negotiated 
flexibility. Despite this, the union policy of trading shop floor productivity increases 
for greater control over employment and production plans continued. Still in the 
summer of 1979, the factory council of Mirafiori admitted:  
 
‘without fake embarrassment […] we have always conceded a certain type of flexibility 
at FIAT. And we will have to concede it in the future. If we want to tackle the problem 
of productivity without the bosses’ blackmail, we have to understand that the market 
situation requires production and cost elasticity’.76  
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The application of market logic to the negotiation of manpower policies on the 
shop floor came at a great cost for organised labour. The consultation process behind 
the corporatist use of CIG lacked any kind of institutional mechanism to enforce the 
employment creation policies asked of management. The negotiating capacity of the 
union was left only to the degree of its mobilisation capacity. But the very concession 
that organised labour was making to the use of short time suspension and manpower 
flexibility ended up estranging a fraction of its own constituency, undermining its 
organisational strength. For management, instead, the CIG-O acted as an instrument 
to optimise production planning and reduce the average level of stockpiles. FIAT and 
Alfa Romeo resorted to the CIG-O as a ‘subsidy to maintain the reserve of labour 
needed to guarantee high elasticity of supply […] allowing them to adjust production 
rapidly, reducing the oscillation of unsold stocks while avoiding a drop in the prices 
of final products’.77 
 
 
4.4 The CIG-S and the management of redundancy 
Union acceptance of manpower elasticity did not only affect the industrial shop floor, 
but was part of a broader rethinking of economic paradigms by the intellighenzia of 
the PCI and the academic world broadly connected to the institutional left. The 
persistence of the economic crisis and the apparent rigidity of the Italian labour 
market led many to question the main tenets of organised labour’s strategy during the 
first half of the 1970s and underline the increasing costs of industrial democracy. In 
1977, Franco Modigliani and Tommaso Padoa Schioppa published an influential 
paper in the journal Moneta e Credito, criticising the excessive rigidity of the Italian 
wage indexation system, demanding a lowering of real salaries and a new 
decentralised system of wage bargaining to cope with rising unemployment.78 This 
sparked an important debate, which included, among other economists, the prominent 
heterodox Augusto Graziani, the independent PCI MP Claudio Napoleoni and Ezio 
Tarantelli, member of the Bank of Italy and founder, in the early 1980s, of an 
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influential institute for labour studies associated with the CISL.79 While Modigliani’s 
proposals received a barrage of criticism, they nonetheless seeped in among national 
level leaders of the Italian left, ‘favouring […] the downscaling of the anti-capitalist 
ambitions of the labour movement’.80 In January 1978, the CGIL leader Luciano 
Lama, in an interview for the newspaper La Repubblica, offered a self-criticism of the 
policy line that had assumed wages as ‘an independent variable of the economic 
system’.81 
A determining factor in pushing the Left towards an increasingly moderate 
position was the soaring level of unemployment. Between 1975 and 1980, the 
unemployment rate more than doubled from 3.33% to 6.90%. This increase was 
absorbed by the most vulnerable parts of the labour force. In the north of the country, 
the unemployed male population almost doubled, but for women, often in intermittent 
jobs, the number quadrupled from 98,000 to 406,000. The mass of the unemployed 
was not only made up of previously employed workers, but increasingly also of first 
time jobs seekers who did not have access to insurance coverage. 82 In 1959, young 
people made up only 30% of the total unemployment figure. In 1978, for the first 
time, youth unemployment composed the majority of total unemployment, with 
almost 800,000 youths without work out of a total of 1,571,000 unemployed.83  
The core industrial working class was spared massive layoffs, but it became 
apparent that there was a structural problem of supernumerary workers in the 
industrial sector. In 1977, the Centro Ricerche Economia e Lavoro (CREL), the 
research centre of the UIL, underlined how, after 1976, the trend of CIG hours 
became progressively detached from the index of industrial production. According to 
the CREL, such a phenomenon was due to the changing expectations of the 
employers, who started ‘judging the crisis as structural and eyed a comprehensive 
downsizing of the occupational base’.84  Compared to the previous period, during the 
second half of the 1970s, the unions and the state were forced to cope with the first 
important foreclosures of large industrial plants. State buyouts and the interventions 																																																								
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of public financial holdings generalised between 1975 and 1979, with the state-owned 
GEPI extending its operations in various industrial sectors.85  
Following the spirit of the 1975 agreement on the guaranteed wage, the unions 
tried to protect employment levels wherever possible, in some instances calling on 
themselves for the intervention of the CIG-S when business owners wanted to shut 
down production. The most important cases of industrial failure polarised public 
opinion and became important national test beds for the unions and their attempts to 
control the employment effects of the crisis. With the input of organised labour, the 
CIG-S was subject to much institutional experimentation, lengthening its duration and 
further relaxing its intervention criteria, to offer momentary income support to foster 
industrial restructuring and, in case of business failure, favour the transfer of workers 
from one company to the other.  
 
While Alfa Arese continued to represent an important reference point, during the mid-
1970s the attention of the Milanese unions focused on another carmaker, Innocenti, 
which in 1975 experienced a severe crisis that left the company bankrupt and 4,500 
workers at risk of losing their jobs.86 The company was located in Lambrate, on the 
outskirts of Milan and had experienced significant growth during the post-war 
decades, delivering one of the most iconic light motorcycles of those years, the 
Lambretta.87 During the late 1960s, Innocenti started experiencing difficulties: the 
explosion of strikes into the factory and poor production planning led to a plummeting 
market share. In 1971, the company reached a partnership agreement with the British 
carmaker Leyland, which finalised the complete buyout of Innocenti the following 
year, looking to outsource its entire production for the European market to Italy.88 The 
British accession to the EEC in 1973 and the explosion of the oil crisis rapidly 
changed the outlook for Innocenti-Leyland: in the autumn of 1974 the company 
resorted to the CIG-O, allegedly due to ‘high absenteeism’ and to ensure ‘the 
regularity of the production process’. For almost a year, the factory of Lambrate 
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remained at half of its intended production capacity, until the summer of 1975, when 
the company abruptly decided to lay off 1,700 workers. 89 
The fierce opposition mounted by the FLM and the factory council prompted 
the Ministry of Labour to mediate, proposing the intervention of the CIG-S on behalf 
of 3,000 workers. Negotiations were carried out during the month of August, when 
workers’ mobilisation was impaired by the summer break; a situation that the FLM 
equated to ‘going to war without soldiers’. 90  A provisional tripartite agreement 
between the company, the factory council and the FLM, brokered by the government, 
was reached in September 1975. The union refused the initial proposal by the Minister 
of Labour, Mario Toros to allow the complete suspension of workers for three months 
– the so called ‘zero-hour’ CIG – as it would have amounted to identifying the 
workers who would be expelled from production.  The plan was to then make use of 
the CIG-S for three months starting in September, creating only one working shift in 
which two groups of workers would take turns at the assembly line, curtailing 
production output by a third.91 The use of permanent suspensions was avoided. The 
CIG-S applied to all workers, on a rotation basis, and the Ministry of Labour offered 
to guarantee the agreement, committing to ‘promote the […] necessary political 
initiatives to promote the productive development and the conservation of current 
employment levels’. The FLM received the agreement positively, as the firings were 
supposedly avoided.92 
The negotiating stance of the FLM was strongly criticised by radical groups, 
such as the Comitato Operaio Innocenti, which accused the factory council of 
‘overseeing a reduction of jobs’, with ‘cheap concessions’.93 Indeed, after the agreed 
three months of CIG-S had expired, management remained adamant in asking for a 
drastic reduction of employment, which equated to an almost complete shutdown of 
the factory. At the end of November 1975, Lambrate was shuttered, leading to the 																																																								
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occupation of the plant by the factory council for almost half a year. The FLM 
immediately noted how the closure of Innocenti represented the first important test of 
the guaranteed wage policy line of protecting employment while accommodating the 
process of industrial restructuring. As such, the union tried to build ‘vast alliances, 
unitary and long-lasting’, searching for the support of local councillors in Lambrate 
and the city administration of Milan. By the end of the year the most immediate 
problem was that, without a credible commitment to re-employment by the 
management of the company, the intervention of the CIG-S could not be allowed, 
leaving redundant workers without any form of income maintenance.94  
In 1975, Innocenti was not the only company to suffer from uncertainty. In the 
same months, another industrial crisis achieved national notoriety: that of the electro-
mechanics company Singer, in Leinì, outside Turin, which produced refrigerators and 
home appliances. The plant had roughly 2,000 employees and acted as a final 
assembly facility for many smaller companies in the Piedmont area.95 In the summer of 
1975, the American proprietor of the company decided to liquidate all of Singer’s 
assets, despite the good technical condition of its machinery. To protest the decision 
to dismantle the company, the factory council of Leinì entered on a ‘permanent 
assembly’, picketing the factory. The unions’ stewards of the factory council wanted 
to resist the company’s decision to declare bankruptcy and occupy the whole factory, 
trying to keep production going despite procurement problems.96  
This, however, would have prevented the intervention of the CIG-S. Many 
workers were uncomfortable with the idea of having to forego the income 
maintenance afforded by short time. The journal Ombre Rosse reported how in 
August 1975, many signs reading ‘no to the occupation, yes to the cassa integrazione’ 
could be seen around the factory. Eventually the factory council was led to accept a 
complete suspension of production for the whole workforce. Similar to Innocenti, the 
shutdown led workers to address public opinion at large, trying to mobilise the 
citizens and other factories of the Turinese area. One of the most advanced 																																																								
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experiments was the creation a radio station to broadcast the grievances of Singer’s 
employees, Radio Singer.97 
In both the Singer and Innocenti cases, it was difficult for organised labour to 
manage the crisis within the framework of traditional industrial relations. The foreign 
ownership of the two companies and the dismissive attitude of the managers made it 
difficult to identify a clear counterpart for negotiations. In time, regional public 
authorities and the central government emerged as the only counterparts who could 
steer the restructuring of the plants and guarantee an income to suspended workers. 
This was particularly the case in Piedmont, where a center-left regional council was 
more sympathetic towards the workers. Stefano Libertini, Regional Commissioner for 
Labour and Social affairs, attended Singer’s worker assemblies from the very 
beginning.98  
At the central level, state intervention was strengthened by enlarging the scope 
of GEPI’s activity. In January 1976, one of the last acts of the DC government led by 
Aldo Moro was to allow GEPI to create public joint stock companies to take over 
failed companies.99 While the law decree underlined that GEPI would have ‘promoted 
entrepreneurial initiatives’ to favour the re-employment of the workforce, the public 
company was often relegated to a subordinate role, buying out failed enterprises 
solely to artificially prolong the intervention of the CIG-S. In time it came to be 
regarded as an ‘entrepreneurial leper hospital’.100 At the end of the year, the GEPI 
intervened to buy out the Lambrate car company, setting up the Nuova Innocenti, only 
so that it could continue supply income maintenance through the CIG-S while waiting 
for private investors.101 Instead, in the case of Singer, it established a temporary 
administration to help the American ownership find suitable buyers. 102  In both 
instances, the relaunch of production proved ultimately elusive. 
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At Singer, the GEPI administration was to last until September 1976, while the 
Ministry of Industry was tasked with finding new partners. However, private investors 
did not come forward – FIAT proposed buying out Singer and converting its steel 
production, but re-employing only a small fraction of the labour force. The American 
owner – still in formal possession of the company – refused to invest in the routine 
maintenance of the plant, with the serious risk of compromising machines and the 
long-term viability of production. In April 1977, the mayor of Leinì decided to 
expropriate the company for three months, allowing GEPI to carry out refurbishment 
and renovations to counter the ‘inactivity of the employer […] which had caused a 
serious social crisis’.103 Eventually, Singer was completely bought out by GEPI. The 
decision was strongly backed by the regional council and, most importantly, by the 
workers of the factory council, who were still occupying the plant.  
The lack of credible prospects for the recovery of the company, however, soon 
engendered the protest of organised labour. In March 1977, a union committee 
bringing together the FLM and the FULC denounced how GEPI lacked a concrete 
development plan. The absence of credible commitments for the re-employment of 
the workforce created problems in the concession of the CIG-S, which for months had 
been the only income lifeline for Singer’s workers. Despite GEPI being a state-owned 
holding, the Ministry of Treasury often raised doubts about the rightness of allowing 
short time benefits, creating severe delays. According to the factory council, this was 
not a simple ‘technical-bureaucratic mismanagement […], but a political problem’. 
The obstacles and bureaucratic rigidities of ministerial authorities ‘betrayed the 
political commitments that government had assumed’.104   
The Nuova Innocenti proved more successful in finding private investors to 
prop up public ownership. In March 1976, the entrepreneur De Tommaso bought out 
a majority share of the company from the state, presenting a plan for the complete 
reinstatement of the workforce.105 A few months into the deal, however, only two 
thirds of the workforce was back into the factory, while the remaining 1,400 workers 
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were still on the CIG-S.106 The prolonged use of short time for a fraction of the 
workforce, without any system of turnover with the rest of the employees, took a toll 
on the mobilisational capacity of organised labour. The Innocenti factory council 
often lamented how suspended workers stopped participating in assemblies, while, on 
the other hand, employed workers stopped taking part in shop floor actions for fear of 
suspensions. This led union stewards to adopt harsh strategies, such as carousels 
inside the factory to force workers to participate.  
Management used the CIG as a lever to threaten the enforcement of greater 
factory discipline and work pace. De Tommaso always refused to accept incentive 
bonuses, pay rises and holidays, exploiting production capacity to its maximum and 
reprimanding strikers, stating that ‘the workers who are willing to work are those who 
will hopefully allow the reemployment of those who are still suspended’.107 In another 
instance, the management of Innocenti tried to pit workers against one another, 
pointing at suspended employees as parasites. Whenever the FLM staged protests to 
request the re-employment of their colleagues, De Tommaso hung a sign on the gates 
of Lambrate, reminding strikers that ‘those who participate in the picket lines do not 
get paid, while your redundant colleagues still receive the cassa integrazione’.108 By 
the end of 1977, Innocenti was employing only 2,000 workers, less than half of the 
number three years prior.109 
 
 
4.5 Worker control and industrial policy 
In 1977, the worsening of major industrial crises and the increase in the level of 
company indebtedness, preventing further private investments, made the 
shortcomings of state intervention more glaring, as the increasingly welfarist use of 
the CIG-S offered scant prospects for re-employment. The need to rationalise the 
system of governmental intervention in the economy coupled with the bottom-up 
pressures of organised labour for a profound revamping of national industrial policy. 																																																								
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In August 1977, the Parliament approved law n. 675 for industrial restructuring and 
reconversion, under the auspices of the Minister of Industry, Carlo Donat-Cattin. The 
law represented a real watershed in the history of Italian industrial policy, attempting 
for the first time to create a coherent framework of economic planning - going past 
the fragmentary and extemporaneous nature of the system of industrial intervention 
inherited from the 1960s.110 The first proposals for an overhauling of Italian industrial 
policies had been formulated in 1974, in the wake of the first slump of the 
international market, but took time to be implemented at the legislative level and even 
more time to become effectively operational.111   
The new law streamlined the decision-making process behind the formation of 
industrial policies, distinguishing more clearly between the jurisdiction of the 
government, ministerial bureaucracies, and local authorities. It instituted the Inter-
ministerial Committee for Industrial Policy (CIPI), bringing together six different 
ministries, including those of labour and industry, formally chaired by the Prime 
Minister and attended by a representative of the Bank of Italy. The statist model of 
continental industrial policy deeply influenced the institutional design of the CIPI. 
Like the French system of centralised industrial planning, the CIPI was tasked with 
the development of four-year industrial plans to act as a blueprint for the 
government.112 These were to be articulated in various sector specific plans to place 
industrial reorganisation in a broader framework, allowing the restructuring of firms 
and the eventual collapse of the most troubled ones while guaranteeing the defense of 
total employment levels.113 The CIPI was also endowed with special funds to provide 
credit subsidies for firms who wanted to introduce technological innovation and 
conform to the directives of the committee.114  
The development of sector plans was accompanied by the creation of new 
venues for the consultation of interest groups. As argued by Richard Locke, the 
French model was not the only one that Italian policymakers looked at when 
attempting a reform of Italian industrial policy. Law n. 675 set up sector specific 																																																								
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committees in which experts from the administration met with representatives of the 
unions and Confindustria, to receive the desiderata of the business association and 
organised labour on the drafting of the plans. These were then subjected to the 
approval of a bicameral committee. This multi-level consultation system was in 
explicit emulation of the institutional design of Scandinavian economic 
policymaking.115 
Given the increased participation of organised labour to the process of policy 
formation, it is no surprise that the unions were initially favourable to such a redesign 
of industrial policy. On paper, law n. 675 afforded labour representatives greater 
control over governmental decision-making and the allocation of public resources, 
offering a political quid pro quo in exchange for union moderatism. According to 
Bruno Trentin, industrial planning was the only path for the Italian labour movement 
to resist the ‘politics of integration’ of the working class to the capitalist system.116 The 
explicit focus of law n. 675 on industrial sectors allowed the unions to tackle business 
crises and the defense of employment without concentrating on single companies – in 
some cases, inexorably doomed to fail - all the while pushing to correct regional 
imbalances and redirect new investments towards the most depressed areas. Luciano 
Lama echoed the need to broaden the perspective of organised labour in 1976, 
stressing that: 
 
‘the economy of an industrialised country is a system with a lot of interlocking 
elements that requires a […] exercise of political direction. […] The union, isolated at 
the level of the factory cannot hope to exert influence on investments and employment, 
without getting into other aspects of the managerial process. […] If the unions are kept 
outside of economic decision making, they risk flowing back into individualism and 
corporatist positions that would pose a danger to democracy’.117  
 
Law n. 675 intended to get rid of the most welfarist aspects of employment 
creation policies and business rescues, redressing at the same time the confused 
institutional arbitrariness that characterised national industrial policies. The first step 
was the reform of the GEPI. Organised labour often denounced how the public 
holding continued to receive financial support while pursuing a ‘case by case policy, 
without any kind of programming plan’, failing to secure an enduring recovery of 																																																								
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production in the companies it was supposed to salvage. The new law tied more 
directly the workings of GEPI to the direction of the CIPI, compelling the state 
industrial holding to submit a term report detailing restructuring and reconversion 
plans for its various enterprises.118 
The CIG-S should have assumed a lynchpin role in this new industrial policy 
framework. As noted by the ISPE, the governmental research centre for economic 
planning, short time was supposed to act as a pivot for the whole system, to carry out 
reconversion plans and coordinate the intervention of credit allowances and other 
financial support instruments for distressed companies, allowing income maintenance 
for employees while the restructuring of production was carried out.119 Law n. 675 
made no explicit reference to standard unemployment insurance, but further extended 
the scope of the CIG-S. Article 21 allowed its intervention ‘in specific cases of 
business crisis that have a relevant impact on local employment and the productive 
situation of the sector’. Law n. 675 broadened the flexibility of the CIG-S, but also 
centralised its governance, granting complete and discretionary control over short 
time benefits to the CIPI. The inter-ministerial committee was tasked with 
ascertaining the causes for the intervention of the CIG-S and issue the relative decrees 
for its concession, arbitrarily deciding the social relevance and regional extension of 
employment crises.120 The law increased the flexibility of the CIG-S but dis-entangled 
it from the concrete processes of industrial restructuring and the pre-requisite of the 
re-employment of the workforce, allowing it to intervene to stem the social crises 
subjectively identified by the CIPI. This represented a further step in the 
transformation of short time into an all-out welfare policy device. 
Intervening at a conference on the management of industrial conflict in Europe, 
held at the European University Institute in 1978, Ezio Tarantelli underlined the 
conundrum facing policymakers. In his view, Italy had become a ‘Pompeian 
economy’: the absence of an ‘adequate social security system’ led organised labour to 
a strong opposition against any kind of layoffs. Against such rigidity, the employers 
replied through a ban on new hiring, effectively halting employee turnover. The 																																																								
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Italian industrial labour market thus ended up ‘with workers who are embedded like 
the dead of Pompei, fixed in factories that don’t produce, don’t hire and don’t fire’.121 
To cope with this situation, articles 22 to 26 of law n. 675 instituted regional 
and central level commissions to favour worker mobility and direct transfers out of 
crisis-ridden companies. Representatives of regional governments and local labour 
offices composed the board of these new institutions. At the central level, the 
commission was chaired by the Minister of Labour and composed by the Director 
Generals of the Ministry. At both levels, organised interest groups were present 
through representatives from the unions and the employers. Working together with 
job placement offices, the commissions had to oversee regional and inter-regional 
worker mobility, finding employment opportunities for redundant workers. This 
required a system of  ‘permanent consultation’ with employers and organised labour, 
to acquire the necessary data on local labour markets and negotiate transfers directly.122  
The law recognised the inevitable need to favour worker mobility as the only 
way to avoid the fossilisation of the Italian labour market. However, it also afforded 
redundant workers a series of benefits that drove a wedge between the core industrial 
working class and the other unemployed. When the CIPI recognised the existence of a 
sector or company-specific crisis, the workers fired through collective dismissal 
procedures did not end up on the normal list of the collocamento, the job placement 
office, with all the other job seekers, but on a separate list of ‘workers in mobility’, 
from which employers could pool for direct transfers. At the local level, the shady 
mechanisms of jobs offices made it difficult to balance between the two lists.  
Throughout the post-war period, organised labour had always fought to contrast 
the influence of employers on the workings of the collocamento - demanding, for 
instance, the abolition of nominative hiring, easily subject to abuse and discrimination 
– but the level of political interference remained high.123 The unions found themselves 
in an uncomfortable position. Law n. 675 gave organised labour the highest number 
of representatives in regional mobility commissions, effectively granting them control 
over direct worker transfers. However, it did not solve the basic contradiction between 
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the interests of redundant workers, the bulk of union constituencies, and the young 
lumpen and other categories of workers registered at the labour office.  
In the city of Naples, the tension between the core industrial workforce and the 
wider galaxy of unemployment became an open conflict. In the south of the country, 
the structural nature of unemployment and criminal infiltration in the management of 
the labour market made it more difficult for both the state and organised labour to 
manage the collocamento in an equitable manner. In the previous chapter, we 
mentioned the rise in late 1974 of the movement of the Disoccupati Organizzati in 
Naples, championing the rights of the unemployed and clamouring for a guaranteed 
wage. The actions of the committee for the unemployed continued to grow until the 
end of 1977, even leading to the election in Parliament of the their leader Domenico 
Pinto, in the ranks of Democrazia Proletaria.124 The group often stormed the local 
labour office and the city council, demanding the hiring of its members through public 
work programs and in the administration of the city of Naples. The movement 
achieved some notable successes and was able to create a mass following, often in 
opposition with the corporatist tendencies of organised labour and the local unions. 
Enrico Deaglio, chief editor of Lotta Continua in 1977, framed the experience of the 
organised unemployed committee as ‘the last utopia of the last against the 
guaranteed’.125  
The creation of a two-track system of job placements, with a mobility list that 
ran parallel to the ordinary collocamento established a clear division between the 
general unemployed and the redundant workers from large companies, fracturing the 
political bases of the labour movement. These differences were exacerbated by the 
uneven social policy treatment of the two categories. While most unemployed relied 
on the weak cushion of standard insurance, employees on mobility could gain access 
to the CIG-S. Short time benefits played a pivotal role in guaranteeing the income of 
workers transitioning from one job to another. In the formulation of the law, 
companies could file a list of surplus workers to local mobility commissions, which 
would then attempt to find new employment opportunities. For the whole duration of 
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the redundancy, while the commission consulted with employers and the unions, 
workers on mobility were afforded a full CIG-S.126  
The need to foster worker mobility was accepted almost unanimously by all the 
political parties and organised interest groups, though the meaning attached to it 
greatly differed. Towards the end of 1977, the political parties that supported or 
abstained from the national solidarity government of Giulio Andreotti, including the 
PCI, presented the Prime Minister with an economic plan – which the Christian 
Democrat journal Civiltà Cattolica re-labelled ‘the plan of six’- asking for ‘additional 
resources to fund labour mobility and new measures to favour a solution to structural 
manpower surpluses […] through an exquisitely political agreement’.127  
In October 1977, the employers’ association submitted its own plan, called 
Operation Development, to the government. This plan offered a solution to the 
economic crisis which was ‘not a welfarist one, but which respected the dignity of 
labour and the function of entrepreneurship’. Confindustria hoped to contain inflation 
without impairing economic development, fighting against the ‘unproductive areas 
[…] of the public sector’ and by increasing the utilisation rates of industrial plants, 
thus freeing the resources needed to stimulate employment creation. Labour flexibility 
figured prominently among their objectives. One of the main problems identified by 
the employers was the fact that ‘the unions had practically cancelled out labour 
mobility. This imposed constraints on capital utilisation that impaired industrial 
production’.128 
Despite its initial opposition, even organised labour accepted inter-firm 
mobility, regarding it as a more viable alternative to massive layoffs. However, it 
demanded a strong system of public oversight to ensure the necessary guarantees for 
redundant workers who were switching jobs. These proposals were formulated in the 
three-year plan discussed by the executives of the CGIL-CISL-UIL in mid-January 
1978.129 Emilio Reyneri identified, in the period between 1976 and 1979, a shift in 
union policies from an ‘offensive rigidity’, based on the improvement of worker 																																																								
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conditions through greater control on industrial organisation, to a ‘defensive rigidity 
[…] understood as the simultaneous protection of both the working class in large-
scale industry and the unions’ own organisations’. In the absence of decent 
unemployment compensation, Reyneri pointed out, ‘a more pragmatic policy began to 
take shape, distant from the more traditional ‘guaranteeist and universalistic-statist’ 
tendencies of the unions.130 
This road was not without danger. Already in 1975, Antonio Lettieri, member of 
the secretariat of the FLM, had warned in the review Consigli: ‘the government and 
the employers do not understand labour mobility as transfer from one job to another, 
but from employment to the placement office’. Blindly accepting the request for 
mobility risked ‘changing the nature of organised labour, leading it to a co-
management of capitalist recovery’.131 In this light, it is understandable why the unions 
initially welcomed positively the new regulatory framework introduced by law n. 675, 
allowing them to participate in the coordination of worker mobility. In some cases, it 
was organised labour itself that pushed employers to resort to external mobility for 
redundant workers, fearing that the simple income assistance of the CIG-S would be a 
precarious prospect.  
The vicissitudes of the Singer workforce are exemplary of the attempt of 
organised labour to control inter-firm mobility in favour of labour market insiders. In 
April 1977, the FLM noted that the GEPI was unable to provide any viable plan for a 
solution to Singer crisis, and worried that the provision of CIG-S allowance might 
expire. The FLM wanted to avoid ‘scorching defeats in the fight for employment’ that 
would open the door to layoffs also in other factories of the area, ‘offering instead a 
new vision of efficiency to liquidate any form of welfarism’. The request was to allow 
the mobility of Singer’s workers across other companies, as a way to ‘to guarantee 
employment, in every sector and territory, also involving the region and other local 
authorities’. 132 
As law n. 675 was still going through the process of parliamentary approval, the 
mobility of Singer workers had to be managed in a highly informal way, mobilising 
the factory councils of major companies in Piedmont – such as FIAT - to request they 																																																								
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132 FIM-FIOM-UIL, Centro Operativo Unitario, a Segreteria FLM, Segreteria Federazione CGIL-CISL-
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hire redundant workers from Singer. This represented an important test bed for the 
organisational capacity of the metalworking union and could serve to make 
employees in other factories aware of wider employment problems, ‘making them 
also responsible towards Singer workers’.133  
During the summer of 1977, the strategy met with relative success, with FIAT 
agreeing to an initial hiring of 100 workers.134 Despite the activism of organised labour 
and the support of regional authorities, however, the flaws in the institutional set up 
meant to coordinate worker mobility soon became apparent. Without a system to 
actually enforce the transfer of workers to other companies, the unions and the state, 
particularly at a central level, had no way other than relying on the pledges of 
employers. In the case of Singer, in October 1977 it was decided that the businessman 
De Benedetti would take over the plant and rehire at least 500 workers, while another 
300 were meant to be re-employed in the company Magic Chef. By the end of 
November, however, despite the intervention of the Ministry of Industry, the latter 
had reneged on its initial offer, while the former had substantially scaled down the 
number of workers it was willing to employ. By mid-1978, the Ministry of Industry, 
Carlo Donat Cattin decided to suspend his efforts, despite the fact that only a fraction 
of Singer workers had received an actual offer of re-employment, with a total of 1,220 
workers still on the CIG-S.135  
Guerrino Babbini, a worker-priest employed by Singer, recounts how as the 
prospects of mobility for all started to fade, the mobilisation of workers grew dim: ‘in 
the year 1978 we found ourselves a bit disintegrated. The very cassa integrazione, 
which we asked to enable us to fight longer, with its irregularities and delays, looked 
like a faucet in times of drought.’ While companies were required by law to anticipate 
the allowance of short time and later be reimbursed by the INPS, the precarious 
economic conditions of Singer made it impossible to ensure the steady flows of 
benefits. ‘This led many workers to distance themselves for occasional jobs or for 
good. Black market work […] was condemned by all but accepted due to necessity.’136 																																																								
133 Ibidem. 
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The mismanagement of mobility for the redundant workforce of Singer showed 
that a huge discrepancy existed between the legislation on employee transfers and the 
practical way in which inter-firm mobility was actually carried out. Public authorities 
had no way of guaranteeing that private entrepreneurs would commit to the hiring of 
redundant workers. Organised labour could count on its territorial and plant-level 
structures to coordinate worker mobilisation so as to put pressure on the employers, 
but the prolonged use of the CIG-S weakened its organisational strength, impairing 
the participation of workers in strikes and demonstrations.  
Despite the obvious risks and practical lack of guarantees that inter-firm 
mobility entailed for the unions, the federal directive of CGIL-CISL-UIL saw no 
other alternative than to offer negotiated market flexibility. In January 1978, it was 
Luciano Lama himself who laid bare the blueprint of the union strategy in the 
aforementioned interview with La Repubblica, significantly titled ‘the sacrifices we 
ask of the workers’. The general secretary of the CGIL stated that the first objective of 
the labour movement was to bring down unemployment, which represented a ‘tragic 
and distressing issue, to which all other objectives have to be sacrificed’, including 
the betterment of working conditions for the already employed. The reform of short 
time work and labour mobility figured prominently in the plan put forward by Lama. 
In his interview, Lama explicitly stated that the ‘CIG had to be revised from top to 
bottom’ as it was impossible to ‘keep forcing companies to keep a workforce beyond 
their productive capacity on their payroll, […] nor pretend that short time would assist 
redundant workers permanently’. The CGIL-CISL-UIL needed to strive ‘for an 
effective mobility of the workforce and an end to the system of permanently assisted 
work’, accepting that ‘when companies are in a certified crisis, they have the right to 
lay off workers’.137  
The abandonment of the principle of the complete guarantee of the wage 
represented one of the biggest upheavals in trade unions strategy since the Hot 
Autumn. This did not mean that redundant workers would be left to their fate. The 
proposal of the unions was to further strengthen the two tracks job placement system, 
creating a special list of laid-off workers who would have absolute priority over re-
employment. The severe social injustice of creating competition between the core 
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workers and the precarious unemployed did not escape Lama, but the general 
secretary accepted it as inevitability:  
 
‘the concession we are ready to make in accepting layoffs and limitations to the CIG is 
already enormous: there is a general interest in not making certain social situations 
even more dramatic and explosive. Until economic development has restarted, the 
protection of redundant workers has to be prioritized above others. It is an injustice, but 
practically it would be folly not to commit to it’.138 
 
In March 1978, the government seemed to accommodate some of the demands 
of the unions, strengthening the guarantees behind worker inter-firm mobility. At the 
end of the month, the Minister of Labour, Luigi Scotti introduced decree law n. 80 to 
cope with the social emergency of many suspended workers who had found 
themselves without the provisions of the CIG-S due to the low cash flow of crisis-
stricken companies. The decree allowed the INPS to pay short time benefits directly 
to redundant workers, bypassing the employer.139 During the parliamentary discussion, 
various MPs across the political spectrum noted how many workers were fearful of 
accepting mobility, because if the new enterprise that offered them a job ended up not 
hiring them after their trial period, they would lose the benefits of the CIG-S. Decree 
law n. 80 made it so that employees who did not pass their trial period in the new job 
would be able to go back to their previous job, thus continuing to benefit from the 
income assistance of short time.140 
In order for mobility to actually work, workers transitioning from one job to the 
other had to be endowed with the necessary skills. Inter-company mobility often 
entailed a change in tasks within the same industrial trade or a change of sector 
altogether, requiring a drastic updating and re-skilling of the professional toolkit of 
redundant workers. Since 1975, organised labour had been vocally requesting the 
CIG-S be made conditional upon the organisation of professional courses – ideally to 
be held inside the factories and jointly planned by the unions and employers under the 
supervision of state authorities. The rapid pace of technological change on the 																																																								
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assembly line made the unions worry that prolonged redundancy would impoverish 
and erode the skills of suspended employees. 141 
Law n. 675 established directives regarding this: the regions were tasked with 
the practical organisation of professional courses for redundant workers, taking into 
consideration business needs and the desiderata of plant-level unions. For organised 
labour, the courses served a double purpose: on the one hand, they helped update the 
skill of the workforce, increasing the bargaining power and appeal of individual 
employees in a rapidly changing labour market. On the other hand, professional and 
re-skilling classes served the crucial aim of keeping redundant workers occupied and 
socialised to industrial work, even in periods of prolonged idleness. Attending the 
courses helped individuals perceive themselves as part of the social body of the 
factory and offered hope for the perspective of an actual re-employment.  
Innocenti was an early test bed for the functioning of training courses. The 
organisation of the classes immediately became a centrepiece in the negotiations 
between the new owner De Tommaso and the factory council. By mid-1977, the 
socially disintegrating effects of prolonged suspensions were taking a toll on the 
mobilisation capacity of the factory council.142 To resist the unraveling of shop floor 
organisation, the FLM and the factory council invested a lot of effort and resources 
into the development of a retraining plan for redundant workers. The initial agreement 
signed by De Tomaso in March 1976 envisaged the full re-employment of workforce 
but made the granting of short time benefits conditional on the organisation of 
professional classes, with the help of the region and with a substantial contribution of 
1 billion lire of state aid.143  
The courses would start by the beginning of June 1977, and were supposed to 
last until September 1978, involving more than a thousand employees. In the words of 
Myriam Bergamaschi, the union officer in charge of the organisation of the classes, 
the idea behind it was to avoid ‘making workers a simple appendix to the factory’ and 
a passive object in the process of industrial restructuring.144 The program of the course 																																																								
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focused on the specific set of skills required by the production process, but also 
implemented notions of industrial organisation and history of technology, as well as a 
seminar that re-traced the history of labour struggle at Innocenti. The objectives of the 
course were ‘the social re-aggregation of the workers scattered by the CIG through a 
meaningful collective effort’ and the ‘strengthening of single worker bargaining 
power in the job market’.145   
The content of the professional courses was not only practical, but also political 
in its nature, serving to bolster the mobilisation power of the factory council. Given 
this, it does not come as a surprise that the management at Innocenti barely suffered 
the retraining courses and took no part in shaping their content. The classes were not 
fine-tuned to the industrial needs of Innocenti, with a clear mismatch between the 
skills that were taught and the shape-shifting production plans of the company. The 
workers, for example, were trained to take up the production of a new model of 
motorbike that never materialised. When the company meddled directly in the 
courses, it did so by disrupting their pattern, temporarily recalling suspended 
employees to cover up for absentees and sick workers on a daily basis.146  
Even in terms of political representation, redundant workers attending the 
courses were often hampered from participating in union events. The concession of 
CIG-S was tied to their attendance in classes and management often used their 
participation in worker assemblies and strikes to cut them off or delay money 
transfers. By the beginning of 1978, the uncomfortable situation at Innocenti was 
summed up by the factory cell of the minor radical group, the Movimento Lavoratori 
per il Socialismo, which denounced the empty promises of the agreement of March 
1976 in a very clear-cut way: ‘it disregarded restructuring plans, nonexistent 
financials, eternal and useless requalification courses, increases in the tempo of 
production, a complete refusal to negotiate already agreed upon incentives, holidays 
and pay rises’.147  
In the end, the retraining courses at Innocenti proved to be a failure. Instead of 
favouring the re-employment of redundant employees, the workforce was trimmed 																																																																																																																																																														
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down even further. By 1980, after another slump in the European car market, no more 
than 1,100 employees remained in the Lambrate factory. The failure of retraining 
classes, however, cannot be ascribed to the company alone, but also to the incapacity 
of organised labour to understand the shifting attitude of a previously highly 
politicised workforce. An instructor at Innocenti, for example, recalls how the content 
of the course was ‘too complex and abstract’ for the sociocultural level of the 
participants. ‘The workers considered the courses to be a dead end’, displaying a 
‘passive attitude that often translated into an open refusal of the teachings’.148 The 
inspiration behind professional classes for redundant employees was to reconcile job 
security, the defence of union organisation and workforce re-skilling. Ultimately, they 
unravelled in the face of the increasing disaffection of suspended employees, 
demotivated by months of redundancy.  
 
Law n. 675 achieved its objectives only partially. Despite the fact that the CGIL-
CISL-UIL accepted labour market flexibility in principle and that a specific 
legislation was designed to foster employees’ mobility, the three years following the 
approval of law n. 675 showed a strengthening of the welfare character of CIG-S. 
Between 1977 and 1980 the CIPI accepted 1,219 applications for short time work 
61% of which due business crises, with no perspective for the full re-employment of 
the workforce, against only 39% for cases of restructuring and reconversion.149  
By the end of the decade, a report of the Bank of Italy noted that the CIG 
allowed employers to lighten excessive workforce burdens and introduce greater 
flexibility, but it was still unclear whether the Italian industrial system had ‘grasped 
this opportunity to recover the lost efficiency and set the basis for a rediscovered 
modernity’. The report noted how ‘law n. 675 strengthened the industrial policy 
instrument of the CIG, but also emphasised its social and welfarist aspect’. In the 
second half of the 1970s, the distribution pattern of short time grew more 
concentrated both in terms of region and industrial sectors. In 1975, the 
metalworking, textile and chemical sectors, with a combined industrial employment 
weight of 60%, absorbed almost 70% of all CIG expenses. In 1980, employment in 
these three sectors had dropped to 59% of the national total, but the total number of 																																																								
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CIG hours grew to 77%. The downsizing of traditional industrial sectors was 
accompanied by an increasing usage of short time work. However, this did not serve 
to favour industrial restructuring and the recovery of production, but rather to cushion 
the social impact of redundancies, down the road of deindustrialisation.150  
The national industrial census, published in 1981, confirmed the crisis of the 
industrial organisation model based on the large factories. Throughout the 1970s, 
plants with more than 1,000 employees lost close to a fourth of their total workers, 
while those between 500 and 1,000 employees saw their total employment reduce by 
more than an eighth.151 The number of small and medium size enterprises, employing 
up to 100 workers, grew both in number of total units and employment, underscoring 
the rise of a new industrial model based on networks of smaller units clustered 
together in the same production chain. This, however, only served to counterbalance 
the employment losses of bigger companies.152   
Social policy moved in to compensate the deficiencies of development policies. 
In 1979, the welfare character of the CIG-S was sanctioned by the approval of law n. 
301, which updated short time regulation for failed enterprises. The new dispositions 
were blatant in their formulation, accepting the use of the CIG-S as a surrogate for 
unemployment welfare. In case a company suffered a severe crisis and was forced to 
resort to collective firings, ‘their efficacy would be suspended and the employment 
relations proceed only so the CIG-S can be granted […] for a maximum period of 24 
months’.153 Law n. 301 sanctioned an almost official equation between the workings of 
short time benefits and the principle of unemployment assistance. It extended a modus 
operandi of social policy that had already been prevalent in the south of the country 
since at least two years prior, when decree law n. 291 granted short time benefits for 
all the workers in southern regions who were left idle ‘after the completion of 
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industrial plants, large-sized public works or any other kind of work financed through 
state funds’.154 
By the beginning of the 1980s, just a few years after its approval, law n. 675 
seemed to have fallen short of its objectives.155 The new industrial policy framework 
failed to foster employment creation and redress the industrial crisis of major 
businesses. The objectives set forth by the law, albeit numerous, remained generic, 
while sector plans did not provide a clear indication of industrial policy. The decision-
making process was extremely centralised and remained concentrated within the 
CIPI. 156  The Inter-Ministerial Committee, however, lacked institutionalised and 
codified venues for the consultation of organised interest groups. This created a 
situation of ‘absolute discretionality’. The lack of clear guidelines led to the formation 
of tight links between the public administration and the very subjects who received 
financing, in a context of arbitrariness and discretion, with the establishment of a 
clientelist system in which single companies translated their political weight into a 
preferential access to the CIPI and the decision-making loci of industrial policy.157 
 According to Franco Momigliano, one of the foremost scholars of Italian 
industrial policy, the credit incentives and investments of the CIPI started to resemble 
a ‘rain of subsidies’, with no criteria of selectivity as to which companies and 
industrial sectors to favour in order to relaunch employment and foster innovation in 
the industrial system.158 
The failure of industrial policy underscored the further extension of short time 
work, and particularly of the CIG-S, to cover the lack of standard unemployment 
insurance.  The ambition of the 1975 guaranteed wage agreement was to make short 
time an instrument to foster the transformation of the Italian industrial system, 
allowing employers the necessary flexibility to carry out business restructuring while 
offering protection to temporarily redundant workers. In the absence of sound 																																																								
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employment creation policies, however, the CIG became a simple instrument of social 
policy to offer income maintenance to labour market insiders, discharging the costs of 
business crises and market volatility on manpower policies.  
The imperfect system of corporatist bargaining that dominated Italian industrial 
relations in the second half of the 1970s goes a long way into explaining the distortion 
of unemployment social policy. The leadership of organised labour accepted the need 
for conflict moderation and labour market flexibility. This was due to the pressure of 
the economic crisis but also to the belief that the new politics of the historic 
compromise had opened new channels for the unions to influence the policymaking 
process. The state, however, lacked the necessary institutional tools to guarantee a 
balanced political exchange with the employers. The venues for the consultation of 
social partners remained highly informal and non-binding, missing an enforcement 
mechanism to commit business to new investments and the creation of new jobs. In 
this context of uncertainty, organised labour negotiated the use of short time benefits 
in exchange for shallow employment promises that failed to materialise, leading the 
CIG-S to finance industrial manpower overcapacity on a permanent basis. 
The consequences for the mobilisation capacity of organised labour proved 
disastrous, and not only because of the social costs of redundancies per se. The 
dynamic of imperfect corporatism embedded into the 1975 guaranteed wage 
agreement dragged the unions into a co-determination of the management of short 
time work.  The lack of credible commitments by the employers, however, exposed 
organised labour to strong criticism, leading to mistrust in the workplace between 
union leadership and the rank and file. On a deeper level, the use of the CIG-S to 
cushion the downfall of employment in large companies forced organised labour to 
face an insider-outsider dilemma that eroded its bases of consensus outside the 
factory’s walls. The strong income maintenance afforded by the CIG to the core 
industrial working class was paralleled by the lack of protection afforded to the rest of 
the unemployed population, which slowly came to perceive unions’ constituencies as 
an overly guaranteed aristocracy. The attempt of organised labour to steer 
unemployment social policy more decisively proved a double-edged sword. It 
undermined its political and organisational strength, and sowed the seed of its demise 
in the early 
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5. Mass redundancies and the demise of the Italian 
labour movement, 1980-1987 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 The reversal of Italian industrial relations 
The 1980s marked a sharp reversal in Italian industrial relations, bringing to a close 
the period of high industrial conflict that characterised the 1970s. The need to cope 
with growing international competition and the shackles burdening the Italian 
economy led large companies towards a more aggressive restructuring of the 
industrial shop floor, to curb perceived organisational inefficiencies and high labour 
costs. At the turn of the decade, businesses adopted a unilateral approach to 
manpower redundancy, effectively attempting to impose on, rather than negotiate with 
organised labour, the expulsion of workers from the factories.1 The opening bell was 
rung by FIAT in the autumn of 1980, when the company forced organised labour to 
accept a year-long use of the CIG-S for thousands of employees in Turin.2  
The new course of managerial politics exploited the lurking contradictions that 
had started to open within the labour movement during the second half of the 1970s. 
The increasing moderatism of national union leaders was estranging the rank and file, 
while the constant negotiations over the CIG at the workplace level slowly 
undermined the organisational strength of factory councils. This made further 
redundancies harder to resist. The business outlook worsened after the second oil 																																																								
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shock of 1979, further increasing production costs, and employers grasped the 
opportunity of the momentary weakness of organised labour to try and regain the 
upper hand in the control of manpower policies.3 The unprecedented decision of FIAT 
and the ease with which the resistance of the unions was broken had a highly 
symbolic impact on the rest of the country and soon many other companies followed 
suit in casting out the workers from the factories.4 
As the wave of redundancies increased, unemployment spread across the 
country. The autumn of 1980 marked a watershed. The unemployment rate rose to 
7.5% in 1981 and increased thereafter, reaching a peak of 10.3% in 1987.5 The 
expulsion of industrial manpower from the factories coupled with a persistent lack of 
opportunities for young people and marginal social categories. The ISTAT’s yearly 
labour force reports highlighted the fact that the Italian labour market was plagued by 
structural problems and had been producing an oversupply of job seekers since at 
least the mid-1970s. Between 1977 and 1984, labour demand grew on a yearly 
average of 0.4% while the available supply grew by 0.9% per year.6  
The growth of the jobless population underscored a wider transformation of 
Italian economy during the 1980s. A few years into the decade, the spiraling inflation 
of the previous period had been brought under control and yearly growth averaged a 
robust 3% between 1984 and 1990.7  The industrial system underwent profound 
changes that led to the recovery of productivity. However, these overshadowed the 
worsening of the country’s structural problems from institutional and social points of 
view: economic growth was accompanied by extreme public sector profligacy, with 
an increase in government spending across the board. Throughout the decade, the debt 
to GDP ratio almost doubled from 56% in 1980 to more than 90% in 1990.8  																																																								
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6 Mario Dal Co, Ristrutturazione dell’occupazione, p. 19. 
7 Giuseppe Berta, ‘L'arena delle relazioni industriali negli anni Ottanta: le occasioni mancate’, in Gli 
anni Ottanta come storia, eds. Simona Colarizi, Piero Craveri, Silvio Pons, Gaetano Quagliariello 
(Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino 2004), 341-358, at p. 341. 
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(1861-2012)’, Economia politica, Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics 3 (2014), 301-328; 
Giuseppe Canullo and Paolo Pettenati, ‘Il debito pubblico Italiano cento anni dopo’, Moneta e Credito 
51 (1998), 17-24, at p.18. 
		 199	
The sharp growth of the public debt was due to the decision in 1981 to separate 
the political direction of the Bank of Italy from the Ministry of Treasury, preventing 
the central bank from financing government deficit directly, leading to an increase in 
interest rates. In no small part, the rise of state indebtedness was also due to the 
expansion of public spending. The sharp rise of unemployment and the delicate social 
problems unleashed up by the unprecedented scale of industrial redundancies required 
a massive intervention of the state, calling into question the very structure of the 
Italian social policy.9 
As underlined by Ferrera, the 1980s represented a ‘januslike and fairly 
tormented period for the Italian welfare state’.10 Throughout the decade, total social 
expenditure rose from 19.1% to 24.1%, a sizable increase that was matched by the 
growth of contributory rate and revenue extraction, bringing the fiscal capacity of the 
Italian state up to par with that of other European countries.11 Despite the growth in 
resources devoted to social policy, the imbalances that characterised the institutional 
edifice of Italian welfare ended up being magnified.12 In order to cope with the 
unprecedented scale of layoffs and displaced workers, new provisions - such as an 
early retirement scheme in 1981 - were introduced, and existing ones tended to cater 
to unemployment. The country failed to increase the targeting and mean testing of its 
unemployment assistance. Instead, money allowances were provided indiscriminately 
through a wide array of passive labour market policies.  
In this context, the CIG played a key role in cushioning the process of industrial 
restructuring and was utilised on an unprecedented scale for the post-war period.  In 
only the first half of the decade the number of hours subsidised by short time almost 
tripled, jumping from 234 in 1978 to 688 million in 1984. Most of the increase was 
absorbed by the CIG-S, which quadrupled from 124 million in 1980 to a peak of 489 
four years later.13 Short time benefits were increasingly used to mask unemployment 
and allow the income maintenance of workers, often for years, after their initial 
suspension. According to Dal Co’s estimates, industry lost close to 20% of its 																																																								
9 See Beniamino Andreatta, L’autonomia della politica monetaria. Il divorzio Tesoro-Banca d’Italia 
trent’anni dopo (Bologna: il Mulino, 2011). 
10 Maurizio Ferrera, 'The uncertain future of the Italian welfare state', West European Politics 20 (1997), 
231-249, at p. 236. 
11 Ibidem, p. 239. 
12 Valeria Fargion, 'Half Way Through the Ford: The Italian Welfare State at the Start of the New 
Century', in Changing Patterns of Social Protection, eds. Neil Gilbert and Rebecca A. Von Voorhis 
(New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 309-338, at p. 310. 
13 INPS, Rendiconti dell’Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (Roma: Inps, 1981-1988). 
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employees during the first half of the 1980s, almost a third of which through the 
CIG.14 Bonazzi estimates that, in 1983, 8.8% of the total industrial workforce was 
actually composed of suspended workers on short time. 15  The incidence was 
particularly high among big companies, underlying how deindustrialisation was 
affecting the large Fordist factories. According to Gros-Pietro, between 1980 and 
1985 the incidence of the CIG hovered on average between 3-5% of total workforce 
for companies below 500 employees, doubling to 9-10% for the larger ones.16 
 
Fig. 5.1 authorised CIG-O and CIG-S hours (1978-1988)17 
 
 
Facing the magnitude of deindustrialisation, organised labour found itself 
negotiating the use of short time benefits from a position of extreme weakness, in 
most cases enduring the unilateral decisions of management. The CIG-S became an 
easy shortcut and synonym for layoffs, eluding the very tight regulations on industrial 
dismissals. The sheer number of workers on short time and the length of the 
suspensions in many factories acted as strong moderators of industrial conflict, 
impairing the mobilisational capacity of the unions. While many workers were cast 
out of the factories, those that remained inside found it more difficult to hold onto the 
control over labour organisation that they had won during the 1970s. The factories 																																																								
14 Dal Co, Ristrutturazione dell'occupazione, p. 10. 
15 Bonazzi, ‘Italian Cassa Integrazione’, p. 578. 
16 Gian Maria Gros-Pietro, 'The Restructuring of Large-Sized Industrial Groups', in Industrial Policy in 
Italy 1945-1990, ed. Mario Baldassarri (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 141-159, at p. 153. 
17 INPS, Rendiconti dell’Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (Roma: Inps, 1981-1988). 
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witnessed a palpable worsening of working conditions, shifts and increased 
disciplinary action. Many trade union leaders likened the new course of industrial 
relations to a return of the ‘harsh years’ of the 1950s, with a divided and powerless 
labour movement.18  
The decline in the strength of organised labour that followed the onset of the 
1980s is highlighted by the fall in the union density rate of the CGIL-CISL-UIL. The 
percentage of unionised workers across the three organisations dropped from almost 
50% to 40% between 1980 and 1990. The traditional indicators of industrial conflict 
also showed a sharp decline in the mobilisational capacity of organised labour.19 In 
1980, more than five million workers participated in a total of 1,407 industrial actions. 
By 1985 the number of protest events had halved to 700 and the number of strikers 
had dropped to slightly more than 700,000.20  
This chapter will track the way in which the CIG-S impacted the industrial shop 
floor during the 1980s, disarticulating the functioning of workplace worker 
representation and thwarting organised labour’s capacity to resist further rounds of 
redundancies. The decline of union strength during the 1980s was a Europe-wide 
phenomenon, with the combined effects of industrial transformation and 
unemployment sapping the basis of labour’s power across many advanced 
economies.21 In Italy, the arbitrary use of short time work became the most apparent 
and direct aspect of the enforced demobilisation of organised labour. The 
cassaintegrati - as the workers on CIG came to be known - were often selected on the 
basis of their political militancy and union affiliation.22 Starting from the events of the 
autumn of 1980 at FIAT, this chapter will show how the political use of the CIG-S 
caused patent discriminations that deprived the unions of key human and 
organisational resources.  
On a deeper level, the massive use of the extraordinary short time work scheme 
led to extreme segmentation in organised labour’s constituencies. Already during the 																																																								
18 Annamaria Vitale, La Talpa nel Prato Verde: soggettività al lavoro alla Fiat di Melfi (Soveria 
Mannelli: Rubettino, 2001), p. 19. 
19 Baccaro and Pulignano, ‘Employment Relations in Italy’, p. 147. 
20  See ISTAT, Rilevazioni sulle forze di lavoro (Roma: ISTAT, 1951-1991). Retrieved from 
http://seriestoriche.istat.it/fileadmin/documenti/Tavola_10.22.xls, 03/09/2018 at 20.06 GMT. 
21 Guido Baglioni and Ettori Santi (eds.), l'Europa sindacale agli inizi degli anni '80 (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1982); Silver, Forces of labor, p. 163. 
22 Giuseppe Bonazzi, ‘Lasciare la fabbrica: cassa integrazione e mobilità negli anni ottanta’, in La città 
dopo Ford: il caso di Torino, ed. Arnaldo Bagnasco (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1990), 23-45. 
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second half of the 1970s, the unions had to grapple with the difficulties of addressing 
the needs of the employed and the unemployed, attempting to govern a form of 
imperfect corporatism that led them to lose consensus and representativeness. The 
1980s bore the fruit of that failure: facing the prospect of mass layoffs, the CIG-S 
often appeared to union leaders as the lesser of two evils.  
The chapter will show how the permanent nature of the suspensions - with the 
failure to introduce rotation mechanisms to spread work-time reduction among all 
employees - broke the solidarity between the cassaintegrati and the rest of the 
workers.23  Employees on short time ended up in a political no man’s land: the unions 
often proved indifferent to their predicament, preferring to concentrate on the wage 
battles of those who remained inside, while the rest of the unemployed perceived the 
cassaintegrati as a privileged caste.24  
The politics behind the management of the CIG-S during the 1980s highlighted 
the ‘features of the Fordist disciplinary forms of power embedded in the practices of 
the state income maintenance system’, acting as a deterrent against organised labour 
mobilisation. 25  Faced with internal divisions and organisational obstacles to the 
mobilisation of their base, the unions tried to secure their monopoly of labour 
representativeness and consensus by acting as reliable bargaining partners with both 
the state and the employers. This led to a high level of centralisation of industrial 
relations, de facto divesting factory councils and the rank and file of any influence 
over the course of national union strategies.26  
In June 1981, the Republican Party Secretary, Giovanni Spadolini led a new 
government supported by a coalition of five parties, including the DC and the PSI. 
The new government set itself the target of reducing inflation as a top priority, and 
welcomed the unions’ new strategy for institutionalisation. This culminated in 
January 1983, when the Minister of Labour, Vincenzo Scotti and the social partners 
signed an agreement on wage restraint, with the unions accepting the relinquishment 
of their right to supplementary negotiations. The so-called Accordo Scotti represented 																																																								
23 Claudio della Valle, ‘il Mondo politico, sindacale e industriale giudica la Cassa Integrazione’, in I 
cassintegrati Fiat. Gli uomini, la storia, gli ambienti, le fonti documentarie, ed. Gian Mario Bravo 
(Torino: Tirrenia Stampatori, 1989), 143-213. 
24 Enrico Pugliese, 'The Three Forms of Unemployment', Social Research 5 (1987), 303-317, at p. 304. 
25 Paul Bagguley, 'Prisoners of the Beveridge Dream? the political mobilisation of the poor against 
contemporary welfare regimes', in Towards a Post-Fordist Welfare State?, eds. Roger Burrows and 
Brian Loader (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 74-94, at p. 83. 
26 Antonio Messia, Ottobre Millenovecentottanta (Roma: Scienze e Lettere, 2000), pp. 79-95. 
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the first official trilateral agreement between the state, capital and labour in post-war 
Italy and opened a short-lived period of effective corporatist negotiations.27  
Contrary to their expectations of a few years before, however, the unions 
entered into negotiations from a position of extreme weakness and were not able to 
reap any advantages, other than their survival. At the plant level, organised labour 
rarely had the opportunity to intervene in the definition of the size or length of 
redundancies, while at national level it was incapable of influencing the policymaking 
behind the reform of short time work. This chapter will show how, despite the 
perceived need to rein in fiscal profligacy and reform the mechanism of 
unemployment assistance, the state further expanded the remit of the CIG-S. The calls 
for a strengthening of standard unemployment insurance and the introduction of a 
minimum income system were silenced by the need of the coalition governments to 
tackle the social crisis at hand and foster its clientele of consensus.28 
Eventually, the tensions that built up within organised labour led to the breakup 
of the CGIL-CISL-UIL in February 1984, when the communist leaning union refused 
to agree to the weakening of the wage indexation system proposed by the government 
of Bettino Craxi and accepted by the CISL and the UIL.29 While the unity of the labour 
movement crumbled on the reform of the Scala Mobile, the attrition caused by the 
continued use of short time was instrumental in weakening organised labour. The 
combined effect of deindustrialisation, on the one hand, and the targeted expulsion of 
the labour force made the 1980s truly a ‘lost decade’ for Italian unions, alienating the 
support of both its base and public opinion. The employers’ extensive use to the CIG-
S proved key in softening the unions’ position towards dismissals, making 
redundancies more palatable while slowly eroding their strength within the factories.  
 
  
																																																								
27 Marino Regini and Ida Regalia, ‘Employers, unions and the state: The resurgence of concertation in 
Italy?’, West European Politics 20 (1997), 210-230, at pp. 210-215. 
28 Jonah D. Levy, ‘Vice or Virtue? Progressive politics and Welfare Reform in Continentale Europe’, 
Politics and Society 27 (1999), 239-273, at pp. 252-257. 
29 Lucio Baccaro, Mimmo Carrieri and Cesare Damiano, ‘The Resurgence of the Italian Confederal 
Unions: Will it Last?’, European Journal of Industrial Relations 9 (2003), 43-59, at p. 43. 
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5.2 Thirty-five days at FIAT 
Studying the history of Italian industrial relations during the 1980s, it is useful to bear 
in mind the words of Giorgio Amendola, leader of the migliorista current within the 
PCI, who in 1979 remarked: ‘Turin has always been the premonitory signal of what is 
to happen to the country’.30 In the autumn of 1980, the sudden decision of FIAT to 
resort to the CIG-S for 23,000 employees represents one of the greatest watersheds in 
post-war Italian labour history. The sheer size of the redundancy imposed by the 
company signaled the will of FIAT’s management to deal once and for all with 
manpower overcapacity and workers riotousness on the shop floor. As the unions 
mounted a pugnacious but ultimately ineffective resistance, their capitulation in Turin 
led other companies to follow FIAT’s example in casting workers out.31  
The decision of the Turinese company had its roots in the progressive erosion of 
union power bases, highlighted by the bureaucratisation of factory councils in many 
of its factories. A year prior, in October 1979, the management of FIAT had fired 61 
workers who were part of the more radical groups at Mirafiori, accusing them of 
being complicit with red terrorism. On that occasion, the mild opposition put forward 
by the unions - particularly from the Communists of the CGIL - allowed FIAT’s 
disciplinary actions to go uncontested, paving the way for the company to try and 
regain the upper hand in shop floor politics.32 Despite these forewarnings, the massive 
redundancy announced by the company in September 1980 took organised labour by 
surprise, as the CIG ‘fell like a mallet’ on FIAT workforce, leaving its organisations 
in shambles and breaking up the solidarity between the workers.33  
By the beginning of the 1980s, the window of opportunity for businesses to 
regain competitiveness was rapidly closing. 1979 proven to be an annus horribilis for 
the Italian economy, bringing to a close the development model based on high 
inflation and external devaluation through which the country had navigated the 
uncertainties of the 1970s. The second oil shock of that year caused sharp price 
increases in a country that was heavily import dependendent for its energy supply, 
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adding to the already existing inflationary spiral.34 This led to credit restrictions that 
severely curtailed the possibilities for company financing. Furthermore, in March 
1979, Italy had decided to join the European Monetary System, curtailing the 
possibility to resort to the devaluation of the lira to prop up the international 
competitiveness of its industry. Domestic inflation, which had previously been 
instrumental in lowering real labour costs, became a further burden because of the 
impossibility of adjusting the external exchange rate.35  
In this new context, it was imperative for employers to curb inefficiencies and 
wastage, recovering productivity by reducing production while achieving greater 
control over labour organisation and manpower policies. In 1980, a poll carried out 
among Lombardy’s employers by the region’s research institute underlined how ‘the 
reduction of businesses manouvering space […] and the tight restrictions on layoffs 
[…] had restricted the possibility for production units to adapt to the needs of market 
flexibility’. Half of the employers interviewed admitted that organised labour 
represented ‘an objectively relevant constraint’ for their initiative.36  
In the eyes of FIAT’s management, it was a do or die situation for the company. 
Cesare Romiti, the FIAT CEO at the time, recalls that mass redundancy ‘was a 
difficult choice, but also a necessary one; indispensable to restoring FIAT, ensuring 
continued employment for those who remained’.37 The economic slowdown of the 
early 1980s hit the automotive industry with particular strength, due to rising energy 
costs and the intensification of international competition. By the mid-1970s, US 
companies also had begun to produce medium size cars, in direct competition with 
European carmakers. The threat of American industry was paralleled by the 
aggressiveness of Japanese companies. Between the first five months of 1979 and the 
same period in 1980, the carmakers of the Rising Sun expanded their market share in 
Europe from 7.9% to 10.5% while italian producers such as Alfa and FIAT saw theirs 
plummet from 17.5% to 14.4%.38 																																																								
34 Antonio Cardinale and Alessandro Verdelli, Energia per l'Industria in Italia. La variabile energetica 
dal miracolo economico alla globalizzazione (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2008), p. 218. 
35 Jeffry Α. Frieden, 'Making Commitments: France and Italy in the European Monetary System, 1979-
1985', in The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification, eds. Barry Eichengreen and 
Jeffrey A. Frieden (New York: Routledge, 2018), 23-47. 
36 Istituto Regionale di Ricerca della Lombardia, Ristrutturazione Industriale e Mercato del Lavoro in 
Lombardia (Milano: FrancoAngeli Editore, 1980), p. 130.  
37 Cesare Romiti, Questi anni alla Fiat. Intervista di Giampaolo Pansa (Milano: Rizzoli, 1988), p. 19. 
38 Morelli, Documento presentato alla Giunta Comunale di Torino, 07/07/1980, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, 
FIOM di Torino, b. 549, f. 4. 
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The two largest national carmakers were suffering not only from the 
unfavourable international situation, but also because of ‘structural delays in adjusting 
to the new production demands and technologies required by the market’.39 This was 
firstly officially recognised in April 1980 with the publishing of the so-called 
Rapporto Prodi, named after Romano Prodi, who in 1979 chaired a parliamentary 
commission on the state of the national automobile. The Prodi report highlighted the 
numerous deficiencies that were plaguing Italian car producers: insufficient product 
innovation, scant investments in the development of electronics, an excessive number 
of vehicle models and, most crucially, an uncompetitive price policy determined by 
the sluggish growth of productivity.40 
FIAT itself linked its inefficiencies to excessive union control over the 
industrial organisation of the shop floor. According to Maurizio Magnabosco, FIAT’s 
head of industrial relations during those years, the abatement of productivity ‘had 
historical reasons, […] due to a bad implementation of the agreements regulating 
work rates and performance’. Management was critical of the consultation system 
introduced by the guaranteed wage agreement of 1975. The need to submit quarterly 
production plans in advance to union stewards ‘represented an element of strong 
rigidity in the daily management of the factory. Official production quotas were 
considered immutable by the unions […] creating a restriction which was 
inacceptable in a market that was continually evolving’.41 Romiti used even harsher 
words, recognising how ‘negotiating with the unions to increase productivity did not 
serve any purpose anymore […] because the rank and file acted freely on its own’.42 
In the first half of 1980, newspapers started to publish news about the financial 
losses of FIAT. In January, La Repubblica reported how the company had lost more 
than 100 billion lire the previous year.43 Towards the end of May the company had 
requested and obtained the CIG-O for seven consecutive Fridays for 78,000 
employees.44 In June, FIAT owner Gianni Agnelli published an interview in which he 
hinted at the possibility of thousands of layoffs, a position he reiterated in the FIAT 																																																								
39  Enzo Pontarollo ‘L'industria dell'auto: aspetti strutturali e dinamica congiunturale’, Rivista 
Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 89 (1981), 554-572, at p. 554. 
40 Patrizio Bianchi, ‘FIAT, automobile e industria in Italia; un commento’, L'industria 24 (2003), 401-
412.  
41 Della Valle, 'Il mondo politico, sindacale e industriale’, p. 171. 
42 Romiti, Questi anni alla Fiat, pp. 106-107. 
43 Giuseppe Turani, 'Nel ’79 la Fiat perde almeno 100 miliardi', La Repubblica, 19/01/1980, 19. 
44 Sergio Devecchi, 'Un accumulo di 30.000 vetture in più sui normali stock. FIAT auto: per 78 mila 
operai chiesta la Cassa integrazione', La Stampa, 09/05/1980, 1-2. 
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shareholder meeting at the beginning of July, when he stated the need for a 30% cut in 
production in the second half of 1980.45 
The signs of an impending industrial relations crisis at FIAT were clear not only 
within managerial circles, but also to local public authorities. In July 1980, the 
Provincial Council of Turin created a special committee for the defence of 
employment at FIAT, ‘to sensibilise public opinion on the problem of employment 
[…] and highlight the unacceptability of any unilateral action by FIAT.’46 The city 
council underlined ‘the grave social and economic consequences that massive 
redundancies would have not only in the car industry, but on the whole structure of 
Turinese industry'.47 Piero Fassino, the representative of the PCI within the province’s 
council, was particularly vocal in denouncing the menacing prospects for the Turinese 
labour market. He noted how the scale of the redundancies vented by FIAT ‘was 
hardly practical […] and would have required the existence of new employment 
opportunities which cannot materialise in a few weeks’.48 
After the summer holidays, at the beginning of September 1980, the FIAT 
management summoned the FLM to announce the need for complete short time 
suspensions for thousands of employees and the possibility of laying off many 
others.49 The union recognised the existence of a critical situation, but proposed an 
alternative way to tackle production burdens. For organised labour it was imperative 
to avoid firings and complete suspensions through a periodic rotation of short time 
benefits for the whole workforce, avoiding singling out workers to be expelled. The 
company however was intransigent, in the words of the union, ‘trying to augment 
productivity by increasing exploitation, weakening worker organisation through 
disguised firings’.50 
In order to strengthen its position during the negotiations, the FLM wanted to  
‘isolate FIAT from other social and political forces”, invoking the aid of the 																																																								
45FLM, La Fiat annuncia altri 8 giorni di cassa integrazione, Centro Stampa FLM, Torino, 25/07/1980, 
IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 728, f. 1. 
46 Giovanni Mercandino, Assessore al Lavoro ed Affari Legali, Provincia di Torino, 17/07/1980, IPAG, 
Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 549, f. 4. 
47 Fassino (PCI), Martina (DC), Francisco (PRI), Cotta Morandini (PSDI), Mussano (PSI), Casiraghi 
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Torino, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 549, f. 4.  
48 Piero Fassino, Al Direttore de “La Stampa” e P.C. al dott. Gianni Bisio, Torino, 01/08/1980, IPAG, 
Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 549, f. 4. 
49 Michele Ruggiero,  'Ripreso il lavoro in un clima di incertezza. Dopo la Fiat, 47 aziende ad orario 
ridotto', l’Unità, 02/09/1980, 4. 
50 FLM, la Fiat conferma la volontà di procedere a massicci licenziamenti mascherati, Centro Stampa 
FLM, Torino, 10/09/1980, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 728, f. 1.  
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government, ‘which should clarify if it is willing to give public money to a company 
that chooses a frontal assault and social wreckage’. Even public authorities, however, 
were presented by FIAT with a fait accompli, breaking with the tradition of state 
consultation over redundancies that had prevailed in the past decade: On September 
11th, unbeknownst to public authorities, the company informed the provincial CGIL-
CISL-UIL of the firing of 14,469 workers in the main plants of Mirafiori, Rivalta, 
Lingotto and the Lancia in Chivasso and Turin.51 The government was not allowed to 
intervene, and Romiti recalls how ‘the Minister of Labour himself had to learn the 
news from the press agencies’.52  
The workers mobilised to protest the decision of the company, beginning a 
month long struggle. On the day of the announcement, the factories in Turin ground to 
a full stop and a huge crowd of workers congregated in front of the gates of the 
Mirafiori plant calling for the occupation of the factory. The FLM immediately 
underlined the political nature of FIAT’s decision: ‘aimed at restoring the 
entrepreneurial freedom of hiring and firing, according to the logic of profit […] 
geared towards the unconditioned expulsion of the labour force and the dismantling of 
the negotiating power of the union’.53 
 Pressured by the union and intending to avert a social crisis that would have 
shaken up the country and its political consensus, the government supported a new 
round of negotiations, held in Rome, and mediated by the Ministry of Labour. The 
consultation procedures were centralised, conducted by the national executives of the 
FLM and the top echelons of the CGIL-CISL-UIL. This left little space for FIAT 
factory councils and the rank and file to influence the bargaining process and control 
the conduct of union leaders, effectively insulated from their base. From the very 
beginning of the mobilisation, workers asked for the negotiations to be carried out in 
public in Turin, similar to the experience of the strikes carried out in Poland by 
Solidarnosc a few months prior. During protest marches, one of the slogans was 
‘Danzig, Stettin, the same here in Turin’.54  																																																								
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The factory council of Mirafiori, while praising the readiness of workers to 
protest the layoffs, denounced the risk of organised labour institutionalisation. The 
Consiglione recognised that the massive layoffs were  ‘a restorative attack […] that 
aims to go back to the 1950s and dictate the new rules for the 1980s.’ The analysis of 
the workers assembly, however, was more nuanced than that put forward by the FLM:  
 
‘the intent of the company is not to destroy the union tout court, but to distort its role, 
making it co-participate in the management of the labour market in a subordinate 
position, content with recognition outside the factories and forced to absorb the social 
contradictions of the system’.55 
 
Despite the growing tension between the rank and file and the union leadership, 
protests in Turin continued unabated, slowly extending outside of the car city. The 
Piedmont CGIL-CISL-UIL called a region-wide strike, joined by the workers of 
Campania. All the while, planning began for a nationwide general strike of the 
metalworkers, which was carried out on the 25th of September. With the ongoing 
deadlock in negotiations, the factory council started to consider the idea of occupying 
the whole Mirafiori, with a ‘total block on production and the possibility of keeping 
the majority of workers within the factory’.56 
The 27th of September was the key turning point in negotiations: the previous 
day the Secretary of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, had offered unconditional support to 
the strikers, prompting Prime Minister Cossiga to call an interministerial meeting to 
face the situation. 57  However, the very same day, the Government fell out in 
parliament over a law to contain inflation. The management of FIAT used this 
opportunity to break out of its isolation, announcing that ‘in the spirit of 
responsibility’ it would postpone the layoffs for three months, resorting instead to the 
CIG-S. The CGIL-CISL-UIL immediately called off the planned general strike, while 
the Communist Party claimed victory. 58  The sudden switch from layoffs to the 
proposal for assisted redundancy via short time, however, created confusion among 
workers, deepening the division between the rank and file, who refused suspensions 																																																								
55 FLM, Relazione introduttiva 5° lega, Consiglione Fiat Mirafiori, Torino, 22/09/80, IPAG, Archivio 
CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 728, f .1. 
56 Valentino Parlato,  'Agnelli voleva una vertenza aziendale. Gli operai torinesi l’hanno trasformata in 
crisi politica nazionale', il Manifesto, 20/09/1980, 1. 
57  Bruno Ugolini, 'Berlinguer fra gli operai: Lotteremo insieme a voi fino in fondo. Nessun 
licenziamento', l’Unità, 27/10/1980, 3. 
58 Valentino Parlato, 'FIAT: Agnelli sospende i licenziamenti e accoglie la proposta Foschi. Il sindacato 
revoca lo sciopero generale', il Manifesto, 28/10/1980, 1. 
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altogether, and the union leadership, more accommodating of the new demands of the 
company, urging strikers to leave the picket lines.59 
The announcement of the CIG-S drove a wedge between the bottom up 
democracy of factory councils and the bureaucracy of organised labour's leadership, 
increasing the tensions between the different political souls of the labour movement. 
A growing distrust was emerging between communist component of the CGIL and the 
Catholic and socialist elements in the CISL and the UIL, accelerating the fracturing of 
the unions’ federation. For instance, Beppe Mainardi of the Turinese provincial CISL 
accused the Communist Party of conditioning workers against catholic stewards, 
fostering ‘sectarianism […] and polluting industrial relations with political 
objectives’. Towards the end of September, Pierre Carniti, General Secretary of the 
CISL, and Cesare Delpiano, another prominent member of the Catholic union, were 
challenged by the workers in Turin, prompting Mainardi to complain that ‘while the 
PCI was rooted among workers’, the labour movement ‘could not be hegemonised 
and subordinated by political groups’.60 
The internal divisions of organised labour were noted and exploited by the top 
echelons of FIAT management. In his diary of those days, Romiti remembers how: 
 
‘The Italian union, at that time, was crumbling. It was a babel of different languages 
and contradictory decisions: the Roman executives said one thing, the federations 
another one, provincial structures yet another one, the factory council of Mirafiori acted 
on its own […] where can a union like this end up? It knocks out itself ’.61  
 
On the 30th of September, FIAT attached 22,884 employees’ pay slips with the 
notification of the CIG-S.62 Without consulting with organised labour, it unilaterally 
decided the numbers and the names of the workers, with ‘clear political and anti-
union discrimination’.63 The abruptness of the decision led to widespread protest, with 
workers refusing to accept the redundancies. In retaliation, the Mirafiori factory 
council immediately decided to implement ‘a block on the gates and all the goods’, 																																																								
59 Bruno Ugolini, 'Dopo il primo importante successo. Per la FIAT ora urge una trattativa rapida'. 
l'Unità, 29/10/1980, 1-4. 
60 Beppe Mainardi, Segreteria Provinciale CISL, In Fabbrica il Sindacato conta meno del Partito?, 
Torino, 05/10/1980, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 728, f. 1. 
61 Romiti, Questi anni alla Fiat, p. 73 
62 Francesco Bullo,  'Cassa integrazione a zero ore (tre mesi) per 21.515 della FIAT auto e 1369 della 
Teksid', La Stampa, 01/10/1980, 12. 
63 FIOM, Documento Interno, Cronaca e 35 giorni, dal 1-9-80 al 18-10-80, Torino, -/11/1980, IPAG, 
Fondo FIOM di Torino, b. 729, f. 3.  
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effectively occupying the factory.64 To organise the picket lines and coordinate the 
struggle, the FLM set up an independent radio station, Radio Lotta, offering daily 
updates on the negotiations between the the union and the company.65 
Worker protests continued unabated for two weeks. On the 6th of October, while 
the negotiations were stalling in Rome, the Minister of Labour, Franco Foschi 
approved a provisional month of CIG-S. The company took this opportunity to try and 
break the unity of the strikers. Cesare Annibaldi, head of industrial relations at FIAT, 
issued warnings against all the suspended workers who attempted to enter the gates. 
The move had no apparent immediate effect on mobilisation. 66  The provisional 
approval of short time, however, helped foster divisions among those who were sure 
of preserving their job and those who were at risk of permanently losing it.67   
In the meantime, the company started working undercover to stir top-level blue-
collar and white-collar workers against the strikers. On multiple occasions, the 
organisation of FIAT middle management denounced the violence of the strikers and 
attempted to break the picket lines. On the 14th of October, the silent majority of Turin 
sided against the unions: after a plenary meeting, middle-level employees staged a 
march through the streets of the city, protesting against the strikers and the drawn out 
block on production at FIAT. 40,000 protestors (according to FIAT's numbers) asked 
for Mirafiori to be freed of the occupation.68 It was an absolute novelty for organised 
labour, facing for the first time an opposing mass mobilisation. The high symbolic 
value of the event shattered the resistance of union leaders. Pio Galli, National 
Secretary of the FIOM-CGIL, admitted ‘in the face of this situation, we were forced 
to bring negotiations to a rapid close’.69 
On the 18th of October 1980, the FLM signed an agreement with FIAT, under 
the patronage of the Ministry of Labour. The agreement foresaw the complete 
suspension via CIG-S of 23,000 workers, mostly in the Turinese plants of Mirafiori 
and Rivalta, for a year. 70  The company, the regional labour office and the local unions 																																																								
64 Ibidem. 
65 Sergio Devecchi, ‘ L’azienda definisce irresponsabile l’atteggiamento del sindacato. La FLM decide 
di presidiare i cancelli’, La Stampa, 01/10/1980, 1. 
66 Bruno Ugolini, 'Significativa prova di unità nella manifestazione di Torino', l’Unità 11/10/1980, 6. 
67 Michele Costa, 'Annibaldi a Torino conferma la linea dura della FIAT', l’Unità, 11/10/1980, 1. 
68 Alberto Baldissera, 'La marcia dei quarantamila', Quaderni di Sociologia 26/27 (1984), 307-336. 
69 FIOM, Documento Interno, Cronaca e 35 giorni, dal 1-9-80 al 18-10-80, Torino, -/11/1980, IPAG, 
Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 729, f. 3. 
70  Miriam Golden, Heroic defeats: The politics of job loss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p. 58. 
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would meet every three months to assess the production situation of the auto group 
and its market prospects. At the end of June 1981, after having evaluated the entity of 
the structural excess workforce, the company would resort to inter-company mobility 
procedures for redundant workers. In two years, by the end of June 1983 - and this 
was the important part of the agreement - all the workers still on the CIG-S would be 
rehired, without firing.71 
Despite the letter of the agreement, the scale of the redundancy and the length of 
the restructuring period foresaw by FIAT made the use of the CIG-S tantamount to a 
layoff. Writing to the Minister of Labour in the aftermath of the agreement, the 
General Director of the company, Vittorio Ghidella, made the permanent nature of the 
redundancy clear. A system of rotation of the CIG-S among all the workers, as 
suggested by the organised labour, would have obtained only ‘a partial reduction of 
the cost of labour. […] A temporary bridge-solution […] that does not resolve the 
structural reason of the crisis […] and does not allow the company to obtain a new 
stable production organisation.’ Permanent short time, instead, would allow a ‘process 
of rationalisation and structural adjustment’, with an average reduction of 20% of 
annual production.72 Reflecting back on those days, even Cesare Romiti admitted that 
the company was already aware that a quota of those workers would never again set 
foot in FIAT.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
71FLM, Verbale di Accordo tra la Fiat spa, rappresentata dall’Amministratore Delegato Dott. Cesare 
Romiti e la Federazione Lavoratori Metalmeccanici, rappresentata dai Segretari Generali Franco 
Bentivogli, Pio Galli, Vincenzo Mattina e dai Segretari Nazionali, Raffaele Morese, Claudio Sabbatini, 
Sileano Veronese, Roma, 18/10/1980, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 728, f. 1. 
72FIAT Auto, L’Amministratore Delegato e Direttore Generale, Vittorio Ghidella, al Ministero del 
Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, tramite Ufficio del Lavoro e della Massima Occupazione di 
Piemonte, Liguria, Toscana, Abbruzzo, Molise, Lazio, Torino, 24/10/1980, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, 
FIOM di Torino, b. 728, f. 1. 
73 Romiti, Questi anni alla Fiat, p. 120. 
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5.3 The CIG-S, discrimination and factory discipline  
The events of October 1980 at FIAT had a momentous impact on the Italian labour 
movement. The signing of the agreement - and the way in which union bureaucracies 
conducted the negotiations – opened up a rift between the factory councils, the 
leadership of the FLM and the CGIL-CISL-UIL. During the month long struggle, the 
rank and file was mobilised on many occasions to strengthen the bargaining power of 
their leadership. However, they were seldom consulted to discuss and endorse the 
overall strategy of negotiations. After having reached a provisional settlement with 
the government and FIAT, the FLM summoned the factory council of Mirafiori to put 
the agreement to a vote. When the overall majority of the assembly rejected it, 
however, union leaders turned a deaf ear, ignoring the result of the referendum to 
declare the agreement approved, to the scorn of many.74 
This authoritarian attitude engendered widespread criticism within the labour 
movement and among traditional leftist outlets. The newspaper Il Manifesto, for 
instance, accused the secretaries of the FLM of ‘passing the agreement by turning 
reality upside down and accusing the workers of being thugs because they protested 
[…] in this case democracy stopped at the gates of the factory’.75 Some executives of 
the Piedmontese CISL noted that there were many 'delegates and militants who 
questioned the veracity of the numbers in favour of the agreement’. By betraying the 
majority of FIAT workers, searching instead for the recognition of the government 
and FIAT, the labour movement risked becoming completely integrated in the 
capitalist labour market, ‘an organisation strong in the institutions but weak in the 
factories’.76 
Even Bruno Trentin, the charismatic ex-leader of the metalworkers, now in the 
secretariat of the CGIL, recognised the crisis of the labour movement. Interviewed by 
L’Unità, Trentin firmly denied that the counciliarism of the union was in crisis. 
However, he also recognised that ‘there was a gap between the agreement and the 
expectations of the most militant workers. […] There were serious lacerations in the 
way workers judged the agreement’. In no small part, Trentin admitted, these were 																																																								
74 Revelli, Lavorare in Fiat, p. 124. 
75 Francesco Ciafaloni, 'In dieci giorni gli Eroi torinesi sono diventati teppisti', Il Manifesto, 25/10/1980, 
FLM Torino, Rassegna Stampa, Torino, 25-26-27/10/1980, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, Lavoratori FIAT in 
CIG, b. 1, f. 1. 
76 Adriano Serafino and Gianni Vizio, ‘Lo Sconfitto della Fiat è un sindacato forte nelle istutuzioni e 
debole in fabbrica’, Il Manifesto, 26/10/1980, FLM Torino, Rassegna Stampa, Torino, 25-26-
27/10/1980, IPAG, Lavoratori FIAT in CIG, b. 1, f. 1. 
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due to a ‘vertical method of direction’ by the leaders:  ‘[…] it is true that a strong 
unity and a rigorous discipline are needed, but we exhibited a worrying and excessive 
centralisation […] without consulting the assemblies’. The company had tried to 
divide suspended employees from the rest of the workforce, allowing the CIG-S to 
foster the difference in status among workers and pit their interests against one 
another. Organised labour fell for the trap: ‘instead of shifting the terms of the debate, 
we acted like an organisation that defended only the employment rights of those that 
were endangered, asking only solidarity of the others. This is the most salient mistake 
we committed’.77  
Yet, most union leaders defended the agreement. On the pages of the journal 
Conquiste del Lavoro, the National Secretary of the FIM, Franco Bentivogli, warned 
against ‘the Peronist tendencies of the base […] and the misunderstanding of the real 
balance of power’. Bentivogli compared the events at FIAT to trade union politics in 
other European countries, ‘in which organised labour allows mass layoffs more 
easily’, vindicating the approach of the FLM. Bentivogli urged ‘not to cede to 
catastrophism […] which would convince workers of the disarmament of the unions’, 
and insisted on the positive aspects of the agreement, ‘which reduced the possibilities 
for discrimination and discouraged other companies from the temptation of getting rid 
of their human stockpiles’.78 
Despite the encouraging words of many union leaders who vindicated the value 
of the agreement, October 1980 marked a strong defeat for the unions, irremediably 
compromising their presence and bargaining power within FIAT factories. The CIG-S 
disarticulated the organisational structure of organised labour, targeting the stewards 
of factory councils and expelling the most politicised workers, which represented the 
lynchpin of union mobilisation on the shop floor. From the moment the CIG-S was 
first announced, the FLM denounced the selection criteria of the company as a 
‘proscription list’.79 The list of workers to be suspended was unilaterally decided by 
the company and clear statistics on the social and political composition of redundant 
employees were missing. FIAT refused to provide a detailed list - neither to the union 
nor to regional authorities - adding to the suspicion of patent discriminations. The 																																																								
77 Stefano Cingolani, 'I consigli sono in crisi? No, vanno riformati', l’Unità, 25/10/1980, FLM Torino, 
Rassegna Stampa, Torino, 25-26-27/10/1980, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, Lavoratori FIAT in CIG, b.1, f.1. 
78 Franco Bentivogli, 'Quali Lezioni dalla Vertenza Fiat', Conquiste del Lavoro, 39, Torino, 27/10/1980, 
IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 729, f. 3. 
79 Revelli, Lavorare in Fiat, p. 108. 
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piecemeal data collected by the regional CGIL-CISL-UIL in the aftermath of the 
agreement pointed to the existence of two levels of discrimination, on a political level, 
targeting the most militant workers and those registered in a union, and on a social 
level, targeting the less productive employees.80 
With the overall aim of downsizing production while increasing average labour 
productivity, the company targeted less skilled workers. According to the industrial 
labour evaluation system in place at the time, these accounted for 81.7% of all 
suspended workers, while representing only 60.5% of the total workforce. In contrast, 
the most qualified employees, accounted for only 3.8% of the workers selected for the 
CIG-S, but composed 21.5% of the total workforce. There was also a disproportionate 
amount of female workers, considered by the company to be less productive and more 
prone to absenteeism and sick leaves: 29% of those on short time were women, while 
according to the unions they ‘represented no more than 18%’ of the FIAT workforce 
in Turin. Regarding disabled workers, data on the health situation of the employees is 
scant and incohesive. At the time, the statistics in possession of the CGIL-CISL-UIL 
pointed towards the intentional expulsion of the disabled. For instance, in the 
accessories department of FIAT Lingotto, handicapped workers represented 49% of 
those made redundant.81 
The aim of the company was not only to increase its productivity, but do so 
while recovering political and managerial control of its shop floor. The unilateral 
selection of the workers to be put on short time served as an expedient to single out 
and expel the most politicized ones, whether part of official unions or of more radical 
groups. The data collected by the unions in January 1981 shows that in Mirafiori the 
incidence of unionization among suspended workers was almost double than that of 
the total workforce. Table 5.1 shows that political discrimination was particularly 
high in those sectors where the average skill level of the workforce was lower and 
working conditions harsher, such as in the bodywork and press departments, while 
less militant white-collar departments were spared massive redundancy.82 
																																																								
80 Pierre Carniti, Passato Prossimo (Torino: Fondazione Vera Nocentini, 2009), p. 72. 
81 CGIL-CISL-UIL, FLM Regionale, Chi sono i 23,000? Cicl. Via Bogino 9, Torino, -/11/1980, IPAG, 
Archivio CGIL, Lavoratori FIAT in CIG, b. 2, f. 2. 
82 Data are taken from FLM, Iscritti FLM operai ed impiegati, (Fabbrica e CIG), 5a Lega Mirafiori, 
Torino, 01/01/1981, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, Lavoratori FIAT in CIG, b. 2, f. 1. Golden reports different 
data, estimating an average 60% unionisation rate among suspensed workers in Mirafiori. Here it was 
decided to rely on primary sources data. See Golden, Heroic Defeats, p. 63.  
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Tab. 5.1 FLM density rate in Mirafiori (Total and in CIG)83 
 
 
Short time suspensions befell specifically the stewards of the factory councils. 
They had provided the backbone of union activity during the past decade, and with 
their action had played a key role in channelling the demands of the rank and file 
towards both management and the union leadership outside of the factories. Slightly 
less than a quarter of all stewards were expelled from the plants of Mirafiori, Rivalta 
and Lancia, effectively disrupting the structure of worker representation. Table 5.2 
shows that the most targeted stewards were those affiliated with the FIM - the 
metalworkers union that had often been accused of excessive rank-and-filism and 
close to the tropes of industrial democracy – and those that were without formal 
affiliation, often linked to radical groups. Compared to FIOM and UILM, Unione 
Italiana Lavoratori Metalmeccanici, which lost 21.8% and 22.7% of their stewards, 
respectively, the FIM saw 39% of its representatives expelled.84 
 
																																																								
83 Ibidem. 
84 FIOM, Delegati in Cassa Integrazione, no date (beginning 1981), IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di 
Torino, b. 610, f. 1. 
In production In CIG
Department  Workforce  Union density  Workforce Union Density
Bodywork 13883 22.3% 4935 40%
Mechanics 13516 23.7% 2644 39.9%
Press 6746 25.6% 1300 48.8%
Press building 896 21.2.% 147 28.6%
Cast Iron Foundry 3269 28% 419 30.1%
Foundry Car. All. 1900 22.3% - -
Foundry Borg. 459 60.6% - -
Forge To 1190 27% 485 21%
Central office 11184 20.6% 250 17.2%
Commercial 870 21.1% 20 20%
Corporate 950 6.1% - -
SEPIN 1005 15.5% - -
CRF 915 16.2% - -
Allis 1100 11.3% - -
SISPORT 84 44% - -
Engeneering 1011 13.9% - -
Total 58928 22.6% 10.200 39%
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Tab. 5.2 union affiliations of CIG shop stewards85 
 
 
The massive redundancies and political discrimination allowed FIAT to regain 
the control of the shop floor.  While union structures were left in a shambles, 
suspended workers were effectively ostracised from the workplace. The company set 
up an external administrative office in Orbassano to manage payments and all other 
interactions with them, reducing their interaction with the rest of workers to a 
minimum. The cassaintegrati were initially even prevented from attending paid 
assemblies inside the plants until the FLM negotiated their limited access.86 This 																																																								
85 Ibidem. 
86 A group of CIG workers from the mechanics department of Mirafiori described this as FIAT 
attempting to create 'a neckline between between suspended workers and those that remained inside' 
FLM Lavoratori della Meccanica, Comunicato Sindacale dei delegati in cassa integrazione della 
meccanica, Torino, 17/11/1980, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, Lavoratori FIAT in CIG, b. 1, f. 3; see also 
Della Valle, 'Il mondo politico, sindacale e industriale', p. 152. 
Total stewards                           Stewards in CIG
FIM FIOM UILM Others Total
Lancia (Total) -
 Chivasso 114 12 6 1 15 34
 Turin - 2 - - - 2
Lingotto (Total) 79
 Press 27 - 5 1 2 8
 Bodywork 52 - 1 - - 1
Mirafiori (Total) 747
Press 108 3 7 3 16 29
Mechanics 171 6 6 - 14 26
Bodywork 268 18 23 9 31 81
Foundry 41 - - 1 3 4
Forge - - 3 1 3 7
Central Offices 96 1 1 - - 2
Carmagnola 63 1 1 - 6 8
Rivalta (Total) 242
Mechanics - - 7 - 1 8
Press - 2 - 2 1 5
Bodyword - 14 23 14 7 58
Total 1182 59 83 32 99 273
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allowed FIAT to rein in worker conflict, tightening up discipline on piecework rates 
and lowering absenteeism. In February 1981, the PCI called a conference on the state 
of the auto industry, denouncing working conditions at FIAT:  
 
'There is greater disciplinary rigour in the factory, but also a great increase in 
productivity and a drastic reduction of absenteeism […] which was already at the 
European average a year prior and it is now below functional levels. […] This situation 
sows distrust inside the factories […] the divisions between workers and the delusion 
of many militants led union activity to stagnate'.87 
 
The same concerns were voiced by the FLM, which denounced the managerial heavy 
hand on the factory shop floor: ‘everywhere the company resorts to unilateral 
decisions, with increased pressure on the exploitation of labour, [...] the multiplication 
of intimidatory initiatives, disciplinary actions and unjustified firings’.88 
The new manpower policies of FIAT were aggressive, but paid off, allowing the 
company to raise productivity by 20% in the first trimester of 1981 alone, and 
increase its European market share from 12.2% to 13.3% in the same time frame. 89  
This positive performance became the excuse for FIAT to proceed to another round of 
temporary suspensions, resorting to ten days of CIG-O between March and July. 
Despite the substantial number of workers already expelled from production, the 
company continued to stress the issue of stockpiles, using it as a lever to threaten 
further rounds of suspensions and pressure organised labour. A shop steward from the 
bodywork department of Mirafiori described the positive feedback effect between 
stronger discipline and the threat of suspensions: ‘people go to work even when they 
are ill: […] compared to production quotas set by the company, […] more cars are 
being produced, then sit in the warehouses and can be used by FIAT as blackmail to 
enforce the CIG’.90 A report of the FLM from June 1981 highlighted that ‘where 
workers resistance is stronger, there is an indiscriminate and exasperated use of the 
																																																								
87 PCI, Federazione Torinese del Partito Comunista Italiano, Nota di discussione, Assemblea Nazionale 
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23/24/4/1981, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 728, f. 2.  
89  Pino Ferraris, 'Senza argine l’esuberanza in Fiat e non per vuoto di strategia', Il Manifesto, 
10/10/1981, IPAG, FIOM di Torino, b. 729, f. 3. 
90  Coordinamento FLM del gruppo FIAT, 'Cassaintegrato non è soltanto una nuova parola del 
sindacalese', Fabbrica/Impresa 0 (1981), 9-11, at p. 10. 
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messa in libertà, there is a refusal to negotiate on any matter and the firing of workers 
occurs at the minimum sign of resistance’.91  
As the summer of 1981 grew closer, FIAT tried to go back out of the agreement 
of October 1980, reneging on its commitment to avoid collective layoffs.92 The crisis 
of organised labour had gone well beyond the initial expectations of management, 
almost taken aback by the sudden collapse of the unions. This allowed the company to 
push for a re-negotiation of the initial agreement, postponing the reentry of redundant 
employees while increasing the number of workers to be permanently expelled from 
the factory. On the 13th of July, the FLM signed a new deal with FIAT management, 
worsening the position of suspended workers and prompting widespread protests. 
Despite its obvious detrimental effects, union bureacucracies accepted the new 
agreement for fear of being sidelined altogether. The new agreement extended the use 
of the CIG-S until 1983 and imposed inter-company mobility for 7,500 workers, with 
no possibility for reentry in FIAT. As partial compensation, management pledged it 
would not resort to further redundancies and guaranteed that by the end of the 
suspension period, 2,000 workers would be assured of reentry. Although the FLM 
noted how, ‘as it had been made clear, there are no assurances that last forever if they 
are not built on the mobilisation within the factory on working shifts, overtime and 
labour organisation’. 93  Confronted with a crisis of democratic legitimacy and 
consensus, organised labour sought to strengthen its position by seeking the 
recognition of its negotiating counterparts, acting as an institutionally reliable partner. 
In the three years following May 1980, FIAT lost slightly more than 43,000 
employees of a national total of 188,000. The reduction of employment was 
particularly concentrated in the factories directly connected with automobile 
production, which lost 33,000 out of a total of 135,000 workers, close to a quarter of 
the entire workforce.94  The curtailment of the workforce proceeded in parallel with a 
more coherent introduction of new technologies on the shop floor, and it is not by 																																																								
91 FLM, Comunicato Coordinamento FIAT, Torino, 09/06/1981, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di 
Torino, b. 729, f. 3. 
92 FLM Piemonte, Lottiamo per Il Lavoro, Centro Stampa FLM Piemonte, Torino, 01/05/1981, IPAG, 
Archivio CGIL, Lavoratori FIAT in CIG, b. 2, f. 3. 
93 Coordinamento CIG-Fiat, Valutazione del Coordinamento dei lavoratori in cassa integrazione della 
Fiat sull’ipotesi di accordo, Cicl. C/o FLM Via Porpora 9 – Torino, 10/07/1981, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, 
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94 Arduino Baietto, La FIAT AUTO nel decennio 1980-1890, documento FIOM per il 5° Congresso 
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chance that redundancies hit in particular the less qualified workers. In May 1980, at 
FIAT there were almost 20,000 blue-collar workers in the lowest professional 
category, representing more than 10% of the total workforce. By 1983, this 
percentage had shrunk to less than 4%, with slightly more than 5,000 workers 
remaining. The process of redundancies at FIAT, thus, served not only to trim down 
the workforce, but also to change its social composition towards a higher skill level.95 
 
 
5.4 Alfa Romeo: a different model of industrial relations?  
The redundancies at FIAT did not remain an isolated case. The aggressive manpower 
policies put forward by the Turinese company provided a model for many other 
companies that were grappling with the effects of the economic crisis, in the auto 
sector and beyond.96  The submissiveness with which the unions accepted the CIG-S 
led other companies down the road of redundancy, triggering a domino effect that led 
to mass redundancies. The reverberation of events at FIAT reached well beyond the 
surrounding Turinese area, affecting other industrial sectors and regions.97  Between 
1980 and 1981, the total yearly hours subsidised by the CIG in the metalworking 
sector tripled from 82 to 231 million, affecting 328 million in 1984. The largest part 
of the increase was accounted for by the CIG-S, which quintupled from 41 to 224 
million in the same time span. In the textile and chemical sectors, the growth was 
more contained, but nevertheless quite substantial: from 30 to 58 million in the former 
and from 39 to 52 million in the latter, between 1980 and 1984.98 By the middle of the 
decade, large firms had seen their total employment decrease by 28%.99  
The productivity increase obtained at FIAT and the way in which the company 
had managed to deal a crippling blow to organised labour were emulated by many 
other employers. At the turn of 1981, Mario Schimberni, the president of Montedison, 
announced he would resort to 10,000 layoffs. This prompted the Minister of Public 
Industry, Gianni De Michelis to intervene, promising the development of a new 																																																								
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Informafiom 3-4 (1984), V-VI, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, FIOM di Torino, b. 549, f. 3.  
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national chemical sector plan to prevent massive redundancies that would have added 
to the already existing social emergency in Turin.100 Despite this, in the autumn of 
1982, the company declared the CIG-S for 3,300 employees, breaking the resistance 
of the FULC. In the steel sector, plagued since the end of the 1970s by a Europe-wide 
problem of industrial overcapacity, the FINSIDER, part of the IRI holding, resorted to 
the CIG-S in May 1981, when the sector’s crisis was officially recognised by the 
government. A year later, in October 1982, the company suspended 6,000 workers in 
the plant of Bagnoli, in Naples, causing uproar in the city.101 
Because of its close proximity and the widespread industrialisation of the area, 
Lombardy was the region most immediately affected in the aftermath of the events in 
Turin.102 In early October 1980, before the unions signed the agreement at FIAT, the 
FLM section of Milan denounced the way in which use of short time was ‘growing 
enormously’: In the first week of the month alone, there were 12,610 workers among 
64 companies affected by the CIG. The light engineering firm Borletti had 500 of 
workers in CIG-S already and the steel-maker Falck requested 3,200 workers to be 
suspended.103 
In this context, the unions were particularly taken aback when Alfa Romeo also 
declared a large-scale redundancy at the end of 1981. The size and the public 
ownership of the auto company led organised labour to believe that Alfa held a social 
responsibility to guarantee and promote industrial employment. Furthermore, despite 
the high rates of industrial conflict, the management of Alfa had always sought a 
more consensual industrial relations environment, particularly when compared to the 
more hawkish stance of FIAT and the metalworker employers’ federation.104  
Political clientelism and government pressures, however, influenced the 
business planning of the company and led it down the road of financial disarray.105  In 
November 1979, the dip in the international car market forced Alfa’s management to 																																																								
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consider a comprehensive restructuring of Arese, presenting the factory council with a 
blueprint for the ‘organisational innovation’ of the factory to tackle absenteeism and 
low productivity. The plan was to rearrange the assembly line around teamwork and 
collective, rather than individual, production targets.106 A definitive agreement for the 
introduction was reached only at the beginning of March 1981, allowing an increase 
in daily production at Arese and the introduction of internal mobility measures to 
cope with chronic absenteeism. Management saluted the agreement as a sign of the 
evolution of industrial relations at Alfa towards a more constructive environment, and 
even the factory council judged it positively, as ‘it tackled concretely the problem of 
productivity on the basis of the company’s commitment to develop its industrial 
policy’. 107 
The concrete implementation of the pact, however, proved difficult. Almost 
immediately, the company lamented - through its Vice Director general, Giuseppe 
Medusa - the incapacity of organised labour to rein in conflict: in the months 
following the agreement, rates of absenteeism actually rose and violence inside the 
factory continued unabated, culminating in the kidnapping of an Alfa executive by a 
terrorist group in June 1981. As of September, the increase in productivity registered 
in Arese was only 4.1%, versus the 14% envisaged by the agreement. This prompted 
management to take action. The request made to the factory council was to ‘obtain 
immediately’ a temporary but drastic reduction of employment. State authorities were 
ready to second the redundancy: at the end of the year, it was the very Minister of 
Public Participation in Industry who threatened that if existing commitments were not 
complied with some plants risked foreclosure.108 
Management’s plan was to use the CIG-O in Arese for a total of two months 
throughout the year, suspending the entire workforce for short periods. Additionally, 
2,290 workers would be suspended permanently for a full year via the CIG-S, starting 
in March 1982. In the words of Ettore Massaccesi, Managing Director of Alfa, this 
served to allow the company ‘to breath for a year’, while working with the unions to 
find ‘all possible solutions [...] to preserve employment and face the negative 																																																								
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conjuncture’.109 Alfa, however, announced the redundancy plan to the media even 
before summoning the FLM to the negotiating table. The selection process of the 
individual workers to be put on short time was carried out unilaterally, without 
consulting with the factory council. As at FIAT, it soon became clear that short time 
was aimed at certain specific categories of workers and served to exclude the most 
undesirable ones. In the wake of the end of negotiations, the FLM denounced the 
attempt to ‘overturn the spirit of the CIG and make it a political instrument to expel 
workers, as opposed to a tool linking restructuring with the productive relaunch of the 
company’. 110 
Many workers were branded as ‘chronic absentees’ and expelled from the 
factory. The way in which the CIG-S was used to discipline the shop floor was 
underlined by the high incidence of factory stewards among the workers on CIG. A 
flier distributed by the Arese factory council referred to short time as a way for 
‘management to carry a real political vengeance [...] and scale down the union'.111 
While the data on Arese is not available, in the nearby factory of Portello - organised 
in the same factory council - the representatives targeted were those affiliated with the 
FIM led by Piergiorgio Tiboni, which was the most conflictual section of the 
Milanese FLM, and those linked to radical groups such as Lotta Comunista and 
Democrazia Proletaria.112 
Indeed, in September 1982, the tribunal court of Milan accepted the appeal of a 
group of 134 suspended workers from Arese, who had sued Alfa for discriminatory 
practices, and forced their reinstatement. The management criticised the ruling for 
making ‘the governability of the factory much more difficult’.113 The success of the 
lawsuit made clear the existence of political discrimination, but it also highlighted the 
deep rifts that were infiltrating into the cohesiveness of worker organisation at Alfa. 
The suit was initiated without the consent of the factory council or the FLM. By 
targeting the criteria with which the company selected the personnel to be put on CIG-
S, the sentence also represented a blow to the negotiating capacity of the unions that 																																																								
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subscribed to and accepted that agreement.114 The most radical worker groups in Arese 
took this as an opportunity to criticise the FLM, lamenting the division established 
between the employees who remained in production and the cassaintegrati.115  
The FLM had tried to devise ways to keep the cassaintegrati tied to the factory, 
preventing the wearing out of political and social ties. Suspended workers were 
invited to show up inside the factory, ‘auto-regulating’ their presence, and to collect 
time cards independently distributed by the factory council. This served to maintain 
the pretense that they were still part of the industrial workforce, albeit temporarily 
destitute. CIG workers were allowed to enter the factory only when official 
assemblies were called, but were prevented from taking part in other activities such as 
strikes, walkouts or even simple unauthorised assemblies. Suspended shop stewards, 
while legally allowed to participate into the political life of Arese, were often 
hampered in their duties.  Still, at the end of 1984, this remained a thorny problem for 
the FLM: a letter addressed to Alfa Personnel Direction lamented the need for worker 
representatives in CIG ‘to attend all their daily duties [...] without detriment to their 
union activity’.116  
During the first half of 1982, some workers on CIG showed a willingness to 
resist their marginalisation. In March of that year, a group of eighty suspended 
workers stormed the direction offices in Arese, demanding their reinstatement, and 
prompting management to complain about the need to ‘discipline more tightly access 
to the factory’.117 The rates of absenteeism, which had led the company to take action 
in the first place, were still showing an upward trend well into summer of 1982. In 
time, however, actual strikes and disruptions to production became more sporadic, 
organised by radical minorities that acted without direct control of the official union.118   
By targeting the bases of worker shop floor organisation, the CIG severely 
curtailed the possibility for the factory council to oversee managerial manpower 
policies and resist further rounds of short time benefis. In October 1983, the company 
asked for a further expansion of CIG-S in light of the ongoing crisis of the car market, 																																																								
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with the complete suspension of 4,463 workers between the two factories of Arese 
and Portello.119 Still in 1985, the number of employees on full suspension at Arese was 
3,414.120  
The effects of prolonged redundancy on the organisational resilience and 
mobilisational capacity of the union movement did not take long to manifest. The 
number of hours lost to strikes per year fell from the peak of 1,071 in 1982 to 778 in 
1983, reaching an all time low of 152 in 1985. In the Alfa group as a whole, the 
number of hours lost to absenteeism came down from 6,423 in 1981 to just 1,936 in 
1985, with a consistent reduction particularly in the factory of Pomigliano d’Arco.121  
Alfa Romeo’s experience shows that FIAT’s new model of manpower policies 
did not remain an isolated case, but was replicated in other factories, including Alfa 
Romeo. The CIG-S served as a conduit for the expulsion of manpower, without 
engendering strife and bypassing the tight regulation on collective dismissals. The 
shifting power balance between organised labour and the employers made the highly 
discretionary rules governing the selection process of workers to be put on short time 
a powerful tool to discipline the factory shop floor. Management governed the CIG-S 
unilaterally, dislocating workplace union structures and marginalising the most 
politicized workers. The waning power of organised labour had its roots in the 
contradiction of its employment policy line of the late 1970s, which alienated the 
sympathies of labour market insiders while not doing enough for those without jobs. 
The extensive use of the CIG-S during the early 1980s provided a fatal blow. To face 
the crisis, the leadership of the CGIL-CISL-UIL - and to a lesser extent the FLM - 
decided to attempt to administer redundancies, going further down a path of 
corporatist institutionalisation that made them subaltern to the employers. Businesses, 
on the other hand, enjoyed a period of boom: according to the Bank of Italy, between 
1981 and 1985, labour productivity in large enterprises grew by 8% a year.122 
 
5.5 The cassaintegrati: social identity and self-organisation 
The redundancies of the 1980s struck at the heart of the model of industrial 																																																								
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democracy that dominated the shop floor during the 1970s. In the aftermath of the Hot 
Autumn, the structure of organised labour was reshaped to accommodate the bottom 
up demands of the rank and file, centering union representation on factory councils.  
These were designed to reflect the demands from various departments of a factory, 
linking industrial organisation with democratic worker representation. 123  The 
indiscriminate use of the CIG-S hindered their functioning. Redundancies altered the 
electoral majorities inside the various sections of the factory and - where factory 
stewards were targeted - deprived certain workers of their elected representatives.124 
The permanent nature of the suspensions made it difficult to locate redundant workers 
within the social continuum of the factory and establish their departmental affiliation. 
This made how to organise them collectively inside existing workplace structures 
unclear.  
The problem of the representation of CIG workers was particularly thorny for 
organised labour. The 1970s witnessed the emergence of new social figures, from 
precarious workers to women and youth. The social fragmentation of the labour 
market questioned the ideological centrality of the male blue-collar industrial worker, 
around which the unions had built their political identity.125 Up until the 1980s, 
workers on short time were not considered to be an autonomous social category. The 
temporary nature of the CIG did not alter the fact that momentarily suspended 
workers belonged to the core industrial working class. The prolonged CIG-S of the 
1980s, instead, established a clear separation between the employees who remained 
inside and those cast out of the factories. This forced organised labour and public 
opinion to reconsider the social identity of this growing mass of assisted 
unemployed.126 Redundant workers blurred the thin line between employment and 
joblessness. On the one hand, they formally remained on the company payrolls and 
were not accounted for in the statistics of the unemployed, receiving an income close 
to the average industrial salary. At the same time, however, CIG workers were forced 
into idleness, without the possibility of searching even for small jobs, pending the loss 																																																								
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of benefits.   
Before the 1980s, there was no word to define redundant workers per se, as the 
CIG was still perceived as a transitory state guaranteeing the continuation of industrial 
employment. At the turn of the decade, however, industrial relations jargon and the 
press started to use the word cassaintegrati to give a collective definition to this new 
group.127 As noted by Briante, ‘the originary mass of workers in CIG, which was 
stratified and not easily defined, became a new social category, characterised by its 
marginality’.128 
The condition of forced idleness had wider individual and political 
consequences for those involved. Since the pioneering study of Marie Jahoda and 
Paul Lazerfeld on the unemployed of Marienthal in the 1930s, sociology and 
anthropology have investigated in depth the deleterious psychological consequences 
and material deprivation caused by involuntary joblessness.129 As opposed to complete 
unemployment, however, the cassa integrazione did not compromise the economic 
livelihood of redundant workers. Rather, it severely damaged their public image and 
social standing. 130  Briante considers how the ‘archaic-rural cultural framework’, still 
dominant in many blue-collar rural migrants, made work a ‘central and totalising 
experience […] a source of social recognition’. The CIG forced suspended employees 
into a state of perceived loss and guilt, not least because of an active defamation 
campaign in the national press, which branded them as slackers.131 
As redundancies spread throughout the industrial system, journalists and public 
intellectuals rushed to discover a new social subject, producing panoply of inquiries 
and interviews.132 In the wake of FIAT’s decision in October 1980, for instance, Ezio 
Mauro of the Gazzetta del Popolo, interviewed a suspended worker from Mirafiori, 
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who described his situation as a ‘shame […] I feel like somebody who has lost out’.133 
According to Antonio Citrinniti, one of the suspended union stewards from FIAT, 
‘working in the factory was ugly, it was tiring […] but the factory was also a place of 
social aggregation’.134  
Among the mass of redundant workers, two categories seemed to suffer assisted 
joblessness the most: first, the highly politicised workers, ‘for whom the factory 
represented a strong political and organisational reference’, as ‘they live this move 
towards isolation in a traumatic manner’; 135  secondly, the women, because the 
gendered approach of employers to the redundancy process struck at their recently 
acquired job market emancipation.136  
The social malaise of the cassaintegrati reached worrying proportions. Between 
1981 and 1983, more than 153 workers on CIG committed suicide.137  This constituted 
a public health problem, prompting local authorities to take action, if anything to try 
and map the lives of these new disenfranchised. In the autumn of 1981, the labour 
market monitoring unit of the Piedmont region published a first enquiry into the 
human condition of workers on short time, with the stated aim of dispelling many 
‘unfounded opinions’ about the cassaintegrati, but admitting that the identity of this 
new social subject was almost completely unknown.138 
In this context, the relationship between the cassaintegrati and the unions was 
not easy. Both organised labour and the traditional parties of the Left, in particular the 
PCI, undervalued the personal frustruation of redundant workers, as well as their 
political and social marginalisation. The lack of suitable channels of representation 
within the existing institutions of the labour movement led suspended workers at both 
FIAT and Alfa to set up their own committees. These were formally constituted 
within the metalworkers federation, but immediately established a very dialectical 
relationship with it, characterised at times by harsh internal struggles and criticism.139 
At FIAT, the need to set up a coordinating structure for the workers on CIG-S 																																																								
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emerged early on. In November 1980, some of the suspended union stewards 
intervened at a meeting of the National FIAT Committee of the FLM, claiming that 
suspended workers should have had a ‘positive role in political initiatives regarding 
labour market interventions […] in order to frame the debate on the reduction of 
working hours with worker control inside the factories’.140 Initially, the FLM did not 
support the autonomous organisation of the cassaintegrati, believing that the 
relationship with redundant workers should be managed within the existing structure 
of the factory council, without creating additional internal rifts in an already divided 
workforce.141 The first embryo of the FIAT Committee for CIG workers developed 
spontaneously: on the one hand, around the shop stewards of the FIOM affiliated with 
the PDUP, the Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo - at this stage the only 
party of the radical left that recognised the need for redundant workers to have ‘their 
own organization […] to exploit their potential for energy and mobilisation’,142 and on 
the other hand, thanks to FIM stewards, for whom ‘it was necessary […] to represent 
the specificity and subjectivity’ of the cassaintegrati.143   
The main committee of redundant workers was officially set up in Mirafiori in 
1981, inside the offices of the local FLM, bringing together 140 suspended stewards. 
This acted to coordinate the rest of the groups of redundant workers in other FIAT 
plants, at Rivalta, Verrone, Carmagnola and Chivasso. In broad terms, ‘the main 
objective of the committee was to favour the relationship between factory councils, 
the unions and the cassaintegrati’, liaising between the suspended workers and 
organised labour. 144  In practical terms, the committee reached out and provided 
information to all workers on CIG, organising press campaigns through its own 
journal, La Spina nel Fianco, literally ‘the thorn in the side’, which highlighted the 
role of the committee as an overseer of negotiations between the company and the 
unions, which risked sidelining them.145 Furthermore, it provided legal assistance. 																																																								
140  FLM, delegati in CIG Mirafiori, Intervento fatto a nome dei delegati di Mirafiori a Cassa 
Integrazione al direttivo del coordinamento nazionale FIAT, Torino, 25/11/1980, IPAG, Archivio 
CGIL, Lavoratori FIAT in CIG, b. 1, f. 3. 
141 Coordinamento Cassintegrati, l’altra faccia della FIAT, p. 30. 
142 Epifanio Guarcello, quoted in Cereja, ‘La Storia della Cassa Integrazione’, p.81; PdUP, Partito di 
Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo, Segreteria Regionale al Coordinamento Lavoratori CIG FIAT, 
FLM 5° lega Mirafiori, Torino, 25/05/1981, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, Lavoratori FIAT in CIG, b. 2, f. 2. 
143 Alberto Capatti, quoted in Cereja, ‘La Storia della Cassa Integrazione’, p.87. 
144 Coordinamento CIG, Documento dei Coordinamenti dei lavoratori in cassa integrazione alla Fiat di 
Torino, coordinamento nazionale Fiat, Torino, 19-29/03/1981, IPAG, Archivio CGIL, Lavoratori FIAT 
in CIG, b. 2, f. 1.  
145 Piero Baral, Niente di nuovo sotto il Sole. I 61 licenziati FIAT preparano l’autunno ’80 e le fortune 
	230	
Initially, the committee held bi-weekly meetings with all suspended shop stewards. In 
time, its organisational structure was better defined. In the beginning of 1982, 
elections were held among CIG workers, appointing 170 new delegates, while the 
setup of the committee was re-articulated, creating a plenary assembly of all the 
delegates and a smaller executive body.146 
At Mirafiori, initially the committee did not have the formal approval of the 
FLM, but could count on its benign neglect and some of its resources – first and 
foremost the cyclostyle with which to print its journal. 147 In some instances, however, 
the cassaintegrati organised without support from the unions or even in direct 
opposition to them. Some autonomous groups, often linked to radical workerist 
factions, developed in explicit opposition to the official CIG committees. In 1981, at 
FIAT Rivalta, a section of suspended workers set up a Comitato di Lotta Operai 
FIAT, ‘because the unions had practically abandoned the defence of worker interests, 
[…] proposing only vertenze bidone [“scam disputes”]’. The Comitato was opposed 
in principle to any form of mobility and layoffs, asking for the full reinstatement of all 
the workers in CIG-S.148 
At Alfa Romeo, a committee of CIG workers was set up at beginning of 1982, 
with suspended stewards from every department of the factories of Arese and Portello 
present. 149  The activities of the Alfa committee were similar to those at FIAT. 
Compared to FIAT, however, redundant workers at Alfa encountered more obstacles 
to their self-organisation and faced a deeply fractured labour movement. The 
committee did not have the same reach among the cassaintegrati and sustained strong 
contestation from other groups, which ‘tried to exploit the discontent, frustrations and 
fears among suspended workers to pit them against the factory council’.150 
At both FIAT and Alfa, the committees had to deal not only with internal 
fragmentation, but also with the tense relationship between suspended workers and 																																																																																																																																																														
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those still in production. When it was time to vote for new agreements, the two groups 
were often on opposite sides, leading to sharp tensions between workers that 
demanded wage increases and cassintegrati that pushed for their reinstatement. In 
1982, the CIG committee at FIAT organised a public march for employment in the 
city of Turin, with the participation of 50,000 workers, cassaintegrati and 
unemployed.151 For the committee, the march was an opportunity to showcase the unity 
of the labour movement, but also put pressure ‘on the union and the left, for which too 
often the right to employment is reduced to a mere slogan’.152 The relationship between 
CIG committees and factory councils remained strained well into the mid-1980s, with 
the stewards of the factory council concentrating mainly on factory problems and 
those of the CIG committee focusing on employment and restructuring, amidst 
reciprocal accusations. Employed workers accused those who were suspended of 
radicalism, while the latter criticised organised labour for its lack of support.  
 The relationship with the confederal union CGIL-CISL-UIL was particularly 
absent, and mostly restricted to the organisation of national level demonstrations and 
consultations on labour market laws.153 Fausto Bertinotti, leader of the Piedmont 
regional CGIL-CISL-UIL, was conscious of the rift opening up between the 
cassaintegrati and the official labour movement. While it is true that the union did not 
oppose the self-organisation of the cassaintegrati – Bertinotti admitted while speaking 
to La Spina nel Fianco - neither it was an active force behind the committees. The 
CGIL ‘did not understand that the bosses’ use of the CIG and the conditions of the 
cassaintegrati have deeply transformed. […] Organised labour still works by 
compartments, but the key objective is the reunification of the world of labour’.154 
Despite the self-criticism, the CGIL remained impervious to the active 
participation of CIG workers into the political life of the union. Towards the end of 
1981, the communist leaders invited only one worker from the CIG to the National 
Conference of the CGIL, propting one of the leaders of the CIG committee at FIAT to 
ask polemically ‘whether it is possible to unify the entire world of labour if the new 
subjects are all but excluded’.155 																																																								
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 Redundant stewards of the Catholic wing of the labour movement voiced 
similar concerns. Intervening at the organisational conference of the FIM-CISL, in 
early 1984, FIAT suspended stewards underlined their disapproval for the unequal 
treatment of the cassaintegrati and the position of the union towards the unemployed:  
 
‘often in Turin the unemployed attack workers in CIG, and these attack those in 
production, in constant pursuit of greater guarantees of income and jobs. […] The 
union has important responsibilities, with its wrong choices, aimed only at defending 
those who are employed, offloading the contradictions on the weakest sectors of the 
labour movement’156 
 
By 1983, the tensions between the unions and the CIG committees reached a 
breaking point in connection with the expiry of the FIAT agreement that should have 
led to the reinstatement of suspended workers.157 At the beginning of the year, FIAT 
announced for a second time it would not uphold the agreement, because it was in no 
condition to rehire the redundant workforce. Thus, in October, the FLM signed a new 
document, which again postponed the reentry to 1985. According to Arduino Baietto, 
the head of the regional FIOM industrial relations department, the re-negotiation was 
a painful but necessary choice. The decline in the unions’ organisational strength 
risked leading the company to marginalise organised labour altogether – ‘because we 
were weak and represented only a part of the workers’.158  
Such perspective was echoed also by Vladimiro Giatti, FIOM’s head of 
negotiations with FIAT, who explained how the unions ‘made a sort of political 
exchange’, allowing lower guarantees for CIG workers only so that they could be 
recognised as a negotiating counterpart. This caused an almost insanable rift with the 
CIG committee, which delegitimised the union by violently storming in during 
negotiations with the company. Giatti remembers how the union delegations had to be 
protected from the workers by the police. Eventually, the agreement was put to a vote 
and accepted with the crucial support of the workers who were still in production, 
while those on short time boycotted or voted en masse against it.159  
To compensate for the lack of space within official organised labour, the 																																																								
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committees of the cassaintegrati tried to bolster their position by coordinating among 
one another, going beyond their presence in single factories to create broader 
‘regional committees’.160 The committee at FIAT tried to create linkages with other 
redundant workers groups in the province of Turin, but also get in touch with the CIG 
committee at Alfa Romeo Arese, to elaborate common strategies for the automobile 
sector. In 1983, the CIG committee of FIAT organised a national assembly, with 
workers from Alfa Romeo, Latium and a substantial representation from the FLM to 
launch the project of a national organisation to represent CIG workers. Ultimately, 
however, the project never saw the light of the day.161 
 
 
5.6 A weak wind for reform: the state and social policies 
The wave of redundancy of the 1980s opened delicate policy reform problems for the 
state, requiring an update of the existing legislation and the introduction of new 
welfare instruments. The issue was represented not only by social turmoil per se or by 
the growing mass of the jobless. Many of the plant-level agreements signed between 
employers and unions to regulate redundancy freely expanded on existing welfare 
mechanisms, forcing the institutional adaptation of the state and the introduction of 
new laws to make industrial relation clauses viable. Interviewed in the pages of La 
Stampa in the wake of the event of October 1980, the Minister of Labour, Franco 
Foschi ensured the government would lead a comprehensive overhauling of the Italian 
welfare edifice to accommodate industrial redundancies.162 
As argued by Valeria Fargion, in Italy ‘the 1980s were at best characterised by a 
makeshift approach to welfare state restructuring. […] The social protection system 
continued to respond primarily to the industrial labour force’s core sectors, while the 
vast majority of the unemployed remained unprotected’.163 This was particularly the 
case starting in 1981, when the rise of a five-party government formula (pentapartito) 
allowed increasing political authority to the PSI of Bettino Craxi. ‘The neoliberal 
wind that was blowing in Thatcher’s Britain, started also in Italy, and certainly 																																																								
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influenced the political debate’. However, attempts at introducing spending rigour 
‘were soldered with Italian policymakers’ traditional difficulties in using equitable 
criteria for the distribution of costs and benefits’.164 This resulted in a spree of public 
expenditure that served to bolster consensus and tackle immediate labour market 
problems, but was also characterised by a short term perspective that ended up 
aggravating the long term social costs of industrial restructuring and budgetary deficit.  
In April 1981, the Spadolini government had introduced an early pension 
scheme to cope with the immediate situation of elderly redundant workers. Law n. 
155 allowed workers who had reached the age of fifty-five (fifty for women) to retire 
early.165 This was in no way different from what had been implemented during the 
same period in France, Germany or Spain. However, whereas in those countries early 
retirement was used as a temporary instrument to cope with a momentaneous adverse 
shock in the labour market, in Italy it became a structural feature of passive labour 
market policy. Initially, its provision was limited to 1981 and was later renewed on a 
year-by-year basis, until 1987.166 Early retirement served to discharge the cost of 
layoffs on the coffers of the state, but it also led to many abuses: many older workers 
were forced to accept early retirement so as to avoid firings, despite being ready to 
continue working in the informal economy. Between 1981 and 1987, public spending 
on early retirement schemes grew from 132 billion to 2,840 billion lire. 
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Fig. 5.2 expenditures and contributions, CIG and early retirement (1981-1987)167 
 
 
 The lion’s share of public income maintenance for the unemployed was 
absorbed by the CIG. Total expenditure for short time support rose from 865 billion in 
1981 to 3,367 billion in 1987, having reached a peak of 3,894 billion in 1984. Among 
western European countries, Italy used short time benefits the most, with almost 
200,000 full-time equivalent workers on the scheme between 1980 and 1990. In 
Spain, the second highest user of short time work schemes, the scheme affected only 
100,000 full-time equivalents.168 
Despite the scale of industrial redundancies across the country, short time 
schemes did not undergo any transformation or attempt at reform, with the 
institutional set up of passive labour market policy designed in the 1970s largely 
untouched.  However, as the number of cassaintegrati increased, with a domino effect 
of redundancies following the downsizing of big companies, the massive expulsion of 
the industrial labour force brought the system under strain. At the end of 1983, the 
FLM wrote to the new Minister of Labour, Gianni de Michelis, to lament substantial 
slowdowns in the disbursement of CIG allowances. The problem was represented by 
the actual administration capacity of the INPS, which did not possess the resources to 
keep up with the growing number of redundant workers. Since the autumn of 1980, 																																																								
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the average length for the completion of the paperwork for the payment of the CIG 
had doubled from ten-to-fifteen to twenty-to-thirty days; for small and medium-sized 
companies, waiting time could reach up to eight or nine months.169 
The administrative problem added to increasing concerns regarding the 
excessive labour market rigidity caused by the overuse of the CIG-S. The 
continuation of workers’ employment relations with the firm was a precondition to 
access short time work benefits, but also made the labour market excessively rigid, 
freezing a large part of the redundant workforce. Employees feared seeking new 
employment for the risk of losing the guaranteed allowance of the CIG-S. The 
experimentation with inter-company mobility allowances to favour worker relocation 
and re-employment did not bear the expected fruit. The Confindustria wanted to 
introduce tighter rules for workers on the CIG-S so as to sever their relations with 
companies after a certain amount of time and avoid their forced rehirings, offloading 
them permanently.170 This position, in turn, was resisted by organised labour, which 
tried to lobby the Ministry of Labour to disallow the use of CIG-S when the 
possibilities of re-employment were uncertain. Organised labour’s proposal, instead, 
was to lower the retirement age even more and to strengthen standard unemployment 
insurance.  
A key demand of the unions was to further decentralise management of the 
extraordinary short time scheme, entrusting regional labour offices with greater 
authority, particularly over companies that wanted to renew an already approved 
application. This would have allowed a speeding up the bureaucratic procedures while 
lessening the degree of political intermediation behind the management of the CIG-S 
at the central level. Since the very beginning of the 1980s, the unions had identified in 
regional governments their ‘main political interlocutor’.171 This was particularly the 
case in Piedmont and Lombardy, where local authorities had already experienced the 
management of redundancy during the second half of the 1970s.172 
The most radical proposal of the CGIL-CISL-UIL was the creation of the 																																																								
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agenzie del Lavoro, regional labour agencies, to substitute and integrate the normal 
job placement system.173 The new agencies would centralise the different activities 
performed by local labour offices and provincial governments, including the gathering 
and analysis of data on local labour markets, searching for placement opportunities 
and promoting investments to create new employment, managing professional courses 
directly to adjust their content with actual job offerings and create a system of 
permanent consultation with social partners. The debate on the labour agencies was 
not new and had been going on among policymakers and union leaders since the mid-
1970s.174 However, it is only at the turn of the decade that the proposals for the agenzia 
took a more concrete shape: the first agencies were tested in Campania and Basilicata 
in 1981, to face the employment problems that followed an earthquake that affected 
these two areas.175 
Faced by opposing perspectives put forward by organised interest groups, the 
government had to compromise, on the one hand with the need to rein in excessive 
public spending and liberalise labour market regulation; and on the other with the 
need to keep providing income support to the redundant employees of large factories.  
During the first half of the 1980s, the framework of discussion among state officials 
and policymakers was represented by law scheme n. 760, firstly proposed by the 
Minister of Labour, Vincenzo Scotti in 1979.176 The project, reconfirmed by Gianni De 
Michelis, foresaw the introduction of the labour agencies, but also a comprehensive 
liberalisation of the job placement system that the unions denounced as a ‘counter-
reform’.177  
Organised labour was wary of the attempt to increase the possibility of 
employers resorting to nominal callings at the job placement office, sidestepping 
union control over the lists of the unemployed to be hired and increasing the risk of 
political discrimination. Furthermore, the law project sought to reduce the maximum 																																																								
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length of both the CIG-O and the CIG-S to 36 months within every 5 year period, 
progressively lowering the wage replacement allowance afforded by short time, to 
discourage its prolonged use. The CGIL-CISL-UIL, however, was critical of such 
restrictions. The labour federation noted:  
 
‘it is not possible to establish a priori and in a compulsory manner the time needed to 
carry out restructuring. If such a law were to be passed, there is a high chance that 
many ongoing industrial transformation processes might be halted […] bringing back 
the CIG to a purely welfarist logic’.178  
 
The debate on the reform of short time work went well beyond government 
circles and organised interest groups. Soon, it also involved research institutions and 
academics, who all voiced in favour of a more universalistic form of unemployment 
support to bridge the divide between labour market insiders and outsiders. The most 
radical proposals came during the early stages of the discussion: In December 1983, 
the ISFOL, the Public Institute for Labour Market Studies, published a report on the 
state of Italian welfare, highlighting the need to introduce a guaranteed minimum 
income, to be offered for a limited period of time to all the officially unemployed and 
unoccupied. The report noted how the Italian social security system was ‘irrational 
and did not cover explicitly all the citizens […] in a distorted way. […] There is an 
unacceptable disparity of treatment between the unemployed and unoccupied youths, 
as well as between the same people who lost a job.’ Unifying the whole system of 
income maintenance for those without work would allow the ‘elimination of 
discretionality and clientelism, identifying welfare recipients more clearly while 
increasing the flexibility of labour supply’.179 
The proposal to introduce a minimum income system with retraining and job 
search conditionalities was broadly in line with the debate on active labour market 
policies that was developing in Europe during the early 1980s. Northern continental 
and Scandinavian countries already had a long tradition of high spending in active 
labour market policies. Even social democratic governments in many other countries 
started to consider the strengthening of employment activation as a way to bridge the 
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growing inequality between labour market insiders and outsiders.180 In Italy, however, 
the debate on active labour market policies remained marginal until the early 1990s 
and was not matched by state investments in social activation programs. In 1987, Italy 
devoted the least resources to active labour market policies among all members of the 
European Community, only 0.56% of its GDP.181 
Following Tarantelli - who in 1983 suggested in an article in la Repubblica the 
introduction of a ‘real unemployment insurance’ – the Italian debate concentrated on 
the need to reform Italian passive labour market policies by strengthening assistance 
to the unemployed.182  In 1985, Amato and Benassi were among the firsts to suggest 
the abolishment of the CIG-S, to be substituted with an unemployment insurance 
scheme with a replacement allowance of 60% of previous wages, to last for a 
maximum of 18 months. In parallel, they suggested the introduction of a monthly 
allowance for first time job seekers. Only the CIG-O would remain. To encourage 
redundant workers to find new employment, when the new wage was lower than the 
money afforded by short time benefits, the CIG would continue to pay a bonus to 
those workers.183 
In 1986, Dal Co echoed this perspective, suggesting the abolition of the CIG-S 
and its absorption into the severely underpowered unemployment insurance. 
According to Dal Co, increasing the coverage and replacement rate of unemployment 
insurance would achieve a double objective: not only would it strengthen the 
guarantees of a social safety net outside of the workplace, but more importantly, 
eliminating the CIG-S would lower the degree of collusion between employers and 
organised labour, depriving them of the possibility of co-managing short time, ‘it 
would increase the social costs of industrial restructuring […] but it would also force 
employers and trade unions to find active and solidaristic solution to the problem of 
redundancy’.184 
During the same period, D’Harmant and Brunetta proposed a lighter reform: 																																																								
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according to them, the CIG should not be looked at ‘as a self-contained entity in the 
labour market: by virtue of its fundamental premises, it must concern itself with all 
policies of active intervention in the field of employment.’ As such, D’Harmant and 
Brunetta proposed the introduction of another CIG fund, the Labour Mobility CIG, to 
intervene in the event of a structural surpluses of workers. This was in line with the 
new dispositions on inter-company mobility introduced during the late 1970s and 
would have allowed bringing the CIG-S back to its normal use, limited to business 
cases involving restructuring and re-employment of the workforce.185  
Despite the many voices claiming a reform of the short time work system, the 
measures implemented at the government level remained half-hearted, at least until 
the very end of the decade. While numerous law projects concerning labour market 
liberalisation continued to be discussed in parliament, pentapartito governments did 
not seem willing to rein in expenditure on short time, strengthening instead the 
welfarist character of the CIG-S. Marginal cuts on welfare spending were 
implemented mostly in health and old age benefits, whereas spending on short time 
work continued unabated.186  Welfare retrenchment was hindered not only by the 
existence of vested interests by employers and organised labour, but also by the 
consensus ‘constraints of coalitions built on a wide range of parties’.187 
Towards the end of 1984, a reserved document from the Ministry of Labour 
showed that there was even a proposal for the introduction of a ‘Super CIG-S’ to act 
as an income bridge for workers who were close to the minimum age requirements of 
the early retirement schemes introduced by law n. 155. In the Ministry’s proposal, the 
measure would represent a one-off opportunity for companies to offload their older 
employees and restructure their plants. Workers between 50 and 55 years who had 
their job contract rescinded would receive treatment similar to that of the CIG-S, until 
they were eligible for retirement. The provisions would not be extended to the whole 
national territory, but applied on a selective basis, only for companies in those 
provinces where the relationship between CIG-S workers and total employment was 
above 1%, or those in which the total unemployment rate was at least 8%. Organised 
labour noted how ‘this limitation would inevitably give rise to discrimination between 
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provinces, with assured disturbances to public order’.188  
Even public administration was repeatedly used as a reservoir of employment to 
absorb redundant workers. In August 1985, law n. 444 announced new hires by the 
public administrations of Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria and Sardinia to replace retired 
employees, reserving at least 5,000 jobs for the cassaintegrati of those areas.189  
Instead, the reform of unemployment insurance advocated by many, arrived 
only in May 1988, when the expulsion of industrial manpower from Italian factories 
had substantially been completed. Presenting in front of Parliament during the 
approval of the law, the Christian Democrat MP Luciano Azzolini explicitly 
recognised not only the piecemeal nature of the reform, but also the fact that it 
intervened after ‘the restructuring of the economic system had ended’.190 Law n. 160 
led to an important overhaul of the mechanism governing unemployment insurance, 
setting its allowance as a fixed replacement rate of the average national salary, instead 
of as a nominal sum.  Since then, Italian unemployment insurance has begun a slow 
process of catching up with that of other core European countries, with parity only 
achived in recent years. This, however, was a largely unintended consequence of the 
reform of the late 1980s: law n. 160 set the replacement allowance of unemployment 
insurance at only 7.5% of the average wage, less than a tenth than that afforded by 
short time.191 
 
During the 1980s, the Italian short time work system completed its transformation 
into an all-out device for unemployment welfare, subsidising the massive expulsion of 
industrial manpower from large factories. This was largely the result of institutional 
inaction. As redundancies increased following the events of October 1980 at FIAT, 																																																								
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191 Legge 20 Maggio 1988, n. 160, Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 21 marzo 
1988, n. 86, recante norme in materia previdenziale, di occupazione giovanile e di mercato del lavoro, 
nonche' per il potenziamento del sistema informatico del Ministero del lavoro e della previdenza 
sociale, Gazzetta Ufficiale, Serie Generale n. 118, 21/05/1988. 
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the rules governing the CIG were left untouched. The highly discretionary decision-
making framework developed during the late 1970s allowed the CIG-S to intervene to 
mask layoffs, stretching its income maintenance almost indefinitely. This served to 
stem the immediate effects of social crises and boost the political strength of an ample 
governing coalition in need of consensus. The many voices for a comprehensive 
transformation of the Italian system of unemployment assistance were silenced. When 
the reform of the insurance mechanism finally arrived, it did so with meagre resources 
and too late to aid the process of industrial restructuring.  
In no small part, it was the very strategy of organised labour that caused the 
CIG to become the preferred form of labour market intervention during the 1980s. 
The weakness of the unions had already been exposed during the second half of the 
1970s, as the first business crises forced organised labour with a choice between the 
protection of core workers and the creation of new employment. This led to growing 
distrust between the unions’ leaderships and the rank and file, who were exploited by 
the employers to push through a more unilateral use of short time during the early 
1980s. Facing the magnitude of industrial redundancies and with a shaky support base 
inside the factories, the unions sought to strengthen their position by acting as reliable 
negotiating partners, de facto accepting the indefinite use of short time as a surrogate 
of unemployment welfare. 
This, however, proved extremely detrimental for the unions, leading to a sharp 
drop in their mobilisation capacity during the 1980s. Employers’ free rein in the 
control of manpower policies transformed the CIG into a powerful tool to discipline 
the workforce, scaling back organised labour’s control over the industrial shop floor. 
Political discriminations in the selection criteria for workers to be suspended - 
coupled with the sheer size of industrial redundancies - disrupted the venues for plant-
level worker representation and wrecked union mobilisation capacity. The growing 
mass of cassaintegrati, instead, was marginalised and progressively ostracised by 
union political life.  
The epilogue of FIAT’s redundant workforce its highly emblematic. In 1987, 
after seven years during which many were fired or decided to resign, the company 
finally readmitted the last few employees on the CIG-S. The most politicised workers, 
however, were not allowed back on the shop floor. They were sent to the outskirts of 
Turin, in run-down detached warehouses in Robassomero and Orbassano, and 
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assigned to menial tasks. Many denounced such practices as a re-establishment of the 
dreaded reparti confino, the ‘prison department’ used in the 1950s to punish riotous 
employees.192 In thirty years, Italian labour history had come full circle.  
																																																								
192 Coordinamento Cassintegrati, l’altra faccia della FIAT, p. 63. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Starting in the early 1990s, the Italian system of protection against 
unemployment started a slow process of convergence with the continental welfare 
state model. The signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and the creation of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union forced the country into a path of macro-
economic adjustment. In order to redress the fiscal profligacy of the previous years 
and increase the targeting and mean testing of social policy, a series of institutional 
reforms were instituted to redesign the fabric of the welfare state.1 
 The end of the Cold War, with the sudden collapse of the traditional parties and 
judiciary scandals that made a clean slate of the political elite of the First Republic, 
brought about momentous changes in the Italian political system, demolishing many 
patronage networks within the welfare administration. By 2010, the net replacement 
rate of Italian unemployment insurance was around 60% of the average national 
wage, broadly on par with that of other core European countries.2 The coverage of 
unemployment benefits still remained one of the lowest in Europe, but the country 
made substantial progress towards the strengthening of insurance-based welfare 
instruments.3 
Short time work benefits, however, continued to represent a key pillar of 
unemployment social policy in Italy. In 2008, the government of Silvio Berlusconi 
introduced the cassa integrazione in deroga, literally a CIG in ‘derogation’ of existing 
regulations. It applied to all companies that could not get access to either the CIG-O 
or the CIG-S and it was managed directly by regional authorities, on a discretional 																																																								
1 Maurizio Ferrera and Elisabetta Gualmini, Rescued by Europe? Social and Labour Market Reforms in 
Italy from Maastricht to Berlusconi (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), p. 9. 
2 Olaf Van Vliet and Koen Caminada, ‘Unemployment replacement rates dataset among 34 welfare 
states 1971-2009: An update, extension and modification of the Scruggs’ Welfare State Entitlements 
Data Set’, NEUJOBS Special Report 2 (2012), 1-70, at p. 21. 
 (2012), 1-70, at p. 21. 
3  Manos Matsaganis, Erhan Ozdemir and Terry Ward, ‘The Coverage Rate of Social Benefits’, 
European Commission Research note 9 (2013), 4-39, at p. 22. 
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basis.4 The year after, short time work schemes underwent a sudden expansion to 
absorb the social aftershock of the international economic crisis and cushion 
employment losses.  By October 2010, CIG suspensions affected 600,000 full-time 
equivalent workers, the highest number since the first introduction of the scheme in 
1941.5  
The massive use of the CIG in recent times underscores a strong degree of 
institutional continuity with the framework that regulated redundancies during the 
1970s and 1980s, highlighting the importance of short time work schemes in the post-
war history of Italian unemployment social policy. This thesis tracked the 
development of the CIG and showed how a device that was originally meant for 
industrial policy was progressively transformed to compensate for the weakness of 
standard unemployment insurance. The centrifugal pressures exerted on the state by 
organised interest groups were key in the evolution of short time work schemes. 
Employers and unions drove the expansion of the CIG to cope with their respective 
needs for manpower flexibility and job security. In the 1970s, as a wholesale reform 
of unemployment insurance was progressively pushed to the sidelines, this resulted in 
a welfare system that was narrowly targeted on labour market insiders. The core 
working class of large industrial companies was afforded redundancy benefits at the 
expense of other, more marginal, categories of workers.  
Macro-sociological theories of welfare state development are ill suited to 
capture the dynamic at play in the evolution of Italian unemployment social policy. 
Power resource approaches, linking welfare development to the strength of working 
class constituencies, go a long way in explaining the initial weakness of 
unemployment insurance during the early decades of the post-war period. However, 
they cannot offer an explanation for the anomalous growth of the CIG. Employer-
centred approaches, on the contrary, understand social policy as an instrument to 
solve labour market coordination problems and can account for the original labour-
hoarding function of short time work, but do not provide an analytical framework for 
its peculiar evolution in post-war Italy.  																																																								
4  Elisabetta Gualmini and Roberto Rizza, ‘Attivazione, Occupabilità e Nuovi Orientamenti nelle 
Politiche del Lavoro: Il Caso Italiano e Tedesco a Confronto’, Stato e Mercato 92 (2011), 195-221, at 
p. 203. 
5 Stefano Sacchi, Federico Pancaldi and Claudia Arisi, ‘Social Protection in Hard Times: Convergence 
or Enduring Divergence? A Comparative Analysis of Short-Time Work in Austria, Germany and Italy’, 
Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche, Rivista quadrimestrale 1 (2011), 59-92, at p. 15. 
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This thesis shifts the focus of the debate, moving out of the domain of high 
politics to demonstrate the role played by unemployment social policy in local 
industrial crises and in factory social relations of production. This allowed it to show 
how employers and organised labour used the CIG in practice, exploiting its very 
discretionary rules to tackle industrial organisation problems and guarantee job 
security and avert social conflict. The development of the CIG did not follow a clear 
administrative blueprint, nor did it reflect the coherent social policy outlook of the 
country’s political elite. Rather, short time was expanded incrementally, to tackle 
immediate labour market crises. This resulted into a flexible but highly stratified 
system of social policy. Institutional experimentation at the workplace level drove 
political reforms, with the evolution of industrial relations driving the policymaking 
of short time work.  
In this context, the pattern of industrial conflict in post-war Italy is of key 
importance in explaining the peculiar nature of its unemployment welfare system. In 
the early post-war years, industrial relations were characterised by the organisational 
weakness of the labour movement. Organised labour was internally divided and 
marginalised from policy-making. The state, on the other hand, did not have the fiscal 
capacity or the political will to support unemployment insurance with ample 
coverage, due to structurally high unemployment rates. The CIG emerged as a leaner 
form of income maintenance for redundant workers, allowing the targeted 
intervention of social policy at a local level, where union constituencies were 
stronger. Throughout the years of the economic miracle and its aftermath, short time 
got entrenched in the Italian welfare edifice, ensuing a path dependent effect.  
In the early 1970s, as the bargaining power of organised labour increased, its 
social policy demands concentrated on the strengthening of the CIG, rather than on 
unemployment insurance. The Italian labour market was near full employment and the 
workforce was decidedly more concentrated in the industrial sector, leading the 
unions to favour a system of protection focusing on already employed workers, 
linking welfare rights to industrial citizenship.6 The demands that emerged from the 
Hot Autumn of 1969 played no small part in the process. The growth of workplace 
democracy amplified bottom-up pressures for job security, while the rise of radical 
worker groups, championing the ideological centrality of industrial wage earning, 																																																								
6 Maurice Roche, ‘Citizenship, Social Theory, and Social Change’, Theory and Society 16 (1987), 363-
399, at pp. 386-389. 
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increased the dynamic of intra-left competition on the shop floor, further pushing the 
unions towards the protection of labour market insiders. 
The expansion of the CIG at the crossroad of the 1970s was not only the direct 
result of bottom-up worker mobilisation. Employers made use of short time to stem 
labour strife and control the effects of strikes on work organisation. The concentrated 
nature of industrialisation in Italy and the relative delay with which Fordist 
manufacturing practices were introduced in the country help to explain the sudden 
burst of social conflict, but also offer important insights as to why employers 
exploited the CIG as a disciplinary tool to govern the factory shop floor. The 
economic slowdown of the late 1960s and the parallel increase in worker conflict 
undermined the main tenets of mass production organisation, at a time in which many 
companies - particularly in the automobile sector – had just implemented it or were 
still in the process of doing so. Management was in need of an instrument to cushion 
the economic and social crisis of Fordist regulation. Short time served to absorb the 
impact of labour strife on work organisation, targeting strikers, in the case of the CIG-
O, and enforcing the demobilisation of the unions to favour industrial restructuring, 
through the CIG-S. 
The economic slowdown that followed the oil shock of 1973 acted as a 
powerful catalyst for the dual pressure for the expansion of short time. The energy 
crisis bit into corporate finances, increasing the need for cost saving business 
strategies and the risk of industrial foreclosures. This engendered widespread protest 
by the unions and led to the renegotiation of the governance framework for industrial 
redundancies. The 1975 guaranteed wage agreement entrenched the CIG in the Italian 
welfare state, accommodating employers’ needs for manpower flexibility while 
sanctioning the principle of seemingly absolute job security for labour market 
insiders. The unions hoped to exploit the new consultation mechanism over short time 
to achieve greater control over company employment levels and use it to obtain new 
investments to foster job creation. The return of unemployment threatened the basis of 
organised labour, forcing union leadership to devise new ways to maintain the needs 
of the employed and the unemployed. 
During the second half of the 1970s, the management of redundancy was 
regulated by a corporatist arrangement based on an exchange between manpower 
flexibility and long-term guarantees for the defence and creation of new employment, 
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with the CIG at the centre of the system of unemployment protection. The pattern of 
negotiations, however, was characterised by a structural flaw: the incapacity of the 
state to act as the institutional overseer of the political bargaining between capital and 
labour. At both the local and central level, the consultation of organised interest 
groups was poorly formalised and public authorities lacked an enforcement 
mechanism to commit employers and the unions to upholding their sides of the 
bargain. Even public industrial policies failed to foster industrial development. 
This proved to be a poisonous chalice for organised labour, as the unions were 
forced to compromise on manpower flexibility and wage moderation, while 
employment creation failed to materialise. The imperfect corporatist governance of 
short time drove a wedge, on the one hand, between union leaders and their 
constituencies, and on the other, between organised labour and the weakest categories 
of the labour market. At the workplace level, the unions were dragged into a 
codetermination of work-time reductions and suspensions that estranged the rank and 
file, while factory councils progressively grew into bureaucratic structures, seeding 
distrust among workers. On a wider level, the pervasive use of short time work froze 
the Italian labour market, increasing barriers to entry for first-time job seekers. The 
strong income maintenance afforded by the CIG - compared to the lack of alternative 
assistance for the unemployed - led to strong criticism against the unions and blue-
collar workers of large factories, perceived by others as an overly-protected social 
class. 
By the end of the 1970s, the tensions building up within organised labour under-
mined its organisational strength, both within the factories and in Italian society at 
large.  Employers exploited the weakness of the unions to push through a more 
comprehensive restructuring of the industrial shop floor, downsizing production 
permanently and scaling back worker control over the organisation of production. 
During the 1980s, the massive use of the CIG-S disarticulated the functioning of 
plant-level union structures, impeding the unions from resisting further redundancies 
and disciplinary actions, ultimately driving down industrial conflict. Without effective 
supervision of organised labour, short time work became a way to bypass the 
otherwise tight regulation on dismissals and favour permanent workers layoffs, in 
practice configuring the CIG as an all-out surrogate of unemployment welfare. The 
demise of union power during the 1980s was an international trend, with changing 
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economic policy paradigms and the structural decline of industry mining the power of 
organised labour across advanced western economies. In Italy, the crisis of the labour 
movement was tied in with the transformation of the country’s unemployment welfare 
system and the abnormal use of short time work schemes, which accelerated worker 
demobilisation.  
In Italy, the relationship between the historical trajectory of industrial conflict 
and the development of unemployment social policy was not one of simple 
correlation, but a dialectical one. The ebbs and flows of the Italian labour movement – 
with its initial weakness during the post-war years, followed by its unchecked 
expansion – help to explain the peculiarities of the country’s unemployment 
protection model. During the 1970s, the unions attempted to reform social policy to 
make it revolve around the needs of the industrial working class. The CIG was to 
become the lynchpin of a system linking long-term job guarantee to bottom-up worker 
control over the transformation of the economic system. Facing the onset of 
deindustrialisation, however, the very nature of short time work schemes became a 
driver of structural crisis for organised labour, entangling it into a system of 
negotiations over redundancies that eroded its organisational bases. The relationship 
between industrial relations and welfare state development was characterised by a set 
of mutually interacting forces. 
The lack of state power played an important role in the demise of organised 
labour and the anomalous metamorphosis of the CIG. The institutional inadequacies 
of public authorities during the 1970s hampered the pattern of corporatist negotiation 
between organised interest groups, with the state unable to broker a balanced political 
exchange between capital and labour, failing to connect the use of short time work 
with a proactive industrial policy. The weakness of state institutions is a common 
trope in the historical sociology of Italy – and Southern Europe in general. This thesis 
proved how industrial relations strongly influenced unemployment social policy, 
effectively driving its reform. But this work also suggests that state, however, should 
not to be perceived as unitary actor, mechanically implementing the directives of 
capital and labour, as macro-sociological theories rooted in orthodox Marxism often 
argues. Rather, institutions were characterised by a ‘relative autonomy’ vis-à-vis 
organised interest groups, with a degree of internal inconsistency. 7  The state 																																																								
7 Poulantzas, ‘The Problem of the Capitalist State’, p. 74. 
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machinery operated like a network, with its different parts responding to different 
pressures and with different short-term goals.8 This dynamic operated, horizontally, at 
the central level, between different ministries, but also vertically, between national 
and local authorities, particularly in regard to the management of industrial policy.  
This thesis also offers broader theoretical implications for the study of the 
welfare state in twentieth-century Europe, showing how the history of labour relations 
and industrial organisation can shed new light on the post-war development of social 
policy. Nesting the welfare state within the factory shop floor offers the possibility to 
relate more closely state policies and the world of work, opening new pathways to 
understand the mutual interaction between social policy, industrial relations and 
workers’ everyday lives, beyond the narrow institutional viewpoint of existing 
analyses. This thesis has done so by concentrating on unemployment protection, the 
social policy instrument most closely related to the working of the capitalist labour 
market. Further research might explore other welfare mechanisms, offering a more 
comprehensive 'history from below' of the Italian welfare state.   
 
 
 
 
  
																																																								
8 Bob Jessop, The State: Past, Present, Future (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), pp. 164-186. 
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